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Foreword 
The use of original case studies for teaching and learning has a long 
history . Some institutions base a substantial part of their curricula on the 
case method . In the social services too, case analysis has occupied a key 
position in preparing practitioners to assume professional responsibilities 
in social agencies . Paradoxically, the professional literature is largely 
barren of useful cases. Student recording of organizational experiences, 
on the other hand, is almost universally required . 
In this volume, a serious and informed observer has undertaken the 
task of preparing detailed and pointed but concise case studies . A sophis-
ticated social scientist, he conducted a series of interviews and observa-
tions with leading management actors in a variety of human service orga-
nizations, and distilled the most relevant behaviors in order to cast light 
on the inner workings of organizational leadership . Dr. Young has here 
moved successfully between the shoals of too great brevity and too elabo-
rate detail, with a view to making each case situation available for ready 
discussion and analysis. 
While stressing entrepreneurship, these studies deal with a variety of 
aspects of organizational life and touch upon a number of social policy is-
sues. They provide vivid material on innovation, change and organiza-
tional growth, detailing constraints and opportunities grasped by creative 
and skilled executives . The settings of the studies differ in a number of 
ways . Those who have an interest in understanding the problems of 
serving children will find a rich lode of professional insight. Others will 
recognize problems and dilemmas faced by their organizations . Students 
will find rich material for reflection and study, for here are live, "real" 
people, many known widely in the field . 
The individual studies concentrate on a special aspect of executive 
leadership- the entrepreneurial spirit, exploring and seizing opportuni-
ties for establishing and extending human services . In this sense they deal 
with particular ways of engineering organizational change. 
Teachers will welcome these recorded experiences for use in the hu-
man service classroom. Administrators will find an abundance of illustra-
tion of principles of management practice. 
This volume is an important contribution to the social organizational 
ix 
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literature. One hopes it will stimulate others to pursue the example here 
provided. 
Simon Slavin 
Editor, Administration in Social Work 
Professor of Social Administration 
and Founding Dean Emeritus 
Temple University 
Preface 
Case studies have long been a mainstay of education for management 
of organizations in the commercial sector of the economy. Theory and 
methods courses are essential too, but the idea behind case studies is that. 
the overall complexity and richness of management problems and life in 
organizations can best be appreciated and understood by experiencing 
them- if not directly then at least through the eyes of others as related 
through case material. 
In the area of human services, case material has not, to this point in 
time, been commonly available or commonly used . One reason for this is 
that education for human services has put much less emphasis on manage-
ment and administration than has education for business, or education for 
government for that matter. The human services , largely concentrated in 
the nonprofit sector of the economy, are administered by specialized pro-
fessionals, highly trained in the treatment or technical methodologies of 
their disciplines- social work, health care, education, the arts - with 
normally just a smattering of management training added in. 
This is changing . Human service organizations ·in the current economy 
of scarce resources and efficiency-minded funding sources have come to 
realize the importance of good management. And education programs for 
the human services are beginning to put greater emphasis on rigorous 
managerial training. Indeed, health administration, arts administration, 
and other areas of human services administration have begun to develop 
into important and self-contained specialties in their own right. 
Which brings us back .to case studies . Those who are now being edu-
cated for administration in the human services require case materials 
drawn from these service areas, as existing materials from the business or 
government sectors can be stretched only so far in order to portray the 
kinds of experiences human services administrators will face . The collec-
tion of cases presented in this volume is intended to address the present 
lacuna. 
These cases are addressed to particular aspects of human services man-
agement- the processes of new program development and the manage-
ment of organizational change. There is particular emphasis here on en-
trepreneurial activity, that is, enterprising behavior by administrators and 
other leaders of human service organizations . Thus, just as in the com-
mercial sector, entrepreneurs or enterprising individuals are seen as linch-
pins or catalytic agents that help set important organizational changes and 
xi 
xii CASEBOOK OF MANAGEMENT FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
program developments in motion, and are largely responsible for their 
successful implementation. This too, is a view that has been neglected in 
the education of human service administrators, heretofore, and which 
needs to become a part of such curricula in the future . 
The cases here are not widely spread over all areas of human services. 
Indeed they are concentrated largely on developments in child welfare , 
though this is broadly construed to encompass not only foster care but 
also management information systems, mental health care, education, 
preventive and community-based services, management consulting , diag-
nostic service programs, programs for runaway youth, and general youth 
programming. Generically, however, the cases deal with a wide array of 
types of organizational change, ranging from development of new pro-
grams to the birth of new organizations , the merger of organizations, and 
the expansion and diversification of the service offerings of various agen-
cies. Moreover, the cases touch on many other intrinsic aspects of organi-
zational administration including management of professionals and other 
staff, working with trustees, financing of programs through government 
and private sources, coping with governmental regulatory processes, and 
managing relationships with organizational clients and constituent 
groups. The cases also cut across sector lines; while most of the cases are 
based in the nonprofit sector, three .cases are drawn from the governmen-
tal sector, as well. Thus, the cases are believed to have a very wide band 
of application for human service administrators not only in social ser-
vices, but in other professional services areas as well . 
The cases were originally developed as part of a research project on 
entrepreneurship in nonprofit organizations, under sponsorship of the 
Program on Non-Profit Organizations in the Institution for Social and 
Policy Studies of Yale University . The cases contributed to a theory of 
nonprofit organizational behavior' and have since been refined as teach-
ing material, successfully tested in courses in nonprofit organizational 
management at the State University of New York at Stony Brook and at 
Yale University . As they are written in nontechnical, easy-to-read lan-
guage, students enjoy them and digest them quickly. They seem to be 
most effectively used as the basis of open seminar-style discussions of 
particular issues or lessons the instructor may wish to draw from a given 
case. As the introductory chapter indicates. the possible choices for such 
topics are manifold, and thus the cases quite flexibly inserted into the 
menus of management courses in a variety of ways. However, there is 
also great value in allowing the cases to speak for themselves . Having 
read the cases, students often come up with their own interpretations and 
ideas on what might have happened or what should have been done in the 
'Young, D. R. ( 1983) If not for profit, for what? Lcxinglon, MA : Lcxinglon Dooks. 
Preface xiii 
circumstances described. As a teacher, I have often found that the most 
interesting way to use the cases is to keep my own preconceived notions 
in check, and to allow the interchange among intelligent graduate stu-
dents to take its own course . 
Dennis R . Young 
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Introduction 
Since 'tis Nature's law to change, 
Constancy alone is strange 
-John Wilmot , Earl of Rochester (17th Century) 
An important strand of the theory and literature on organizations and 
bureaucracy centers on the notion that formal organizations permit soci-
ety to carry out its ongoing functions more efficiently by structuring work 
into programmed tasks and sequences. By extension, the management of 
such organizations can be viewed as a routine control and support func-
tion-- pushing the right buttons, making the right corrections, providing 
regular supervision and administrative services, and so on , so that organi-
zations continue to operate smoothly and reliably in a steady state. No 
doubt, mastery of the routine aspects of administration arc essential to 
successful organizational management. But routine administration is by 
no means the most interesting nor even the most important part of effec-
tive organizational management, in the human services or elsewhere in 
the economy . 
It is perhaps trite to indicate that human service agencies, like organi-
zations in other industries , are dynamic entities. They must adapt to 
changes in their social and economic environments and they must re-
spond to the advance of professional knowledge and scientific technol-
ogy . To stand still in a changing world is to invite organizational disaster. 
Thus a key to successful management , especially in the long run, is the 
understanding of how and why organizations undertake change and how 
changes in programs and organizational structure can be effectively de-
veloped and administered . Indeed, the appropriate image of a successful 
manager may be less that of controller and facilitator of routine services , 
than that of leader and entrepreneur- a person who can chart a clear and 
confidence-inspiring course for his organization and pull together the var-
ious elements needed to implement such plans successfully . In the human 
services particularly , the entrepreneurial role has not been well under-
stood . Narrowly interpreted, the term "entrepreneur" conjures up images 
of profit making and wheeling and dealing for purposes of self-interest. 
But as the cases in this volume graphically illustrate, there is much more 
to it than this. Entrepreneuring in the human services involves a wide va-
riety of motivations - selfish and unselfish- and it is a functjon that is 
essential to the ability of human service organizations to carry out their 
acknowledged, legitimate societal missions . 
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It is worth a note of clarification to mention that while entrepreneur-
ship is central to managing an organization's successful adaptation to 
change, entrepreneurship is not precisely congruent with the responsibili-
ties of executive leadership. Entrepreneurship entails identifying a new 
concept or idea, e.g., a new service to be offered or a new way of provid-
ing an existing service, garnering resources and support, planning and 
advocating, and overseeing implementation of a venture-in short, doing 
whatever is necessary to move a project from concept to reality. Execu-
tive leadership, in contrast, entails a much more general set of responsi-
bilities, for organizational change, as well as for organizational mainte-
nance and stability. 
To expand on this point, various routine or day-to-day aspects of or-
ganizational life must be tended to by executives-much of this routine 
activity legitimately characterized as leadership . For instance, a top exec-
utive must serve as a good role model for his subordinates, personifying 
enthusiasm, proper work habits, and style so as to maintain employees' 
morale through exhortation and example, and to convey the organiza-
tion's values and ideology (what recent writers on corporate management 
have called superordinate goals). 
To the contrary, entrepreneurship, a nonroutine function, while it 
clearly involves leadership behavior, can to an extent be delegated by ex-
ecutives to other staff members by granting them sufficient autonomy and 
resources . Board members or trustees may also involve themselves in en-
terprising activity on behalf of the organization. Some staff may even 
specialize in entrepreneurial projects rather than routine administrative re-
sponsibilities, just as some executives may farm out as much routine ad-
ministration as possible so as to concentrate on enterprising . (See the 
GLIE and Sanctuary cases for contrasting examples.) 
In short, entrepreneurship and executive leadership are not full coinci-
dent: Entrepreneurs in an organization may not be executives, though 
they are leaders in a general sense, and executives may not be entrepre-
neurs. However, as an empirical matter, the correlation between the two 
roles is strong. And one thing seems certain-successful executive man-
agement of human service organizations in a dynamic world requires that 
the entrepreneurial function be adt:quately provided for, one way or an-
other. Such provision may entail direct and intensive executive involve-
ment in enterprising activity, as in the cases of Greer and GLIE presented 
here, or it may involve, as in the Huntington Sanctuary case, establishing 
an effective organizational regime within which the executive can encour-
age, nurture, control, and otherwise facilitate new ventures undertaken 
by staff. 
How then can the management of entrepreneurship and organizational 
change be learned? Probably not very well through textbooks or even case 
studies. Experience is always the best teacher. However, as an initial ex-
posure, case studies do have the distinct advantage of relating the actual 
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experiences of real administrators and managers and other leaders who 
have been responsible for carrying out important projects that have al-
tered the faces of organizations, brought new organizations into exis-
tence, and have had significant effects and implications for the industries 
in which they have taken place. Learning the lessons embedded in these 
cases should help aspiring managers and even those with some manage-
rial experience to embark on their own ventures with some confidence 
and awareness of the principles they should apply, the factors they should 
be aware of, and the pitfalls and opportunities that may lie ahead. Perhaps 
such study will reduce some of the "trial" in the unavoidably trial-and-
error process of mastering this subject, and will help to minimize the 
prospects of failure, either failure by commission of strategic errors, or 
failure to recognize or exploit circumstances where enterprising activity 
is appropriate or opportune. 
Before fleshing out some of the perspectives and management lessons 
on which instructors may wish to have their students focus their atten-
tions and discussions, a few words on the selection and structure of the 
cases themselves is in order. Since the human services are delivered pri-
marily through public and private nonprofit organizations, and because 
the objective of this volume is to provide educational material illuminat-
ing the management of change in primarily professional rather than com-
mercial contexts, the cases here are confined to public and nonprofit 
enterprise. Moreover, the balance of cases take place in the private, non-
profit sector where the dearth of managerial case studies has been partic-
ularly acute. It should be noted, however, that all but one of the private, 
nonprofit cases involve considerable interaction with government, and 
that virtually all of the cases reflect the importance of the government-
voluntary sector relationships that pervade delivery of human services in 
the U.S .-relationships that human service managers must deal with, no 
matter what the sector to which their organizations formally belong . 
The cases are grouped into four categories and subcategories according 
to the type of venture, and· the particular sector of the economy within 
which a case takes place . Most of the cases (11 in all) take place in the 
private, nonprofit sector and within this collection cases involve three dif-
ferent types of activity: the founding of new organizations from scratch; 
the founding of new organizations under the wing of existing or parent 
agencies; and the development of major new programs or expansion of 
activities by existing organizations . 
Three cases of human service ventures in the government sector are 
also presented . These provide some perspective on differences in incen-
tives, constraints, motivations, problems, and opportunities, between 
government and the private, nonprofit sector. One of the public sector 
cases concerns the establishment of a new organization (youth bureau); 
the other two focus on the development of new programs within the con-
text of existing organizations. As indicated in the Preface, all the cases 
4 CASEBOOK OF MANAGEMENT FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
cluster in the general field of child welfare but range very widely in terms 
of particular services and programs within this field. Moreover, as elabo-
rated below, the cases concentrate on generic management problems and 
aspects of organizational change that appl.y to a very wide spectrum of or-
ganizations dealing with professional or human services. 
A comment on the methodology of construction of the cases is in order 
at this point. As noted in the Preface, the cases originally contributed to a 
theoretical study of behavior of nonprofit organizations. 1 In that context, 
a variety of different types of ventures, along the lines noted above, were 
sought. Through various types of (formal and informal) inquiry, organi-
zations which had exhibited each variety of venture (establishing a new 
organization, developing a new program, etc .) within recent memory 
were identified . The rationale was that cases that had transpired recently 
would offer better access to the principal actors involved, greater accu-
racy of memory of these actors, and greater availability of written docu-
mentation. 
Ultimately twenty-one cases were identified in organizations whose 
decision-makers agreed to cooperate. (All of these cases were written up. 
Three took place in the proprietary sector. Fourteen of the remaining 
eighteen cases were selected for this volume.) In each case, as many of 
the principal actors as possible were interviewed extensively by the au-
thor. Interviews were tape-recorded and later transcribed . Available writ-
ten materials such as annual reports, minutes, proposals and other docu-
ments were studied as well, and, where possible, outside observers were 
also consulted . The cases were each written up in draft form and circu-
lated to those interviewed to check accuracy. and subsequently revised 
and edited . As presented here, the cases provide the available facts, the 
views of the principal actors, and the author's suggested interpretation 
and explanation of events. 
In order to facilitate comparative discussion and analysis of the cases, 
they are all structured into a uniform format. Each case is divided into 
nine sections, each of which describes a particular dimension to the case, 
as follows: 
Precis. This is a short overview summarizing what the venture is, 
when and where it took place, and a brief glimpse of its character. 
The Entrepreneur( s). This section brietly introduces the key partici-
pants and indicates some of the history, skills, philosophy, and motiva-
tions of these individuals. 
The Organization(s). Here an overview is given of the organi7.ational 
context in which the venture takes place . This includes characterization of 
the parent organization(s)~if the venture is a new internal program, 
'Young, D. R. (1983) If not for profit, forwhat?Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
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spin-off, or a merger- and if applicable, a description of the new organi-
zation . 
Chronology of Events. This is simply a list in chronological order of 
the key events leading to and culminating in the implementation of the 
venture at issue. This section is intended to serve as a convenient refer-
ence for the reader, to guide him in tracking the sequence of events. 
Context . This section discusses the social context in which the venture 
takes place . This includes demographic, economic, and social trends, as 
well as developments in the professional disciplines that served as stimu-
lative and long-run determining factors influencing the case. 
Choices . This section describes the strategic choices facing the manag-
ers and entrepreneurs in the case, the alternatives they considered, and 
the reasons they selected particular courses of act,ion . 
Risks and Constraints. Here the professional, personal, organizational, 
and financial risks facing decision-makers are described and assessed, 
and the financial, regulatory, bureaucratic, political, and other constrain-
ing factors that inhibited the venture's implementation or affected its 
form, are identified and discussed . 
Outcomes. This section tells what ultimately came of the venture, as of 
a given cutoff date (approximately mid-1979) when documentation was 
completed. Some sense of the ultimate success or failure of the venture 
can be gleaned from this presentation . 
Analysis. This is a brief discussion that brings together various aspects 
of the case and suggests a way to crystallize and summarize why the ven-
ture took place in its particular form and circumstances. A sense of the 
overall "chemistry" required to carry off the venture is indicated here. 
LESSONS AND PERSPECTIVES 
What is the student of management and administration in the human 
services to learn from these cases? To answer this question, let us begin 
with the premise previously stated that successfully managing a human 
service organization requires the ability to guide and inspire program-
matic and organizational change, not only the ability to ride out stonns 
and trends in the organizational environment but perhaps more importantly 
to anticipate requirements for change and to lead an organization through 
constructive adaptations in advance of debilitating crises. This ability in 
tum requires that the manager have: ( 1) a good understanding of how and 
why major changes in organizations take place and what factors shape 
the outcomes of efforts to change, and (2) a mastery of strategies and 
techniques and a knowledge of the prerequisites for successfully imple-
menting and managing change. In the following few pages, an overview 
of the perspectives and lessons that can be drawn from the cases will be 
presented . The intent here is to identify some of the important points 
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instructors may wish to emphasize and have discussed by their students . 
There is no claim of comprehensiveness here, however. Each case is suf-
ficiently rich in detail that instructors or students are likely to draw many 
other perspectives, interpretations , and management lessons of general 
value on the subject of change or on other managerial questions such as 
management styles, organizational relationships, and so on. Indeed this 
flexibility represents much of the educational value of case studies per se. 
The cases are meant to be provocative and to challenge the reader, but 
neither the following discussion nor even the analyses presented in each 
of the cases constitute the last word. Rather, this material is meant to be 
suggestive, and perhaps a good jumping off point from which further 
discussion can take place . 
General Perspectives on How and Why Change Takes Place 
At least four different lessons may be drawn from the cases here on the 
subject of why and when major changes take place in human service or-
ganizations . These lessons repeat themselves throughout the cases, but 
here we shall highlight only a few important instances . 
The first important perspective is that changes often occlir as part of a 
process of solving an important internal organizational problem. The sec-
ond perspective is that changes are driven by entrepreneurs who are in the 
right place at the right time and devote great amounts of energy to the 
project, for a variety of strong personal motives . The third perspective is 
that changes at the organization level usually reflect trends and long-term 
developments in the social, economic, and technological environment of 
the organization . Fourth, change often reflects the crystallization of some 
important, new idea. 
Problem Solving 
A pessimist could survey the cases in this book and observe that organ-
izational crises are the seedbed of change and that unfortunately organiza-
tional managers and trustees tend not to see far enough ahead to head off 
such crises with reforms earlier on . An optimist on the other hand, would 
note that severe crises often allow organizations to change in ways that 
make them much stronger and healthier in the end . Both perspectives 
seem to have strong elements of truth . Financial crises and related diffi-
culties with the quality and workload of organizational services are prom-
inent among the cases and seem often to be at the root of impending 
change. For example, Seabury Bam, a residential program for runaway 
youth sponsored by the Smith Haven Ministries (SHM), was a compro-
mise component of a package proposal to a state funding agency designed 
to shore up the Ministries financial condition and allow it to honor its se-
rious debt obligations. 
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Sometimes financial problems are tied closely to workload problems. 
Characteristic of many charitable organizations, Smith Haven Ministries 
and the Group Child Care Consultant Services {GCCCS) were overex-
tended in terms of the services they wanted to provide their needy clien-
tele, compared to the resources that were available to provide these ser-
vices. A new program and a reorganization followed from these 
circumstances, respectively. The Harlem-Dowling program sponsored by 
the Spence-Chapin organization was also inspired in part by an economic 
overburden the agency faced with its foster care program, and a desire to 
avoid having its foster care program overwhelm the main agenda of adop-
tion and research and demonstration programs that Spence-Chapin con-
sidered its principal mission. 
Quality problems sometimes couple with financial difficulties to in-
spire change. The two spectacular examples of the Florida Sheriffs Youth 
Fund and Greer-Woodycrest Children's Services illustrate how the great-
est successes in organizational growth, development, modernization, and 
efficiency, can follow from the depths of physical plant and service dete-
rioration and management stagnation . Greer and Florida Sheriffs are clas-
sic "turnaround" situations. 
Finally, serious "image" problems tha.t impair and threaten an organi-
zation's relationships with its supporters and constituents may be seen to 
inspire change. In the case of Greer, the perception of low quality by state 
regulators was a serious blow and impetus to reform. In the case of Flor-
ida Sheriffs, it was the poor public image of the sheriffs as law-enforce-
ment officials that prompted their organization to get into the business of 
helping troubled youth. And in the case of the Pleasantville Diagnostic 
Center of the Jewish Child Care Association {JCCA), the perceptions of 
New York City officials and others in the child care community, that 
JCCA, especially its Pleasantville campus, was an institution only for 
well-behaved, white Jewish children, stung at a time when the social pri-
orities required service to troubled minority children. In all these in-
stances, the image problem contributed to an impetus to do something to 
reverse those outside perceptions, perceptions which represented a seri-
ous long run threat to the viability of the organizations involved. 
Entrepreneurs 
It is impossible to read the cases here without realizing that the ener-
gies, drives, and skills of entrepreneuring managers or other leaders are 
crucial to the formulation, launching, implementation, and nurturing of 
new programs and organizations. It is clear in many of the cases that the 
particular organizational changes might never have occurred without the 
right entrepreneurial characters in place at the particular time. For exam-
ple, the Group Live-In Experience (GLIE) in the South Bronx, the Saga-
more outpatient program, and the Melville House on Long Island, are 
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special and unusual programs that are uniquely associated with particular 
social entrepreneurs and seem unlikely to have come into existence with-
out them. There seems to be no inevitability surrounding such innova-
tions, and without their entrepreneurial roots there seems to be no reason 
to believe that something like them would have sprung up in a proximate 
time and place . 
In other cases, where alternate ventures might have filled in the vacant 
market niches, the entrepreneurs clearly put their individual stamps on 
the character of the programs they inspired, and at the least could be cred-
ited with ventures their organizations would not otherwise have under-
taken or succeeded in. Greer, for example, or Florida Sheriffs Youth 
Fund, might not have survived at all, much less develop into the organi-
zational pathbreakers they eventually became, were it not for the fortu-
itous employment of Harry Weaver and Ian Morrison, respectively, at 
crucial times in the histories of these organizations . While in cases such 
as the Child Welfare Information Service, the Sanctuary Program of the 
Huntington Youth Bureau, and the Brookhaven Youth Bureau, it seems 
clear that some programs like these would eventually have come along 
(with other leaders at the helm), the expediency with which they did de-
velop, and the particular form they took, derived much of their substance 
from the ideas and energies of the entrepreneurial characters, Joe Gavrin, 
Andy Casazza, and Tom Williams, respectively. 
Finally, it is of interest to note that the opportunity to make money or 
to gain other material rewards is not necessarily the essential or even most 
common motivation underlying enterprising behavior in the human ser-
vices. Contrary to the stereotypical concept of the entrepreneur, financial 
return is not the sole engine of venture even in the profit-making sector, 
and certainly not in the not-for-profit parts of the economy. A perusal of 
the cases here reveals that motivations vary widely. They include: artis-
tic-like urges to build and create; the seeking of status or inner satisfac-
tion from professional achievement and accomplishment; a psychological 
need to test oneself and prove that one is capable of carrying off a major 
project or program; pursuit of innate desires to help, teach, or serve the 
less fortunate members of society; intellectual satisfaction from shaping 
and implementing new ideas; the achievement of personal recognition, 
power, and social status; the urge to control people and events; the fulfill-
ment of strong social or religious beliefs or causes; a desire for autonomy 
and independence (to be one's own boss); maternal-like satisfactions of 
parenting an enterprise and seeing it grow; and material security and gain . 
Thus the entrepreneurs encountered in the cases here are quite a diverse 
group, ranging from the grandiose builders like Bert Beck, Jay Gold-
smith, and Ian Morrison to the outspoken and unencumbered firebrand 
Lorraine Reilly, to the soft-spoken, behind-the-scenes facilitators like Joe 
Gavrin and Peter Ryan, to the persistent idealists like Tom Williams and 
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Ken Goldman, to the highly professional achievers Jane Edwards, Andy 
Casazza, and Mary Hagamen, to the very businesslike Harry Weaver, to 
the almost reluctant enterpriser and devoted educator in the person of 
Alan Keith-Lucas . But this diversity of motives and styles belies certain 
strong common traits that bind these entrepreneurial characters to-
gether- the intense energies and commitments they have exhibited in 
pursuing their objectives in clear, single-minded, and opportune fashion. 
1'he Environment 
While each venture is impressive and somewhat unique in its own 
right, each case may also been seen as a current or eddy in a stream of 
social, economic, and technological change. No organization changes in 
a vacuum, and most organizational changes signal larger changes taking 
place in the environment. Thus, while individual ventures and program 
developments may not be inevitable manifestations of environmental 
trends, at the very least these ventures tend to blossom when develop-
ments in that environment signal that "their time has come." 
Technological change, for example, is reflected in the case of the 
Child Welfare Information Service (CWIS) where the advent of the com-
puter makes inevitable improved information processing for management 
of child care agencies in the New York City system, and prompts the 
agencies to take initiative in this direction . Or, in the case of the Saga-
more Outpatient Clinic, new professional knowledge of mental retarda-
tion and autism in children influenced the development of new, noninsti-
tutional services . 
Changes in the economic environment also have a strong influence in 
prompting enterprising behavior. In the instance of Harlem-Dowling, for 
example, the New York City fiscal crisis severely depressed the per diem 
rates which the City could pay for child care, at first delaying the possibil -
ity of launching this new agency, but eventually creating such strains on 
the parent agency (Spence-Chapin) that cutting the new agency loose be-
came imperative. 
Demographic trends may be seen to underlie much of the economic 
pressure that influences the development of new ventures in the human 
services . In the case of the Jewish Board of Family and Children's Ser-
vices (JBFCS), a merger of two Jewish agencies in New York City re-
flected the need for services consolidation in a region where the Jewish 
population was declining. By contrast, the case of Florida Sheriffs Youth 
Fund illustrates how a venture can ride a demographic trend to prosperity, 
in this instance, the growing elderly population in Florida which gener-
ated a strong element of voluntary contributions through estate planning. 
Demographic change may be observed to have a much more pervasive 
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influence on enterprise in human services than just what is felt through di-
rect economic effects . The increase in the youth population in Brook-
haven Town, for example, was a major justification for the establishment 
of the Youth Bureau in that location while that same trend in nearby 
Huntington Town and surrounding Suffolk County underlay the develop-
ments of the Sanctuary program in Huntington and Smith Haven Minis-
tries' Seabury Barn, respectively. Similarly the turnover of youth and 
family populations in New York City, featuring a large influx of racial 
minorities, played a large part in stimulating the program developments 
of Greer-Woodycrcst Children's Services, Pleasantville Diagnostic Cen-
ter, Harlem-Dowling, and other cases in this volume . 
Other kinds of social changes also influence organizational enterprise 
in important ways . The growing phenomenon of runaway youth in the 
1960s and 1970s, for example, was a direct antecedent of the programs 
presented in the GLIE, Sanctuary, and Seabury Barn case studies . And 
the deterioration of urban centers such as the South Bronx or the Lower 
East Side of New York helped inspire the GLIE and Lower East Side 
Family Union (LESFU) projects. Finally, important shifts in the role and 
character of government social services policies overtime underlie a num-
ber of the changes described in the case studies. Demands for greater ac-
countability in the public sector, for example, directly influenced the de-
velopment of projects like CWIS which would provide better information 
to monitor child care agencies under contract to government, while the 
deinstitutionalization movements in mental health and retardation, social 
services, and criminal justice, which deemphasized residential care in fa-
vor of services delivered in the community, underwrote elements of the 
GLIE, Sagamore, and LESFU cases. 
In short, it is almost always necessary to ask where an individual ven-
ture fits into the "big picture" of social, economic, and technical change, 
in order to obtain a comprehens've understanding of why a given enter-
prise developed in the particular time, place, and form that it did . Even 
where particular ventures seem to buck the trends, such as the Florida 
Sheriffs Youth Fund case, which grew solely on private, philanthropic 
funding ai a time when dependence of social service agencies on govern-
ment funds was generally dramatically increasing, they can be under-
stood by studying the local context, in this case, the growing elderly 
population and the political conservatism of Florida. 
Ideas 
It is striking how often the strength of simple but profound new ideas 
or concepts serve to inspire and crystallize program developments. Such 
ideas may capture the essential purpose or character of ventures, hence 
their articulation gives the participating parties the vision they need to 
push the enterprise forward and rally its supporters. A few examples will 
suffice to illustrate this phenomenon . In the Child Welfare Information 
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Service case, the idea that "information is power" played an important 
motivating role, and the desire for shared control over such infonnation 
underlay much of the energy for the child care agencies to develop a man-
agement information system of their own before the government devel-
oped one in which they would have little part . In the Huntington Sanctu-
ary, Brookhaven Youth Bureau, LESFU, and JBFCS cases, the "model" 
of a comprehensive mental health or social service delivery system that 
coordinates various kinds of services from different sources or divisions 
provided the essential design principle by which these enterprises were 
developed. In the case of LESFU and Harlem-Dowling, the concept of 
social service agencies having to be firmly rooted into the local communi-
tics and populations they service also played a central inspirational role. 
Professional concepts, reflecting current disciplinary thinking in social 
work, mental health, and related fields provide the intellectual cores 
around which various other programmatic developments grow. For exam-
ple, the idea of comprehensive problem diagnosis prior to foster care 
placement formed the conceptual foundation for the Pleasantville ven-
ture, while the concepts of deinstitutionalization and preventive services 
clearly influenced the Sagamore and LESFU developments. 
Reform strategies also may constitute the central idea. In the case of 
Sagamore Children's Center, Mary Hagamen devised the "inside/out" no-
tion to convert the center from inpatient to outpatient emphasis over time, 
while in the Pleasantville case, Jake Trobe saw the diagnostic center as a 
"foot in the door" that would eventually turn the program emphasis of the 
whole agency around. In both these cases, the entrepreneurs worked with 
an explicit concept of incremental or evolutionary reform, envisioning 
how their initial projects would set in motion a long-term sequence of 
constructive change. 
In short, the context of organizational problems, the presence of entre-
preneurial energies, skills, and motivation; trends in the social, eco-
nomic, and technological environment; and the conception and articula-
tion of key ideas seem to constitute much of the basic chemistry leading 
to important organizational changes and program developments . For the 
human services manager it is well to be able to recognize these circum-
stances and prerequisites if one is to be capable of fostering change by 
planting the seeds of reform into fertile soil. But what of the nurturing of 
these seeds and resultant seedlings? What lessons can we draw from the 
cases, for the successful management of change? We turn to this question 
next . 
Principles of Managing Change 
There are of course no cookbook solutions to successfully carrying off 
the development of a major programmatic or organizational enterprise. 
Every venture is different and of necessity a large degree of adaptation 
and "learning while doing" must take place, even for seasoned managers 
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and leaders in longstanding organizations. But a perusal of the cases here 
reveals a surprising number of common principles and lessons that seem 
to underlie success, and these seem worth fleshing out for consideration: 
( 1) Styles of administration must be adapted to fit the circumstances. 
Most managers and leaders have their own personal styles of administra-
tion. Some prefer tight centralized control and others put more emphasis 
on delegation of responsibilities and decentralized control. Some prefer 
expansion and development of large organizations , and others lean to 
spinning off new programs as autonomous units, and so on . Similarly, 
organizations develop their own cultures, policies, and styles of adminis-
tration over time, which may reflect their size, diversity, age, sources of 
support, and programmatic objectives . Certainly a wide variety of organi-
zational structures and administrative styles is reflected in the fourteen 
cases presented here. 
It is interesting, however, that the form in which new program devel-
opments are administered is not always consistent either with the intrinsic 
preferences of the guiding entrepreneur nor with the historical style of the 
organization in which the developments take place. Rather, the styles and 
strategies for new developments often seem to follow an internal logic 
dictated by the intrinsic concepts and environmental circumstances in 
which they are built. 
There are several noteworthy examples of this in the cases here. Har-
lem-Dowling was an embryonic program in the Spence-Chapin agency 
whose executive style was tight central control. Yet the logic of the pro-
gram, its ability to function as an indigenous agency to the Harlem com-
munity, required a loosening of such control and eventually a letting go 
entirely . It took discipline on the part of the guiding executive, Jane 
Edwards, to allow this to happen. A similar case in point is LESFU, a 
program also built on the concept of indigenous local operation and on 
the principle of coordinating packages of social services from a number 
of different local social service organizations . Yet LESFU started out as a 
program within the Henry Street Settlement under direction of Bert Beck 
whose intrinsic preferences were to maintain and expand the repertoire of 
programs under his direct jurisdiction. However, the logic of the program 
and the cooperation of other local agencies dictated otherwise. Again, 
Beck had the insight and discipline to let go . 
In various other cases, there is more harmony between the logic andre-
quirements of the fledgling program and the intrinsic preferences of the 
entrepreneur or the style of the parent agency . Joe Gavrin, for example, 
was perfectly happy to move the CWIS program outside of his Council on 
Voluntary Child Care Agencies (COVCCA) both as a logical step in its 
development and as a way of keeping COVCCA in the small and infor-
mal style he preferred . And Jay Goldsmith was content, even enthusiastic, 
to decentralize the JBFCS in order to make management of this very large 
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new agency more viable. So too, the expansiv'e style of Ian Morrison fit 
the strategy of expansion through merger on which his agency was em-
barked . In still other cases, however, the reluctance of the entrepreneur to 
adapt his or her management style to what the program change appeared 
to require seemed to cause problems. Alan Keith-Lucas's reluctance to 
get too heavily involved in administration may have held back the needed 
formalization of GCCCS, for example, when that agency was growing 
quickly and running into substantial financial and other management dif-
ficulties. And, while the fierce, antibureaucratic rebellious style of Mary 
Hagamen served her well when her program was in vogue and outside 
funding was available, it may have come back to haunt her when the cir-
cumstances changed and the bureaucrats were back in the driver's seat. 
A relevant aside here is that the complex and multifaceted require-
ments for management and entrepreneurial leadership may sometimes be 
divided into subspecialities, allowing the skills and styles of alternative 
officers to better match the requirements of the job to be done. In several 
cases here, this takes the form of having a "Mr. Outside" and a "Mr. In-
side." For example, in the Pleasantville case, Jake Trobe is the dominant 
figure in dealing with the outside world and with his agency 's overall 
governance and administration, but Paul Steinfeld is given the responsi-
bility for implementing the project itself and running it on a day-to-day 
basis. Similarly, in the Harlem-Dowling case, Jane Edwards is the head 
honcho but Joe Smith is given responsibility for laying the groundwork in 
the Harlem community, and initially implementing and running the pro-
gram. In these cases and others, the chief executives were able to orga-
nize themselves in a manner which met the projects ' requirements with-
out cramping their personal administrative styles. In the case of LESFU, 
on the other hand, finding an adequate Mr. Inside proved to be a problem. 
In short, entrepreneurs may be able to pick and choose their ventures, 
and organize their agencies, in a manner consistent with their administra-
tive and leadership styles, but sometimes the intrinsic concepts behind the 
innovation being implemented, or particular stages in the development of 
those projects, require adaptation and rethinking of administrative strate-
gies to ensure continued success. 
(2) Managing change requires sensitivity to staff, trustees, and consti-
tuents. 
Change is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to 
better. 
- Richard Hooker, in the "English Dictionary" 
(16th Century) 
Change is, by definition, disruptive. In human service organizations it 
affects the welfare of a number of important groups ·of participants-
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staff, trustees, clients, and the like. Given that successful implementation 
of change usually requires (at least the passive) cooperation of these par-
ticipants, an important tenet in the management of change is to deal sensi-
tively with them-bringing them along in partnership, or at least making 
them aware of why certain painful adjustments or compromises need to 
be made; giving credit for their support and sacrifice; distributing benefits 
and costs in a manner that is perceived as fair and reasonable; and re-
specting existing loyalties, sentimentalities, and personal principles 
where possible. 
Certain of the cases present examples of such sensitive behavior in 
clear terms. The JBFCS case involved the merger of two agencies with 
long traditions, loyal staff and boards members, and ties to their client 
communities. Most of the energy in carrying out the merger was spent on 
working out arrrangcments that would minimize the dislocations and re-
lieve the anxieties of those involved, while still accomplishing the consol-
idation objectives. Meetings, discussions, training sessions, protocols for 
allocating positions on the board and staff, "massaging personalities," 
and paying meticulous attention to the language employed to describe 
what was being done- for example emphasizing the concept of a "mar-
riage of equals"- dominated the proceedings . Even so, the proposed 
merger almost failed because of sensitive feelings on both sides of the 
aisle. 
The case of the Brookhaven Youth Bureau provides another good ex-
ample of sensitive management. Here, because the program was to be im-
plemented in the local public sector, the entrepreneur Tom Williams was 
meticulous in his efforts to build bipartisan support in order to minimize 
the risks facing the council members he had gotten behind the effort. He 
was careful to give credit for the successes, however, and to propose ser-
vice patterns that benefitted alternative local jurisdictions in a balanced 
way. The Pleasantville case provides another such example, where an ex-
plicit incremental change strategy was adopted in part to bring anxious 
staff members along slowly, rather than to try to impose a sudden radical 
shift in clientele upon them. 
The Harlem-Dowling case is even more intriguing in this respect. Anx-
ieties of staff members understandably nervous about breaking away 
from the parent agency were here balanced against the growing impa-
tience of would-be board members of the new agency whose autonomy 
had been delayed . Here management had to stroke two different groups 
whose interests were at odds with one another. 
In other cases, an inadequate degree of sensitivity may have accounted 
for problems in implementing or maintaining the venture at issue . In the 
LESFU case, tensions between research- and demonstration-oriented 
management and service-oriented staff members were not very well ame-
liorated. And in the Sagamore case, inattention to the sagging morale of 
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the staff of the contracting inpatient department may have contributed to 
conditions that eventually became unstable . 
Clearly, sensitivity to affected groups cannot dominate the scenarios of 
change, else too often nothing would be done . Too many have vested in-
terests in the status quo. Hard decisions need to be made, such as in the 
Greer case where longstanding staff members had to be let go. But there-
alization that changes will be painful and that successful change can de-
pend on ameliorating that discomfort seems to be a key element in the 
successful management of major change. 
( 3) Being creative. Just as problem solving often forms the basis of en-
terprising behavior , creative solutions to problems frequently seem to 
spell the difference between the successful implementation of a venture 
and its stagnation or failure . In a number of the cases, stubborn opera-
tional difficulties threatened the viability of whole initiatives and efforts 
to develop and implement new programs. At the same time, creative 
thinking-- formulating new alternatives or new ways of approaching the 
problem- saved the day . These creative solutions, though modest in 
concept, had the common characteristic of being out of the ordinary, 
demonstrating the need for enterprisers to avoid the mental rut of always 
going by the book, but rather thinking things out afresh when conven-
tional ways of doing things do not work. 
A few examples from the cases will suffice to illustrate the point. In 
the instance of GLIE, the ordinary procedures for certifying the new 
agency had led to stalemate. Someone (Barbara Blum of the State Board 
of Social Welfare) came up with the bright idea of putting the new pro-
gram under the wing of an existing agency. The solution was obvious, but 
only in retrospect. Similarly, in the Florida Sheriffs experience, a restric-
tive trust stood in the way of plans to diversify and expand beyond pro-
grams for boys . Harry Weaver conceived the bright idea of setting up 
multiple corporations at least as a way of circumventing the restrictions in 
the short run, and as a way of demonstrating to the courts later on that the 
restrictions had to be lifted. It was not a conventional solution, but it 
worked. In the Jewish Board of Family and Children's Services case, 
there was a problem of who would become the board president of the 
newly merged agency. A Solomon-like arrangement was developed 
whereby the board presidency would go to the current board president of 
one of the merging agencies, but then shift to his counterpart in the other 
agency for a longer term after a given period of time. Unusual, but it was 
accepted . 
The managerial lesson in all of this is straightforward enough, if not so 
easy to carry out in practice: explore all the angles and don't be confined 
by the conventional ways of doing things . A simple solution to a knotty 
operational problem may mean the difference between success and fail-
ure. 
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(4) Enterprise requires risk-taking . Classically, commercial entre-
preneurship is commonly associated with risk-taking of a financial na-
ture . There is some of this kind of risk-taking in the public and nonprofit 
human services as well. In cases such as Melville House or the Brook-
haven Youth Bureau, the entrepreneurs faced personal financial sacrifice, 
at least in the short run, and put their future incomes at risk . 
Still, if the cases here are at all typical, financial risk-taking does not 
seem to be the primary gamble for those who guide new ventures and un-
dertake major programmatic change in the human services . Rather such 
individuals appear to go out on a limb in other ways, perhaps more coura-
geous ways than simply financial peril . Specifically, these leaders often 
put their professional and managerial reputations on the line, and risk the 
security of their jobs, by undertaking bold initiatives whose consequences 
cannot be fully anticipated . Moreover, the process of organizational 
change and the ·success of major new ventures seems to depend impor-
tantly on the willingness of entrepreneurs to assume such risks . 
In several of the cases, the ventures involved controversial new pro-
grams, which if they failed would invite the disdain of professional peers. 
In the Harlem-Dowling case, for example, there were more than enough 
naysayers who thought it was foolish to try to establish a new human ser-
vices agency in the rocky social soil of Harlem . As a fledgling executive 
director, Mrs . Edwards faced potential ridicule from fellow social work-
ers and loss of effectiveness as an administrator if the venture had back-
fired . Similarly, Jake Trobe and Paul Steinfeld perceived themselves as 
playing with fire in their effort to establish a diagnostic center for poten-
tially violent and disruptive children on their campus at Pleasantville. 
One serious incident might have jeopardized the project and the long-
term reform strategy it spearheaded, and would have put the future per-
sonal effectiveness of these administrators in doubt as well. The case of 
the Huntington Sanctuary program is similar. One serious incident associ-
ated with the overnight placement of a runaway youth might have under-
mined the program and had serious implications for the youth bureau 
itself. 
In other cases, the new ventures threatened to mar the reputations and 
effectiveness of the organizations and increase the managerial burdens of 
executives, because they introduced complexity into existing administra-
tion arrangements . In the case of Seabury Bam, an additional program in 
an area where the organization had no experience (residential care) was 
being grafted onto an organi7.ation (SHM) which already was straining to 
hold itself together . Yet this new program promised financial salvation 
and necessitated the risk. In the Florida Sheriffs case, Harry Weaver set 
up multiple corporations for his different campus programs, gambling 
that the courts would strike down the restrictive trust on his Boys Ranch 
and allow him ultimately to consolidate the organization's operations into 
a manageable administrative structure. Had he lost this gamble, he would 
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have been saddled with a highly cumbersome and unwieldy managerial 
arrangement. But had he not tried, he would have been unable to under-
take the subsequent expansion and growth of the Youth Fund enterprise . 
Finally, in the case of the Jewish Board of Family and Children's Ser-
vices, two agencies of manageable size and individually respected reputa:. 
lions were merged into a new, very large agency whose future shape and 
prospects were theorized but largely unknown. Moreover, these agencies 
were coaxed along into consolidation by the executive directors of each, 
one of whom, Jay Goldsmith, would have to administer the new arrange-
ment. Not only could Goldsmith be blamed for whatever failure or loss of 
reputation the new agency might incur, but he faced a potentially over-
whelming managerial burden had he not been able to reorganize in a man-
ner that would ease the responsibilities of the top man . 
Finally, entrepreneurs in these human services case studies sometimes 
exhibited an explicit willingness to stick their necks out by taking actions 
that were unauthorized but which seemed necessary to keep their ventures 
on track. Most often this brand of risk-taking involved refusal to wait for 
official government approvals prior to opening new facilities for busi-
ness. In the cases of GLIE and Seabury Barn such actions were taken 
both for economic reasons and to prod the bureaucracy into faster action, 
but they were gambles nonetheless. 
Any consideration of risk-taking must of course take into account both 
sides of the coin-i.e., what were the risks of doing something versus 
not doing it. In several cases, especially those where the venture repre-
sented a solution to an important and pressing organizational problem, 
the risks of not undertaking the proposed project or program were clearly 
high as well. This applies, for example, to the Seabury Bam case and the 
early stages of the Greer and Florida Sheriffs experiences, where not un-
dertaking the initiatives might have meant the financial failures of the 
agencies involved. In other instances, however, the dangers of inaction 
were not necessarily imminent and the risks were taken by those who 
could foresee potential long-term benefits from their short term gambles 
and sacrifices. 
(5) Successful enterprise requires persistence. While the entrepre-
neurial characters encountered in the cases here are a very dynamic and 
sometimes fervent, hot-blooded group of personalities, they all exhibit 
unusual degrees of patience and what is called in the slang "stick-to-it-
iveness ." Constraints and complications pepper these cases as they would 
all significant ventures involving major change, yet the entrepreneurs re-
fused to be defeated by these roadblocks and indeed took them on as per-
sonal challenges. This behavior comes out most clearly where these 
enterprising individuals had to deal with government to obtain certi-
fications, approvals or funding, and where they had to overcome skepti-
cism, political reservations, and bureaucratic inertia and inconsistency. 
This is nowhere better illustrated than in the case of Melville House, 
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where obtaining certification from the state bureaucracy to open the facil-
ity dragged on interminably and threatened to sink the venture at various 
points, but where the resolve of the entrepreneurs eventually won out. 
Similarly, in the GLIE case a charter for the new agency had to be fought 
for, and interim governance arrangements accepted, before the city's reg-
ulatory machinery allowed the program to officially open. And in the 
case of Sagamore Children's Center, the persistence of the entrepreneur 
is illustrated by her incredible energy and effort in coping with the state 
civil service system in order to hire suitable staff for her outpatient pro-
gram. 
Persistence and patience is required not only with the bureaucracy but 
with the overriding political system as well . Thus, in the Seabury Barn 
case, Peter Ryan spent endless hours in negotiation with county legisla-
tors as well as state officials over funding and governance arrangements 
acceptable to these interests. Andy Casazza and his staff repeatedly re-
submitted their grant proposals for Sanctuary until it was funded. And 
Tom Williams waited patiently through changes in the town's administra-
tion until a receptive town supervisor and councilmen were in place ; then 
he persisted in his efforts to document needs, garner support , and ulti-
mately gain appointment as the Brookhaven Youth Bureau director. 
Of course many other facets of enterprise require similar persistence, 
including pursuit of internal agency matters. Thus, Jane Edwards had to 
keep up the pressure over a long period of time in order to avoid any ten-
dency of staff members comfortable with present arrangements to slow 
the emancipation of the Harlem-Dowling project. And Jay Goldsmith had 
to anticipate months of meetings and negotiations not only to prepare per-
sonnel for the JBFCS consolidation, but to deal with setbacks, and to ease 
the implementation and smooth the transition once the merger had offi -
cially taken place. 
Overall, the lesson seems to be that the guiding entrepreneurs and 
managers must be clear-minded about what is to be accoinplished, but. 
must also expect that accomplishment to take a long time and to encoun-
ter many problems along the way . Ventures can thus fail either because 
the leaders can lose their senses of direction in the midst of the numerous 
barriers to implementation, or because they may lack the fortitude to keep 
plugging in the face of resistance , distraction, and delay . 
(6) Beware the dilemmas of funding. One of the trickiest problems the 
entrepreneurs in these cases seem to encounter is balancing the program-
matic and organizational implications of accepting various sources of 
funds against the benefits of that support. Often , the implications arc sub-
tle and even deceiving . In other instances, the implications are fully un-
derstood and anticipated, and either funds arc rejected or accepted with 
awareness of the consequences . 
In various cases , concessions are made as a necessity of essential fund-
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ing . In the GLIE case, an onerous oversight arrangement is accepted as a 
way of qualifying for foster case funding . Even more dramatically, GLIE 
is forced to separate from its advocacy activities as a condition of funding 
for its services. The Seabury Bam case also exhibits an example where 
undesired oversight arrangements are accepted in exchange for funding 
eligibility. For GCCCS, concessions in autonomy were also the price ex-
tracted for overhead support from the university in which the organization 
is housed. 
Alternatively, agencies are sometimes forced to make service program 
concessions in exchange for funding . Thus, Seabury Bam was itself a 
project taken on by the Smith Haven Ministries in exchange for funding 
support of SHM's other programs . And in the LESFU case, spinning-off 
the project from the Henry Street Settlement was a partial consequence of 
securing a grant from the state. 
In other instances, funding sources were specifically rejected because 
of the programmatic implications they contained. Thus GLIE rejected 
various juvenile justice and drug program monies in order to avoid the 
labelling of its clients that this would entail. And more spectacularly, the 
Florida Sheriffs organization scrupulously avoided government money of 
any sort in order to preserve its autonomy and avoid any entanglements 
that might interfere with its program objectives . 
In various cases, the leaders and managers devised strategies to free 
themselves somewhat from the oppressive consequences of receiving 
funds from particular sources. Diversification is one strategy, employed 
by GLIE for example in its later stages of<levelopment, and sought by the 
designers of the JBFCS merger that combined agencies with primary de-
pendence on different public and private funding sources. The federal 
grant for the Sagamore outpatient project was another instance where di-
versification permitted escaping the requirements of the state's regular 
(inpatient-oriented) funding system. 
Another strategy is deliberate ambiguity in proposal writing for grant 
funds . This was an idea used in the LESFU case as a way of maximizing 
the chances of funding from different sources as well as allowing nexibil-
ity in implementation. A third strategy, for the private agencies at least, 
was to build up endowment or reserve funds that could ultimately gener-
ate income in the form of returns on investment, free of external condi-
tions and restraints . This was the objective of Harry Weaver in the Flor-
ida Sheriffs case. 
But these strategies, even if they worked, were not without problems 
and unanticipated consequences. For LESFU, ambiguity in the proposal 
stage translated into uncertainties and tensions when it came to detailed 
program design and implementation. And in the case of Florida Sheriffs, 
the strategy of building up reserves meant putting great emphasis on 
fund-raising activity and particularly the solicitation of donations from 
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conservative elderly contributors, which in tum seemed to dull the ag-
gressiveness and shunt the planning for the agency's primary objec-
tive-services to predelinquent youth. 
Other dilemmas are also raised by decisions on funding. What was to 
be the future of the outpatient program at Sagamore when the special 
grant ran out, given that the state's regular funding programs were de-
signed for inpatient care? Was permanence ever possible in this regime? 
And what about the dangers of false secur.ity once comfortable endow-
ment funds are put into place, as they were in the instance of the Greer 
agency prior to its deterioration? No easy answers appear to exist. The 
lesson for management then is to be aware enough to look gift horses in 
the mouth and to anticipate and be prepared for it when they buck . 
The Chemistry of Success 
A final perspective that seems worth imparting to the student of man-
agement in the human services is that purposeful organizational and pro-
gram change cannot be taken for granted. Rather it requires explicit man-
agement attention, adherence to sttategies and principles of the kind 
indicated in the previous section, and an appreciation of the conditions 
conducive to change and the elements prerequisite to it. More than this, it 
is useful to recognize that change is fragile and that successful change re-
quires that unstable elements be brought together at the same time and 
place in order for the necessary interactions to take place, i.e., the chem-
istry of change to be effected. The case studies are, by and large, studies 
of ventures that were successful, at least for a period of time. Instances 
where ventures were nipped in the bud, or were foregone for lack of the 
proper combination of factors, would of course be much harder to find 
and to document. But the number of these would no doubt overwhelm the 
number of successes that can be identified. 
Even the case studies of success, however, contain with them substan-
tial evidence of how fragile, even serendipitous, successful implementa-
tion of change can be. Case after case belies the unique combinations of 
factors, or the critical timing, or the fortuitous catalytic element responsi-
ble for action and progress where there might have been none . For exam-
ple, it is hard to imagine development of the GLIE program without the 
unique personality of Lorraine Reilly . Indeed , in many cases, GLIE, 
LESFU and GCCCS among them, leadership was a critical commodity, 
and where it floundered, so did the enterprise. The GLIE experience also 
illustrates how a fortuitous suggestion that a parent agency be found to 
overcome the barriers to having GLIE enter the child care system can 
make the difference between action and stagnation . The Pleasantville 
case too demonstrates the role of fortuitous circumstances - the fact that 
a building fund drive just happened to be going on that could supply reno-
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vat ion funds for a new program facility, and the unanticipated bright idea 
that Medicaid rates could be adjusted to cover the operating costs. These 
elements allowed the project to ignite and takeoff when it might other-
wise have gone by the boards. Well-timed, sometimes unexpected grant 
opportunities, such as those that arose in the cases of Sagamore, Sanctu-
ary, and Seabury Barn, also attest to the fortunate confluence of events 
that often seems to underlie the successful launching of important ven-
tures. And usually the window of opportunity is quite narrow once the 
necessary elements appear to be in place. The JBFCS merger, for exam-
ple, had to exploit the retirement of Shep Sherman and be effected before 
his agency would begin to look for a replacement for him. Moreover, the 
timing between the agreement to merge and effecting of the agreement it-
self seemed quite critical. A long enough period was needed to explore 
the implications, but too long a time period would allow people to have 
second thoughts and opponents to gather strength . Similarly in the case of 
Harlem-Dowling, the timing of emancipation of the program from the 
parent agency Spence-Chapin was critical- too early and the new 
agency would fall on its face, too late and internal resistance would grow 
and the motivations to effect the separation would be diffused . And in the 
instance of Melville House, much further delays in certification by the 
state would surely have led to an aborted enterprise . 
All this is not to suggest that a programmatic organizational change is 
simply a happenstance affair. A good bit of luck does seem to be in-
volved . But the real managerial lesson here is that circumstances favor-
able to the successful launching and growth of an enterprising activity do 
not last forever, and must be recognized and exploited when they do oc-
cur. The successful manager of change in the human services field is not 
unlike a tightrope walker, who needs to master the skills, assess the cli-
mactic conditions, map a strategy, make the necessary adjustments in his 
machinery, resolve to carry on and to assume the risks, understand the 
potential consequences, and finally when conditions are favorable, make 
the narrow passage over dangerous territory to hopefully stable ground on 
the other side . 
Group Live-In Experience, Inc. (GLIE) 
PRECIS 
GLIE is a child care agency for older children, established in the South 
Bronx in 1972. It grew out of the Claremont League for Urban Better-
ment (CLUB), an advocacy group developed under auspices of Our Lady 
of Victory Roman Catholic Church on behalf of distressed families in the 
Webster Butler housing projects. Under the dynamic leadership of Sister 
Lorraine Reilly, GLIE developed three group homes for adolescents, 
an emergency placement unit for runaway youth, an innovative long-term 
apartment-living program for older adolescents, and special residential 
programs for multiply handicapped and autistic youth. 
THE ENTREPRENEUR 
Several individuals· contributed substantially to the successful es-
tablishment and growth of GLIE. The early protagonists such as Gary 
Waldron, Carmen Goytia, Ellen Garcia, Father Joseph Fitzpatrick, and 
Father Tim Collins were all active in the South Bronx community, 
mostly through Our Lady of Victory Roman Catholic Church and the as-
sociated Claremont League for Urban Betterment. But the central charac-
ter was Sister Lorraine Reilly, a teacher in the Lady of Victory Parish and 
an active participant and organizer in the Claremont League at the time 
GLIE began to emerge. Sister Lorraine is a native and lifelong resident of 
the South Bronx , a fact which has shaped her single-minded dedication to 
the renewal of this area . 
Sister Lorraine's dynamic personality and humanistic orientation com-
bine themselves into an unusual managerial style . She is feisty and inde-
pendent, and not afraid to call the shots as she sees them. She can also be 
very demanding of staff, if she sees a discrepancy between their interests 
and that of the kids. But, as tough as she can be, Lorraine Reilly is not 
comfortable as an administrator and in fact she disdains this role and sees 
herself as a creator, catalyst, and enterpriser. For example, she is quick to 
turn over program responsibilities to people under her and to delegate 
authority. 
Moreover, Sister Lorraine expresses a basic preference for keeping 
GLIE small, and spinning-off new programs. This orientation is based 
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partly on Sister Reilly 's distrust of large bureaucratic organizations and 
her belief that a service organization should be close to the community it 
serves. But it is also a matter of her personal style and motives . She is "a 
fast mover" and lack of encumbrance and freedom of action are essential 
to her way of doing things . 
Gary Waldron calls Sister Lorraine a" 'charismatic advocate. ' People 
tend to want to follow her as a leader . .. . I think she is an advocate of the 
first order. She believes that the only way the system will change ... is to 
make a lot of noise .... That is what she does." 
A strong motivating factor in Sister Lorraine's calculus is indeed com-
munity involvement and social activism. She sees herself primarily as a 
social work organizer, with the South Bronx as her universe. Her career 
exhibits a consistent activist orientation . The Claremont League, and the 
beginnings of GLIE, are examples . 
Caring about people, especially kids, and about the neighborhoods she 
grew up in, and being talented and able to do something to organize and 
help them- especially in view of the dramatic deterioration of the 
Bronx- is a great energizer for Lorraine Reilly. She says she plans to 
continue to devote her efforts to this particular comer of the world, and 
she means it . 
THE ORGANIZATIONS 
GLIE was born out of the Claremont League for Urban Betterment 
(CLUB), grew under the wing of St. Dominic's child care agency in its 
first three years, and has since evolved as an independent, but still chang-
ing, child care agency in its own right. 
The relationship of GLIE to St. Dominic's Children's Home from 
1972- 1975 was a short-Jived convenience that enabled GLIE to begin 
operations before it could secure official status as an independent child 
care agency . Essentially, St . Dominic's, a chartered foster care institution 
affiliated with the Catholic Church and the Dominican Order of Sisters to 
which Sister Reilly belongs, acted as the fiscal agent through which GLIE 
could be reimbursed for services by the New York City Department of 
Social Services. Aside from administrative hassles, however, there was 
little substantive interaction of St. Dominic's with GLIE. (See Choices 
below .) 
If St. Dominic's was a temporary foster parent to GLIE, the Claremont 
League for Urban Betterment was GLIE's true lineage . CLUB developed 
as a community action of Our Lady of Victory Church and Parish in the 
Crotona Park area of the South Bronx. According to Sister Lorraine:" ... 
It really starts in '65 (when we didn't [even) have a name) within Our 
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Lady of Victory Parish ... working with gangs and being with kids [from 
the! city [housing projects] .. .. In 1967, through Catholic Charities, we 
got a grant of $5,000 to develop an advocacy [program) to work with 
families having difficulty .. . . We incorporated as CLUB [in 1968] and 
[began) doing tenant organizing . By '68 [with support of Catholic Chari-
ties and foundations - including United Fund) we had two storefronts . 
One was totally for adolescents-an after school tutorial program, an 
evening rap session program [with] gang members, teenagers ... what-
ever. And the other one was an advocacy storefront. . .. From '68 to '72 
we worked so much with gangs ... setting them up in abandoned build-
ings [etc . ) that we got into the whole syndrome and we decided to try to 
apply . . . r for child care agency status]." 
The founders of CLUB were people active in the Church parish. The 
parish priest was a key figure, along with Gary Waldron, an IBM man-
ager who grew up in the South Bronx and was active in youth recreation 
programs, parishioners Carmen Goytia, Ellen Garcia, Sister Joan, and 
Sister Lorraine . It was both a service organization and advocacy group, 
which according to Gary Waldron:" . . . Attempted to service community 
people, youth, people with welfare problems, outreach services, and all 
that." It was basically an informal, volunteer operation, with only three 
paid staff. 
As an informal organization, with no steady means of support and no 
hard-and-fast mandate, CLUB depended on the commitment of a few 
people. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Claremont League dis-
solved shortly after the GLIE program began in 1972. Sister Reilly's en-
ergies were devoted to GLIE, and, according to Waldron, "When she 
spun off from CLUB, several things happened .... The local pastor left 
the priesthood and [CLUB) began to become less and less effective be-
cause there was no driving force behind it. There wasn't anybody avail-
able every day. There were some people working, but they weren't doing 
very much, and if l were to look back, I think that GLIE was the thing 
that was beginning to grow on its own, and Lorraine was really off doing 
her own thing . . . quite apart from anything Claremont had offered at that 
point." 
Indeed, in a very real sense, GLIE is simply the part of CLUB that sur-
vived, albeit altered in form and purpose. Many of the CLUB founders 
became active in GLIE . And, GLIE continues in the same tradition as 
CLUB-with its roots in the church and dedication to the community of 
the South Bronx. As Sister Lorraine explains: "We really are [confined to 
the Bronx Community] . . . . We might help another group get started, 
you know. But I don't think the Board would go along. . . . Anything 
within the community .. . fine, but outside the community ... no." 
Since its founding in 1972, GLIE has expanded its board membership 
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considerably beyond the core group [e.g., Waldron, Goytia] from CLUB. 
Membership now includes the chairperson of the local community plan-
ning board, a nurse and active member of the Baptist Church, a probation 
officer, a university professor, a bank employee . . . all people with an 
active involvement in the local community and/or professional interest in 
youth problems. 
However, the selection of board members became considerably more 
"worldly" as Sister Lorraine describes: "The Volunteer Urban Consulting 
Group . . . had a book called Candidates for Directors . . . published 
yearly ... of graduates of Harvard who are interested in becoming mem-
bers of boards of directors. So we went through that book and picked 
[three men] . .. called them up and out of that three, two were interested 
. .. [eventually one] came on board." 
Until 1979, the board of directors had not been particularly influential 
in setting policy for GLIE compared to the single-minded style of Lor-
raine Reilly's leadership. But Gary Waldron saw this changing:" . .. We 
have gone through some redefinitions of board roles and board member-
ships and needs of the board. We are getting a lot closer to goals and mea-
surement than we ever were before. We have gathered some very, very 
interested members to the board. I think these two things alone are going 
to help to make the board more effective. This is one half. The other half 
is that as that board becomes more effective, it is going to contend with 
her [Sister Lorraine] more ... . There is going to be more contention . .. 
and she is . . . just not going to be allowed to do some things that 
she would do in her own pioneering way. Probably it will create some 
boxes [constraints], some parameters of her actions . . . . It may make her 
uncomfortable because of the style that she had enjoyed for a long 
time . ... " 
Fund-raising is one illustrative area, whe e Sister Lorraine has essen-
tially been a one-woman show. Waldron continues:" ... She has done it 
in the past. You know, she would get wind of a proposal and she would 
go out there and .. . get our proposal approved .. .. She did virtually all 
of that. I got some IBM funds, and a lady from Morgan Guarantee [got] a 
few thousand dollars, but the big funding sources were primarily driven 
by Lorraine .... She is kind of a magic lady . .. . She would come in and 
be able to sell them stuff. And they would agree with it, and would fund it 
for her." 
General organization and management have also revolved around the 
personality of Sister Lorraine. As noted above, GLIE is decentralized to 
suit her own "fast-moving" style and disdain for administration . And 
GLIE's decentralized style of administration extends into its philosophy 
of growth, where Waldron notes:" .. . She believes that there ought to be 
a series of . . . small programs that grow on their own, eventually spin-off 
and become independent things." 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
1965-The Claremont League begins informally (without a name) 
as a community project by Our Lady of Victory Church and Parish . 
CLUB begins to work with gang youth in the Webster-Butler housing 
projects. 
1967-CLUB receives a $5,000 grant for an advocacy program on be-
half of families in difficulty from Catholic Charities. 
1968 - CLUB is incorporated. By this time it has two storefront oper-
ations. One provides tutoring and job counseling services for youth. The 
other provides day care and recreation programs, and general advocacy 
activity. 
1968-1972-CLUB does considerable work with youth and gangs, 
including provision of shelter in the abandoned buildings over the store-
fronts. Funds are received from Greater New York Fund as well as Catho-
lic Charities over this period . 
1972- CLUB applies to the city and state to develop a group home for 
adolescent youth, but the state refuses to grant CLUB status as a child 
caring agency . The city's Director of Special Services for Children, Bar-
bara Blum, suggests that the proposed program affiliate with an existing 
child care agency . As a Dominican Sister, Lorraine Reilly approaches St. 
Dominic's Children's Home (in Blauvelt, New York) for the purpose of 
obtaining sponsorship. 
GLIE opens as a single group home for girls , separate from CLUB, un-
der auspices of St. Dominic's, which operates as receiver and administra-
tor of funds . The arrangement calls for GLIE to work towards autonomy 
within three years. 
1973-CLUB dissolves . . 
1972- 1975- GLIE develops two additional group homes for adoles-
cents, making a total of three short-term (90 day) residences- one for 
boys and two for girls. 
July, 1975- GLIE incorporates as an independent, nonprofit child 
care agency, and formally separates from St. Dominic's. 
July, 1976-GLIE is one of three New York City programs to receive 
federal funds under the Runaway Youth Act (Juvenile Justice Act of 
1974). It establishes a 24-hour emergency placement unit (8-bed crash 
pad) intended for lengths of stay up to two weeks. 
December, 1976- GLIE contracts with the New York State Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene to provide urban group home care for twelve 
multiply handicapped and retarded youth from the Willowbrook State 
Hospital (or similar institutions). Such children were being moved from 
Willowbrook under state decree . Implementation of that decree was ad-
ministered by Barbara Blum, appointed as Assistant Commissioner of 
Mental Hygiene for that purpose . 
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January, 1977- An innovative long-range program of independent, 
apartment living is developed for older (16- 17 year old) adolescents. 
1977- GLIE receives a grant from the Greater New York Fund toes-
tablish the groundwork for a program for autistic children . The agency 
also requests permission of the New York City Board of Education to de-
velop an alternative high school for truant youth. 
CONTEXT 
GLIE has grown up at the intersection of several social crosscurrents. 
Its roots in the Claremont League recall the poverty program era of the 
mid-sixties, when community organizing and advocacy on behalf of de-
prived minorities in the cities were in full bloom across the nation. So, 
too, CLUB was a manifestation of a new activism of the clergy in bring-
ing about desired social change at home and abroad (e .g., Vietnam) . Cer-
tainly CLUB was a response to the deterioration of the city, especially the 
social pathofogy associated with the large, impersonal, low income hous-
ing projects that were built in the fifties and sixties to house the inflow of 
blacks and Hispanics and to replace older deteriorated housing. 
In the world of urban decay, the South Bronx had become the symbol. 
National recognition was underlined in 1977 when President Carter per-
sonally visited the area and promised a program to rebuild from the dev-
astation. But the deterioration had become obvious and widespread long 
before that - as early as the late fifties. By the mid-sixties the South 
Bronx was already in terrible shape, with rapid abandonment of buildings 
by landlords, soaring rates of crime, frequent fires, and so on . The educa-
tion system was another victim, and the impacts of deterioration were felt 
particularly hard by youth . 
Some of these youth became "urban nomads," a particular variety of 
"runaway" who remained in his community but spent little time with 
whatever family he might have . Rather, he or she hung out with others in 
a gang and sought whatever shelter was available. This is the type of 
youth 1hat was attracted to CLUB, and was ultimately served by GLIE. 
Thus, another social crosscurrent surrounding GLIE was the phenomenon 
of runaway youth. 
In a photo essay for U.S. Catholic magazine in 1977, Sister Lorraine 
implies that youthful runaways are akin to discoverers and explorers, and 
are part of a long-standing history of transients in Western civilization. 
Be that as it may, it is clear that the runaway phenomenon came to na-
tional prominence in the late 1960s with the flower children of Haight· 
Ashbury in San Francisco. 
in the early seventies the flow of young runaways into the sex industry, 
particularly on the "Minnesota strip" in the Times Square area of New 
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York City, came to light. Through organization and lobbying by people 
like Rev . Bruce Ritter and Lorraine Reilly, the federal Runaway Youth 
Act was enacted in 1974, providing funds for information exchange and 
program development. In New York State, runaway legislation was 
passed in 1978 to fund sanctuary and other types of programs for runaway 
youth . From its beginning GLIE has serviced the runaway youth of the 
South Bronx, especially those that improvised shelter in the burnt-out and 
abandoned buildings . In 1976 it received one of the earliest allocations of 
federal runaway funds to establish its emergency shelter "crash pad," the 
only existing 24-hour emergency service in the Bronx. 
Finally, GLIE has been entwined in the changes taking place in the 
governmental social services systems at large. For example, GLIE joined 
the child care system at a time when it was becoming clear that the popu-
lation of children requiring foster care was changing radically in age com-
position from younger to older children, and from relatively "normal" to 
behaviorally difficult youngsters. GLIE proposed to serve this new breed 
of foster child . Indeed, GLIE' s emergence coincides fairly closely with 
the establishment of a separate reimbursement rate for group homes by 
New York City 's Office of Special Services for Children. Despite there-
luctance of the State Board of Social Welfare to authorize GLIE as an in-
dependent agency in 1972 (see Choices, Constraints below), it was un-
doubtedly these social imperatives that brought forth support and 
encouragement for GLIE by the City, especially by Barbara Blum, then 
Assistant Commissioner in charge of Special Services for Children. 
Another crosscurrent , later in GLIE's history, was the deinstitutionali-
zation movement as it applied to mental hospitals in New York State . Of 
particular interest , a court decree in 1976 ordered the State to dismantle its 
Willowbrook institution for the retarded and multiply handicapped, and 
to place its residents into community-based programs . The job of imple-
menting this decree was given to Barbara Blum, and it was GLIE that re-
sponded within its own mandate, with a program to service (largely 
Bronx-originated) Willowbrook children , in a group home setting . 
Sister Lorraine is quick to contend that if those involved in GLIE had 
not responded to the various social needs emerging in the South Bronx 
others would have. This hypothesis may be questionable, but the social 
context ce11ainly inspired and strongly shaped the founding and develop-
ment of GLIE . 
CHOICES 
The founding of GLIE involved several stages of decision-making. 
The first stage was based on the realization that current CLUB activities 
on behalf of local youth were not adequate or sustainable indefinitely, and 
that more substantial services and support were necessary . Sister Lorraine 
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explains the need to undertake residential services: "We tried [counseling 
and referral to other agencies] .. . but [in] the end ... we found our-
selves putting [up] more and more .. . kids [in the abandoned buildings] . 
. . . Their [problems were 1 family dysfunction and their needs [were 1 to 
get out. ... [Often it was the] healthiest kid [in a family] who wanted 
out, even if it was for only a short period of time .. .. Sometimes [when) 
you really did intensive therapy, it was better to separate the youngster 
from the problem, so he could look back and see the problem . .. then he 
could go back in, and do very well . But when we found ourselves setting 
up so many kids a month in an old abandoned building . . . it seemed 
ridiculous." 
One obvious alternative was referral to existing agencies and institu-
tions, all of which were some distance from the South Bronx- usually in 
upstate New York. But this proved not to be viable: "Kids whom you fi-
nally convinced to go ... [wouldn't stay there). You'd take them up 
there and tell them; 'Look at the beautiful trees . Ah, it's great! ' [But) by 
the time you'd get back to New York, they were sitting here on the steps. 
They hitch-hiked back. They couldn't deal with it." 
In any case, referral to other agencies did not, for the most part, repre-
sent a viable solution: "We thought of ... not developing [our own pro-
gram and] sending the kids into the other recognized child care agencies. 
But these were . .. older adolescents . The child care agencies didn't want 
anybody over 14 in 1976. Now they'll take them up to 16, but then they 
didn't want to hear about them. So we ... had no place to go with our 
kids . .. . " 
The first inclination of Sister Lorraine, and others involved in GLIE, 
was to seek private funding, which would preserve flexibility : "Originally 
. .. in '70, we put in a proposal to the National Campaign of Bishops . 
. . . They were going to fund us .. . becauseit was a good idea. This was 
minority kids, gang kids, the whole list. Then they sent it back to the 
Archdiocese of New York and said, you fund half of it and we'll fund the 
other half. [But] it was the Archbishop (of New York] . .. who said, 'No, 
we are not going to fund that program because there's a (government] 
system in child welfare that they can get into .... '" The lack of church 
support was certainly a factor in turning to government sources, espe-
cially in 1972 when church resources for the Claremont League itself 
were precarious. 
Having resolved to seek governmental support , there was another basic 
choice for GLIE promoters to make . The issues of stigma and labeling of 
children were of paramount importance: "We didn't want to go into juve-
nile justice money . Kids have to have a name on them . . . . They would 
be branded .. .. We didn ' t want to go after drug money because a lot of 
the kids had brothers who were already into drug rehab programs and it 
also meant that they had a stigma attached to them .... So, we felt that 
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the city, whose foster care system . .. should have been providing some 
kind of prevention programming for kids living in the ghetto . .. [was the 
appropriate choice] ." 
The intent to seek support through the public foster care system 
strongly influenced a number of subsequent organizational choices. For 
one thing the effort would have to be organized on a nonprofit basis. This 
was no problem since CLUB was already an incorporated nonprofit orga-
nization. However, passing thought was given to the possibility of direct 
public provision through city government. Sister Lorraine recalls, " ... 
The City has a program for hard-to-place youngsters ... [but] ... it's 
been closed since. It was known to be a horrendous place ... all kinds of 
atrocities were going on there . They had two settings, one for boys and 
one for girls .. .. Two short-term facilities ... and they were really in 
bad shape .... There was no reason to think that the City was going to 
put on a better show .... [But] I don ' t know that that might not be a 
[good] thing. You see, one of the underlying goals of GLIE is to employ 
community people and to make sure that that is stable employment. 
That's very important to us . So I'm not so sure that would have been a 
bad idea , if the city government was a little more avant garde and pro-
gressive . It could really pull off an awful lot of good programs ." 
The fact that CLUB was nonprofit was not qualification enough for 
status as a child care organization eligible to receive public (per diem) 
funding for residential child care services . The founders would be forced 
to choose between CLUB and the GLIE program, and between an inde-
pendent GLIE and one affiliated with an existing authorized agency . 
The initial application did envision CLUB as the organizational auspi-
ces, but the broad mandate and informality of CLUB became an issue: 
" . . . As a child care agency we couldn't do the kinds of advocacy work 
[that CLUB did] ... and we [couldn't] set up an umbrella agency in that 
way . . .. " Indeed, CLUB would have had to be radically changed 
in terms of mission and structure to conform with Board of Social Wel-
fare licensing requirements. Even with the willingness of CLUB to 
do so, however: "The State of New York would not recognize us as 
the Claremont League for Urban Betterment and refused to amend the 
charter .. .. " 
According to Sister Lorraine, the basic problem was the South Bronx 
itself: "At the time, there were ... no group homes in the South Bronx, 
not one . . . because the City and State officials felt that this was a deteri-
orating neighborhood . Nothing could be done here . . .. Listen , let me tell 
you we had one commissioner who wouldn't even walk down the street. 
"We were talking about . .. opening up in a very deteriorated commu-
nity ... for that community 's stability. We were trying to tell them that 
you would stabilize the South Bronx [this way, butl ... they could not 
see . . . . " 
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Gary Waldron sees the issues in a somewhat different perspective: "As 
a separate group home, it was indeed an experiment .... There were two 
issues as I understand it: [First] the credibility of community agencies in 
general. . . . There was a Jot of scandal and a whole lot of reverends and 
the like ripping off monies .... Secondly, the novelty of the program. 
There was not universal agreement that that type of a program [urban 
group homes] would be acceptable .. . . Most of the eggs were stored in 
the other basket . .. kids went somewhere else in an institution setting 
outside of New York City." 
Fortunately, the founders of GLIE had a receptive ear in the City's Di-
rector of Special Services for Children, Barbara Blum. Mrs . Blum 
wanted to see GLIE get off the ground, and suggested another alternative 
to Sister Lorraine- affiliation, at least temporarily, with an established 
agency. With that suggestion things began to fall into place in 1972. Sis-
ter Lorraine says she really had not previously seriously entertained the 
notion of using the services of another agency, must less formal affilia-
tion. But, given the idea, Sister Lorraine pursued it effectively. As Wal-
dron described it, " . . . Only because she was a Dominican nun dealing 
with a Dominican home, was [she] able to convince them to take a shot at 
trying it this way .. . a different approach than used in the past. . . . It 
was indeed an experiment. . .. St. Dominic's was an established agency . 
If it would support the experiment, then the City would fund [us] through 
St. Dominic's .. .. " 
Sister Lorraine elaborates on the arrangements," ... If we could dis-
play to the City and the State what we were talking about ... then we 
could get our own charter . .. . We would have three years to do it. . .. If 
within three years we did not [secure] our own charter, St. Dominic's 
would claim any group homes that we had opened .... " 
Affiliation with St. Dominic's was not the preferred arrangement for 
the founders of GLIE. Indeed, if Sister Lorraine had it to do again, she 
says, " ... We definitely would not have gone to St. Dominic's. We 
would have fought for our charter . ... That was a mistake." Nonethe-
less, the arrangement did allow the GLIE program to get started. Gary 
Waldron questions whether it would have been possible otherwise. But 
Sister Lorraine is proud to point out that independence was achieved 
within two and a half years. 
The arrangement with St. Dominic's was, from the start, intended as 
temporary. And the operation of this arrangement strongly reaffirmed this 
initial preference. Sister Lorraine bristled under the wing of St. Domi-
nic's, and the feelings of officials of the parent agency were probably mu-
tual. A large part of the problem was money since St. Dominic's claimed 
a good fraction of GLIE's reimbursement for overhead expenses. In ad-
dition, St. Dominic's tended to impose its policies on staffing and other 
program parameters . 
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On the other side of the argument, an official of the State Board of So-
cial Welfare indicated that St. Dominic's might actually have been losing 
money, because of loose bookkeeping and reporting by GLIE, i.e., that 
reimbursement was not being made for all children actually in care . Gary 
Waldron, who was GLIE's Treasurer at the time, gives a more balanced 
appraisal. " . . . The [problem was] over an allocation [of funds] which 
was very fair in St. Dominic's eyes . . .. It turned out to be 50 percent of 
her [Sister Lorraine's] reimbursement that St. Dominic's was keeping, in 
effect. ... [Sister Lorraine] was fair in believing that she was not getting 
the right end of that deal. However, on the other side of the coin ... 
[they] were providing some accounting services and support services . It 
was an accounting and billing process. They were going through the di-
rect billing from the City . . . . I'm sure they were sharing a part of the 
cost of their whole office staff." In any case, ultimate separation from St. 
Dominic's was never in question, as far as the two principals were con-
cerned . 
In terms of programmatic content, GLIE's apartment-like group homes 
were pretty much an outgrowth of the impromptu activity begun under 
CLUB . But design parameters were influenced by child care regulations . 
According to Sister Lorraine," ... We were ... obliged to listen to what 
the bureaucrats wanted .... For instance, for us to open a group home, 
we never thought of boys separate from girls, or six year olds not in the 
same apartments as their mothers ... or single parents and a boyfriend 
not living in the same apartment. .. . Whereas immediately all those host 
of rules came in, so all the types of apartment development we had gotten 
(into) with young people in abandoned buildings ... was now thrown 
out. ... " . 
Later programmatic decisions of GLIE were shaped by a combination 
of unanticipated opportunities and an underlying desire to escape the nar-
rowness of the conventional child welfare system . The program of group 
care for the multiply handicapped was a response to solicitation under the 
Willowbrook decree. A new program for autistic children follows a simi-
Jar scenario: "The Bronx Chapter for the Autistic came to our open house 
[for) the two units for handicapped kids .... We hadn't thought of ... 
ever doing anything like [a program for the autistic] but we said we would 
help ... . The board said, 'Look into it, Lorraine. Do a little research ... 
and tell us what you think ... . ' My research {showed that] a large num-
ber of autistic children in the Bronx were out of state. Wasn't that ·a good 
enough reason to develop a program, if their families were asking that 
they be close [by)? ... [So we went to] look for a grant. . . . " 
Another example is the runaway program. "Once we got the temporary 
houses [group homes] going, we realized we could only take in those 
children that the Bureau of Child Welfare decided we could take in, 
which still left out a lot of gang members ... a lot of really nomadic, 
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homeless youth ... which were words the City didn't even know . So we 
went after [funds under] the National Runaway Youth Act .. . in '74 
when it first came out. We did it again in '75 and we got the grant in '76, 
[and] ... opened the Crash Pad ... . [Now we could say], 'City, we 
don't need your bread . No, we'll show you, who you should be caring 
for .' ... We'd take in a kid and we'd call up and say, 'Listen, this kid 
has bruises all over him; it's an abuse case, and you have to accept the 
case .' ... We had the federal grant to help us . .. . " 
In sum, the choices made in establishing GLIE and developing its pro-
gram have been pragmatically designed to ensure success. A preference 
for autonomy was temporarily subdued to achieve operational status. 
Constraints were accepted to secure resources, but additional resources 
were sought to loosen the constraints. In no case were the restrictions 
crippling, and/or indeed permanently oppressive . And while the choices 
have produced a variety of programs, there is an underlying consistency 
in terms of semi-autonomous organizational units each servicing a real 
need for youth in the South Bronx . 
RISKS AND CONSTRAINTS 
Sister Lorraine's basic style of enterprising is bold and tilted toward 
risk . It is an orientation that was apparent from the beginnings of her 
GLIE-related activity: "My own religious community thought that it was 
crazy , and I knew I was at risk .... Becoming politically involved for me 
was very risky. I really didn 't know anything about politics . .. I al-
though] I think I've enjoyed ... becoming involved politically and feel-
ing that's really where the change has to happen .. .. If you don't get to 
that, than whatever you're stirring up will definitely die ." 
The risk-taking behavior of Sister Lorraine has been precipitated 
largely on her perception that that is how you get things done in a world 
of pernicious bureaucratic constraints and subterfuge. With respect to the 
establishment of GLIE, the conservatism of government officials was 
manifested in skepticism about the viability of any enterprise in the South 
Bronx . Another barrier that Sister Lorraine cites is the existence of some 
eighty other child care agencies in the City, and hence the official reluc-
tance to approve "yet another one." But at the core of Sister Lorraine's 
perception, and the barriers she and the others who founded GLIE faced, 
is the system of Cateh-22 regulations in which the developers of a new 
child care agency in New York seem to be caught: " ... Once we decided 
to go [for child care status], then we had to go by all their regulations in 
forming a board and bylaws and what not. As a matter of fact, we had the 
bylaws sent back to us . . . three times because in the charter . . . we put 
... things like 'advocating for community youth.' They didn't under-
stand that. You don't have that in a child care charter [so) we deleted all 
that kind of stuff. . . . 
Group Live-In Experience, Inc. 51 
"[Then] ... we took building commissioners to thirty-three apartment 
dwellings here .. . before they would allow us to open up one single 
group home. They said [there] was a major violation to every apartment 
... [but] when I asked them to write down those violations on behalf of 
[a] number of families living in the building, they refused . No, they were 
only there because of child care, looking [at] the group home! 
"I think we have one house still in operation that the State Board [of 
Social Welfare] has not licensed . You just can't wait for them ... and 
their regulations as to square feet between beds, and square feet in rooms , 
and number of full bathrooms and number of half bathrooms. You know, 
if they would tell you actually that we don ' t want you here because [our] 
worker is afraid to stay on the street . .. then I would live with that. . .. 
Okay, we ' ll put a bodyguard next to your working people . That's a fine 
way to keep you from achieving what is in need! 
"It's horrendous! Some of these laws arc ridiculous . [For example, to 
open! .. . these two units [for multiply handicapped children), their fund-
ing source would be different. They would be called ICFMRs .. . Inter-
mediate Child Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded . Now the regula-
tions for an ICFMR are all institutional regulations. We have these 
youngsters living in two apartments on I 49th Street. There's no way I can 
make that apartment building meet the code for an institution . And at any 
rate, none of those kids lived in an institution that met those regulations, 
anyway . You know lit's as if] ... it's wrong for the community to be 
doing it and yet the State and City never do it. So it 's Catch-22 . You have 
to work through it . You know , you have to either ignore them and keep 
on going, or try to work through as much of it as possible ." 
OUTCOMES 
GLIE is a success story, having rooted itself in a devastated urban 
area, and grown from a single group home and budget of $75,000 to a 
multifuceted, million dollur program over six years. The program has di-
versified from its originul focus on gang-oriented youth, growing some-
what by happenstance in a decentralized mode into new dimensions of 
services . But the themes are still fundumentally troubled youth and the 
community of the South Bronx . 
ANALYSIS 
The social chemistry which results in the birth of a new agency is a 
multifaceted and complex phenomenon- usually a combination of con-
scious intent and fortuitous circumstance. In the case of GLIE, there were 
some fortunate occurrences, most particularly a timely suggestion that 
GLIE could begin operations by affiliation with an established agency. 
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This idea, although accepted with reluctance, accelerated (if not simply 
made feasible) the birth of GLIE. However, it had little influence on its 
eventual fonn. 
The environment in which GLIE developed, on the other hand, was in-
auspicious. Certainly there was a host of legitimate social problems to ad-
dress in the South Bronx, and there were new opportunities emerging for 
support of child care services to older, runaway, and handicapped youth. 
But there was a great distance to be bridged between the opportunities 
and the reality of services. 
Primarily, therefore, the emergence and early growth of GLIE is attrib-
utable to the bold and risk-taking, yet pragmatic behavior of its primary 
entrepreneur, Sister Lorraine Reilly. Her willingness to force the issues 
and test and challenge the bureaucratic constraints, sometimes overstep-
ping the bounds of technical legality, was instrumental in overcoming the 
odds against successful enterprise in the devastated environment of the 
South Bronx. This risk orientation is a product of the distinctly and inten-
tionally independent and unencumbered style that Lorraine Reilly person-
ified. 
Much of GLIE's organizational form also reflects Lorraine Reilly's 
style . Program units are small and decentralized because this allowed 
Lorraine freedom of action, and keeps each unit close to the grassroots, 
where Lorraine thinks they belong. A variety of programs have emerged 
because GLIE has been attuned from the beginning to expressions of need 
from the Bronx community, but also because some sources of funds 
(e.g., federal runaway funds) offer the prospect of loosening the bind of 
current funding agents (e.g., the local child welfare system) and permit-
ting more discretion. 
Finally, the GLIE experience reflects the tensions that inevitably arise 
when an enterprise founded in advocacy enters the regulated, bureau-
cratic environment of social service delivery . For GLIE the trade-offs be-
tween the advocacy and service delivery missions were apparent from the 
beginning, as GLIE was forced to separate from CLUB and drop its ex-
plicit advocacy orientation. Subsequently, the leaders of GLIE had to 
swallow hard many times, accepting constraints such as oversight by St. 
Dominic's and compliance with rules and regulations on services and fa-
cilities that inhibited a quick response to perceived service needs in the 
community. In essence, GLIE had to learn how to become part of the ser-
vice producing establishment without losing the energy that had sprung 
from its idealistic roots . 
Jewish Board of Family 
and Children's Services (JBFCS) 
PRECIS 
In February of 1978, the Jewish Board of Guardians (JBG) and the 
Jewish Family Services (JFS), two large social service agencies belong-
ing to the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies (FJP) in New York City, 
merged to become the Jewish Board of Family and Children's Service 
(JBFCS) . The merger was prompted by the retirement of the executive di-
rector of JFS, but occurred against the background of a long history of at-
tempted mergers of FJP-affiliated agencies . Arrangements for the merger 
were worked out jointly by the two agencies over a two-year period, 
overcoming various points of resistance. Through this merger, however, 
JBFCS became one of the largest social service and mental health agen-
cies in the country. 
THE ENTREPRENEURS 
The process of merging JBG and the JFS involved the efforts of many 
people at the staff and board levels of the two organizations. Various 
committees and subcommittees were formed to explore the numerous is-
sues and concerns associated with the merger, and to negotiate the param-
eters of the arrangement. 
Although .there is a history of "merger talk" among social service 
agency members of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, the specific 
chain of events leading to the JFS-JBG merger began with Sanford (Shep) 
Sherman, Executive Director of JFS . Mr. Sherman was contemplating re-
tirement and identified that juncture as a unique opportunity to pursue a 
merger. He broached the idea with Jerome Goldsmith, Executive Di-
rector of JBG. JFS and JBG would merge and Goldsmith would be-
come the executive of the new agency . 
Shep Sherman was a career social worker and administrator, but 
throughout his career, he kept his hand in teaching and in practice . He 
was an adjunct faculty member of three schools of social work in New 
York City, has given courses and seminars in various other universities 
and agencies, has been a member of the editorial boards of two profes-
sional journals, and has written extensively on his own . Thus, despite his 
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long administrative career, Sherman candidly admits that his heart has 
been in teaching and practice. 
There are strong similarities but also great differences in outlook be-
tween Sanford Sherman and his JBG counterpart Jerome Goldsmith . 
While not a practitioner, Goldsmith is also much the scholar, having 
earned a doctorate in education, had several university teaching affili-
ations, and written numerous articles in professional journals . But un-
like Sherman, who has been clearly ambivalent about his administra-
tive role, Goldsmith thrives on his work as an executive. 
As chief executive of JBG, Goldsmith followed a pattern of pro-
gram building and reform, and in the process increased the agency's op-
erating budget from some $5 million to over $12 million in a 13-year pe-
riod. He views himself as "an engineer of human services" and enjoys 
"thinking big" and translating grand ideas into programmatic initiatives . 
He also enjoys the political give and take, inside and outside his agency. 
that is required for successful enterprising. 
Jay Goldsmith says, half-humorously, that he sometimes regrets not 
having gone into show business, which he once had the chance to do . But 
his professional career has nonetheless provided him with the opportunity 
to occupy center stage, while at the same time allowing him to utilize his 
creative and political talents to dream grand designs and put them into 
practice. 
THE ORGANIZATION 
With representatives of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies 
playing a background role, the process of merger required the painstaking 
deliberation of the two organizational marriage partners, JBG and JFS. 
While similar in some ways- as Jewish-oriented social service agen-
cies-these two agencies exhibited more differences than similarities. 
Some of these differences represented complements which strengthened 
the rationale for merger. Others represented potential conflicts that re-
quired resolution to permit merger. 
The strongest complements lay in the programs and services of the two 
agencies prior to 1976. JFS was primarily a community-based counseling 
agency which provided various services to Jewish families, including cri-
sis intervention assistance, mediation service, homemaker service, legal 
aid, and family life education . JFS's program also included a rehabilita-
tion service for offenders in correctional institutions and on probation, a 
therapeutic summer camp for children ages 7 through 11, and a Joint 
Passover Association which gave supplemental income allowances· to 
Jewish families at Passover holidays . Overall, JFS defined its purpose: 
"To meet social and mental health needs of Jewish families and individu-
als ... of the city utilizing a broad spectrum of services: guidance, coun-
Jewish Board of Family and Children's Services 129 
seling, psychotherapy, as well as homemaker and other material adjunc-
tive services." 
JBG, on the other hand, was a "patient -oriented" agency, attuned to 
the needs of emotionally disturbed children . Its services included residen-
tial facilities such as the Hawthorne Cedar Knolls School and associated 
group homes, Geller House (detention services), the Linden Hill School 
(for emotionally fragile youngsters), and the Phoenix School (for serious 
delinquents); plus a number of day treatment and day care programs; and 
specialized facilities such as the Henry lttleson Center for Child Research 
and the Madelaine Borg Child Guidance Institute. 
In theory, the "preventive" family therapy-oriented JFS comple-
mented the treatment-oriented JBG rather well, providing an overall spec-
trum of required services for troubled families and children . The comple-
mentary quality seemed reinforced by certain common elements as well, 
including the emphasis on staff training and therapeutic mental health ser-
vices of both agencies . 
JFS cared for some 40,000 families per year, while JBG served 10,000 
children . The complements and overlap in caseloads of the two agencies 
are nicely summarized in a 1976 memorandum: "In the large middle, JBG 
and JFS caseloads overlap ... . At the extremes, caseloads may differ, 
but never in opposition. For example, at the extremes the Madelaine Borg 
Child Guidance Institute of the JBG will directly treat borderline psy-
chotic children; JFS does not. JFS, on the other hand, has under treatment 
single adults living alone or childless marri,ed couples; JBG does not. 
However, in the large middle . . . there are similarities: l) families in-
cluding children with habit or conduct disorders, neurotic traits, etc., are 
abundantly represented in the caseloads of both JBG and JFS; 2) adoles-
cents ... are similarly a large concern of both agencies; 3) both agencies 
provide consultative mental health services to nurseries, day care and 
community centers, and schools; and 4) both agencies offer preventive 
services in the form of parent education and adolescent guidance groups . 
"In the in-service training pro_vided for their staffs ... there is a core of 
teachable expertise derived from clinical experience and staff 'experts' 
(in the JBG, there is child development and child therapy; in the JFS, 
family process and family therapy) . For staff training in complementary 
or corollary modalities (for JBG, family therapy; for JFS, child develop-
ment and therapy), each agency has had to tum to 'outside experts.'" 
Still, there were certain areas of potential conflict deriving from pro-
gram orientations. Given JBG's more sophisticated treatment programs 
and residential institutions, JFS might fear being relegated to the status of 
an "outpatient division" of the new agency. And given JFS's particular 
focus on Jewish families, compared to JBG's more nonsectarian orienta-
tion, JFS might anticipate the erosion of its services to the Jewish 
community. 
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Basic differences characterized the two agencies' sizes and financial 
positions. A JBG prepared memorandum of early 1977 notes: "Total ex-
penditures of JBG were $12,376,000 compared with $4,097,000 for JFS 
(fiscal year 1975). In other words, JFS is about one-third the size of JBG . 
. . . [However] a comparison of JBG outpatient services with JFS, ex-
cluding the management and general expenses of both agencies shows 
that JBG's expenditures in this area were $3,693,000 vs. JFS's 
$3,527,000." 
Jay Goldsmith provides further comparison: "JFS [had) . .. a 4 million 
dollar budget, primarily in outpatient services. JBG had .. . a 12 million 
dollar budget with a lot of residential and outpatient services . The JFS 
had 77 percent of its money from private philanthropy (mostly from] the 
Federation .. . . The JBG had about 73 percent of its money from public 
agencies ... mostly public service contracts ... [and J 18 percent from 
the Federation [and other philanthropic contributions]." 
Of particular relevance to the merger, Goldsmith continues, "JFS had a 
2 million dollar endowment and JBG had a million dollars worth of debts . 
That was not a good combination." Some of those affiliated with JFS 
would worry that its endowment would be used up bailing out JBG. (See 
Risks and Constraints below.) 
The JFS, with its counseling orientation, brought roughly 80 social 
workers to the new agency, more than JBG. JFS also employed about a 
dozen psychologists and psychiatrists. But in this category and other staff 
categories such as teachers and child care workers, JBG far outnumbered 
JFS . Goldsmith provides an overview: "There were more caseworkers 
. .. from the JFS side .. . in the outpatient services. There were more 
[from] the residences and all other categories .. . from JBG. There were 
long-term, old-time, well trained clinical people in the JBG. There were 
more young, lesser trained . .. in the JFS, except for the top [administra-
tion]. There was a more formal structure in the ... JBG, and a more ad 
hoc structure . . . in the ... JFS ... " 
Of particular relevance to the merger, there was no immediately obvi-
ous successor to Shep Sherman within the administrative ranks of JFS, 
while Goldsmith of JBG was regarded as a leading executive in the local 
voluntary sector. Thus the question of leadership for the new agency 
would not be a serious issue. However, at other levels of the organiza-
tion, the staffing of positions would be troublesome. Both agencies had 
active boards of trustees whose officers coveted their status . And both 
agencies had field offices distributed throughout the city, some of which 
would require consolidation. The task of meshing the two structures 
would be a delicate one (See Risks and Constraints below). As Louis 
Lowenstein, first Board President of JBFCS diplomatically writes in the 
1978 Annual Report: "Not only did the rationale for merging our organi-
zations have to be explored, but we had to deal with the separate agency 
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egos and pride in their past accomplishments . The Jewish Board of 
Guardians and the Jewish Family Service represent, collectively, two 
hundred years of service, and any effort at reshaping service delivery had 
to be approached with sensitivity to their histories and philosophies." 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS' 
Early 1976-Shep Sherman initially explores the idea of a JFS-JBG 
merger with Jay Goldsmith at an informal luncheon meeting. 
Spring, 1976-Sherman and Goldsmith meet at Goldsmith's initia-
tive. Goldsmith indicates a positive response to the merger proposal and 
the two executives make plans for further exploration . A joint meeting of 
executives and board presidents of the two agencies is held. Agreement is 
reached to explore the possibility of merger, and the Federation of Jewish 
Philanthropies is alerted to this possibility. 
May 20, 1976-A meeting of JBG's Professional Executive Commit-
tee is held to discuss the merger proposal. Various issues are raised by the 
JBG management personnel. 
June, 1976-Goldsmith and Sherman circulate a memo discussing the 
rationale for merger with JFS, which indicates that the board presidents of 
the two agencies should appoint a joint committee of the boards "to begin 
the initial exploration of the issues raised in this memorandum and others 
which may be indicated as the committee proceeds .. . . " 
July 14, 1976-Goldsmith asks the Executive Committee (of the 
Board of Trustees) of JBG to state an interest in exploring a merger with 
JFS. The committee authorizes a subcommittee of the board to explore 
the issue . 
December, 1976-A joint meeting is held between staff of JBG and 
JFS to discuss the merger proposal. Various issues are raised in an ex-
ploratory discussion. 
January 18, 1977-The subcommittee on staff of the Executive Joint 
Merger Committee meets to review various merger-related issues includ-
ing staffing patterns, clientele, training and other items. 
January 31 , 1977-The subcommittee on finances of the Executive 
Joint Merger Committee meets to review fiscal aspects of the merger. 
February 16, 1977-The merger proposal is discussed before the fu ll 
JBG Board of Trustees. Previous meetings and discussions are described 
as "purely exploratory" and the Board is asked to indicate policy direc-
tion. Issues are discussed but no decisions are reached. 
April 6, 1977-The JBG Executive Committee meets. The results of 
several joint JBG-JFS meetings are reported by the Executive Subcom-
'This chronology is based primarily on minutes keptby JBG. 
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mittee to explore merger. Enthusiasm by senior professional staff and 
concern by JBG trustees are also indicated. 
April 27, 1977- A meeting of the JBG Executive Subcommittee on 
Merger is held . Goldsmith reports that he has met with the JFS Board, 
noting several areas of interest and reservation by that board. The sub-
committee votes to recommend to the full Executive Committee that JBG 
go forward with formal negotiations for merger with JFS . 
May 4, 1977- A meeting of the full JBG Executive Committee is 
held. The April 27 vote of the subcommittee is noted, issues are dis-
cussed, but no resolution is reached . 
June I, 1977-JBG Executive Committee meets again . Discussion of 
issues continues. The Executive Committee then votes to "approve the 
merger in principle," and to authorize the Board President to commence 
negotiations . 
June 20, 1977-The full JBG Board of Trustees considers the recom-
mendation of its Executive Committee and votes to "approve the merger 
in principle ." The Board President is directed to appoint a committee to 
negotiate with JFS and to develop a definitive merger plan. JBG merger 
subcommittees are subsequently designated, at the board and staff levels, 
to review financial, personnel, program, and policy aspects of the 
merger. 
July 12, 1977-A meeting of the JBG Merger Committee is held . 
Various structural questions including the organization and finances, 
board structure, and name of the new agency arc discussed . The commit-
tee agrees to retain paid legal counsel to prepare a corporate charter and 
by-laws. On the same day, the Joint JBG-JFS Merger Committee meets 
for the first time . Issues of parity and structure of the new agency are dis-
cussed . A subcommittee is designated to study the issues of board and ex-
ecutive committee structure for the new agency . The executive directors, 
Goldsmith and Sherman, are asked to draft how the programs of the two 
agencies would be integrated, as a first step to overall consolidation . 
Summer, 1977 - This period is described by Goldsmith as the "sum-
mer of discontent," when proprietary feelings on both sides become ig-
nited and the merger almost falls apart . 
November 2, 1977- The JBG Executive Committee approves a plan 
by its merger subcommittee, for merger. 
November 9, 1977- The full JBG Board of Trustees adopts the mer-
ger plan of its Executive Committee. 
November, 1977- A proposal for $45,000 is submitted to the Greater 
New York United Fund to help defray the costs of merger. 
December 7, 1977 - The JBG Executive Committee meets and reports 
that the merger plan has been approved by both agencies, and that legal 
counsel has prepared the necessary documents of incorporation. Gold-
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smith reports having met the staffs of JBG and JFS and having discussed 
the merger with various City officials. 
December 20, 1977-A meeting is held between representatives of 
JBG, JFS, and the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies to discuss the 
merger, especially the financial issues. On this same day, JBG and JFS 
senior staff meet to draft details of the board structure of the new agency. 
January 4, 1978-Goldsmith reports to the JBG Executive Committee 
that the NYS Department of Education has approved the merger, and that 
approval of the State Department of Mental Hygiene and Department of 
Social Services and the Attorney General's Office are pending. Official 
declaration of the merger is described as "imminent ." 
January, 1978-Notices of intent to dissoJv,e JFS into JBG, and subse-
quently change name to JBFCS are filed . 
February 8, 1978-The merger of JBG and JFS is officially pro-
claimed. The process of reorganizing staff, facilities, governance, and 
operation is begun . 
CONTEXT 
Merger is not a new topic for social service agencies in the New York 
Jewish community . As far back as the 1930s, the Federation of Jewish 
Philanthropies has encouraged merger discussions among its recipient 
agencies. Since the 1950s particular interest in merging JBG, JFS, and 
the large foster care-oriented Jewish Child Care Association (JCCA) has 
arisen from time to time. For FJP, merger represents greater efficiency 
and simplicity in the funding of child-oriented social services. As Jay 
Goldsmith recalls the history , discussions more frequently focused on 
JBG and JCCA: " . .. [The merger idea) has a long history .. .. [ln]l950 
. .. [for example) there was a visit from the JFS leadership to the JBG at 
that time to discuss cooperative efforts and ·mergers .... It has come up 
periodically ... because the logic of merger had been pressing for many 
years . .. . The question has always been- why- doesn't the Federation 
have ljust] one Jewish children's agency that deals with all the issues of 
treatment and placement? ... That was the logic, the unyielding logic 
that always pushed us . But ... [there was a] fundamental lack of sympa-
thy ... 'sympatico,' between [JBG and JCCA] that would make it im-
possible for them to merge. There was a competitiveness ... an uneasy 
... relationship between ... the two agencies ... [which] didn't aid the 
merger climate .... [Nonetheless j, Federation, each time, even in the 
middle of our discussions with JFS, convened [a meeting] of JBG and 
JCCA to see whether that [JCCA-JBG] merger could be once again re-
vived .. .. " 
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Shep Sherman recalls the debate of the 1950s: "[In] the 1950s, ... a 
study was done . . . and a proposal for the merger of a number of agencies 
[ was made] . . . . That . . . recommendation was debated and argued and 
(ultimately] fell apart. Then once or twice in the interim between those 
years and the present .. . there were starts made in this direction ... . 
(Once it was proposed that] . . . the three largest agencies [JBG, JCCA, 
JFS] merge .. .. That fell apart in a heroic, epochal meeting in which the 
three boards of directors got together for a meeting chaired by a Supreme 
Court Judge . ... One after another, the child care people ... the foster 
care agency people ... condemned the merger. . .. So that fell apart, and 
... [so] the thing . .. has been cooking for sometime but (has been], of 
course, on the back burner (of late] ... . " 
JBG, JFS, and JCCA have not been the only focus of FJP sponsored 
merger activity. For example, in a June 1976 memorandum, staff of JBG 
note: "Federation itself recognized decades ago, the value of such integra-
tion of services by creating the Westchester Jewish Community Services 
and the Jewish Community Services of Long Island, both of which en-
compass in a single agency the functions now carried out separately by 
the JFS and the JBG in the (city] .... " 
In the 1970s, the rationale for consolidation and merger was strength-
ened in the city by the decline of the Jewish population in that locale, as 
well as the darkening picture of philanthropic and public funds . The 
aforementioned I 976 JBG memo notes: " . .. For the immediate future, 
the prospects are that there will be severe contraction of the real dollars 
available from public as well as philanthropic sources . . .. (And] the 
movement out of the inner city of great numbers of Jewish families con-
tinues; the number of Jewish aged will continue to rise; there is a continu-
ing decline in the birth rate and therefore reduction in the number of 
'young' families." Therefore, the call for merger by Federation reflected 
the need to consolidate service arrangements in view of a declining popu-
lation and resource base, and an emphasis on greater efficiency. 
Paralleling the economic and demographic imperatives, the trends in 
the social service and mental health professsions also now favored the 
service concepts around which the JBG-JFS merger revolved . Two inter-
related points are worth noting. First, in the child care field specifically, 
there was a marked movement toward preventive programming, i.e., 
working with families to reduce the need for residential placement. A 
February, 1977, JBG memorandum notes, for example, that, " .. . pre-
ventive service projects aimed at 'saving families for children' .. . have 
been put in place in (various) children's agencies including our own ... . 
These are essentially family services utilizing a variety of social services, 
clinical input and supporting services to help maintain children in their 
own homes ." The implied reference here is to the 1973 New York State 
Preventative Services Demonstration legislation which provided funds for 
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such programs on an experimental basis. That l.egislation was stimulated 
by a general hue and cry in the foster care field that children have 
been placed outside of their homes too often, and too many for long 
periods. 
The second, more general trend in professional thinking has been to-
wards comprehensive models of treatment services . As the June, 1976, 
memorandum explains: " ... There has been an extraordinary expansion 
of knowledge in the field in the past several decades . The foundations for 
the separate identities of the JFS and JBG were laid many years ago, in a 
different era. . . . 
"In the past two decades there have been radical changes in our intel-
lectual approaches to social welfare and mental health work . The model 
of the individual patient and client treatment that had been based on phys-
ical medicine was considerably altered by our increased understanding of 
the interrelatedness and interdependence of family members, both in 
healthy development and in illness. Treatment has increasingly focused 
on the family unit and on other natural group associations ... . The chil-
dren's agency. like JBG. tries to cncompuss the family unit ... in its 
work with children; the family agency, like JFS, increasingly includes 
children ... in its work with family units .... 
" . . . Throughout the country there has been a trend in the broad mental 
health field toward merger of family and children's agencies . In hospi -
tals, for example, family psychiatry has moved into departments of child 
psychiatry and into the training of psychiatric fellows and residents . Fed-
eral and local legislation, guided by the best of professional thinking, has 
increasingly favored the creation of comprehensive structures for delivery 
of service. Similarly, mental health practitioners are becoming increas-
ingly more appreciative of the way in which individual and family dis-
ablement interlocks, and are calling for integration of practice 
specialties." 
During the period when the JBG-JFS merger was being deliberated, 
the parties were aware of the current interest by the professional commu-
nity . In December of 1977, Jay Goldsmith reported to his executive com-
mittee that the merger would be "watched . .. by agencies all over the 
country since there is a great interest now in the kind of model which we 
will be developing .. . . "And in January of 19'78, Goldsmith reported to 
the same committee that, "The imminence of merger .. . has also elicited 
a great deal of interest in the academic community, and we have been ap-
proached by a number of universities . . . about affiliation with the JBG 
Educational Institute ... . " 
Thus, it is no surprise that the JBFCS Annual Report should indicate: 
"The decision to merge .. . is based on the conviction that the compre-
hensive model of service, which is being adopted by medical and social 
welfare organizations throughout the country, is the most effective way to 
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deliver needed social welfare and mental health services to the commu-
nity .. .. " 
CHOICES 
Although its deliberation transpired over a relatively short period of 
time (approximately two years), the merger of JBG and JFS passed 
through a number of distinct stages of decision-making. Initially, Shep 
Sherman broached the proposal. Later, board members and staff of the 
two agencies, after substantial study and debate, resolved to merge 
- based on general principles of agreement on the shape of the new 
agency . Finally, the particular parameters of the new agency had to be 
worked through, in the process of actual consolidation and redirection, by 
multiple staff committees under leadership direction of Jay Goldsmith. 
The basic decision to merge was affected by numerous issues and con-
cerns, almost anyone of which could potentially have sunk the proposal. 
(See Risks and Constraints below.) However, the merger initiative was 
also driven by its fundamental logic, and by a good sense of timing by 
Sherman, Goldsmith, and members of their respective organizations . 
By early 1976, Shep Sherman was contemplating his retirement. This 
personal milestone required some decisions germane to the future of JFS . 
Clearly, alternative leadership would have to be found, but there was no 
immediately obvious successor in the JFS ranks. The existing deputies 
were either too old or ill, or otherwise unsatisfactory to the JFS board. 
The options were to initiate a search for new leadership, or to explore a 
merger. According to Goldsmith," ... They [JFS] really didn't have any-
body in sight, and after looking around they decided there was nobody in 
the field that they wanted. So the idea of merger occurred to them, with 
an agency where it had been discussed in .. . years past and discarded . It 
had ... been in people 's minds from time to time, as a possibility, [so] it 
was decided to explore it on their part and we were approached .... " 
According to Sherman, the search for alternative leadership was never 
really serious: "If the merger hadn't come off . . . we would have looked 
for an[ other) executive. Who knows? I hadn't thought that far ahead ... . 
I don't know that there would have been any other merger that would 
have made the same sense. . . . " 
To Shep Sherman, the merger became a central theme around which he 
would design his retirement. It was, in his view, a "golden opportunity; 
... the reason why the other merger [attempts] really fell apart was the 
competitiveness of the executives as to who was going to be on top, who 
was going to be dispensable . . . . And I said, 'Listen, we have got a 
golden opportunity here. I am retiring. I want out of the administrative, 
executive ranks . I'll support ... your being the executive. So there is re-
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ally no need for us to compete on this thing. We are free to look at what is 
really desirable ... without competitive, sibling rivalry.' And that is 
what made it possible . I would say that single thing ... made it possible, 
because it made it possible for the executives, Goldsmith and myself, to 
mobilize sentiment on our boards, in favor of it. ... " 
The merger idea had a compelling quality to both executives . Gold-
smith would be offered the leadership of a significantly expanded agency 
with a wide-open agenda, while Sherman could exit with a flourish, hav-
ing made an important contribution to his field and his agency . As Sher-
man saw it, these two loyalties were consistent and intertwined, despite 
the fact that JFS's identity might be submerged by consolidation: 
" ... The Jewish Family Service was my professional forum and home 
for over 30 years, and I have felt an attachment. [Feeling otherwise] 
would be like not caring what happens to your family . .. . I was deeply 
concerned about ... the continuity (and] ... the identity of the Jewish 
Family Service, even into the merger ... not as an agency (per se] ... 
but the tradition and the work that it is doing, and the reputation it has . 
. . . [The merger was a] last creative task ... (to] approach more the con-
cept, the holistic concept of ... individuals and families . Children and 
family, family and children .. . I think being able to help the agency into 
a new phase of creative ferment . . . hell . . . that is exciting and re-
warding, and gratifying .. . . " 
Once merger talks got underway between JFS and JBG, with FJP as an 
interested third party, the whole gamut of merger possibilities was raised. 
Federation again introduced the possibility of merger between JBG and 
JCCA, the two child care agencies, but to no avail. (The mutual disaffec-
tion still obtained .) The possibility of a looser affiliation between JFS and 
JBG, short of actual merger, was also raised by JBG board members . For 
example, in a meeting of the JBG Executive Committee in November, 
1977, it was reported that JFS was pressing JBG for a commitment to 
merge, and that JFS was not interested in affiliation arrangements . At 
least from the JFS side, the comprehensive services model and the issue 
of executive leadership made merger compelling, and Jesser alternatives 
unattractive. 
For JBG there were also some immediately compelling arguments for 
merger. One factor was JBG's strong identification with residential treat-
ment, particularly through its large and long-established institution at 
Hawthorne. Such a heavy emphasis on residential care was fast becoming 
a liability in the view of modem mental health and social service profes-
sionals, as well as a financial burden. Addition of JFS 's network of com-
munity-based services would give the new agency a more balanced image 
and set of resources . 
For example, at a May, 1977, meeting of JBG's Executive Committee, 
Goldsmith indicated that " . . . merger would give us an opportunity to 
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improve services for adolescents . . . without keeping us a prisoner of 
Hawthorne ." And at a June, 1977, meeting of that committee, it is again 
noted that the merger would help free JBG "from its dependence on 
Hawthorne ." 
Another factor for JBG was JFS's strong financial position, particu-
larly its private funding base. This was viewed as a potential source of 
leverage to attract more public matching funds to the agency, through the 
mental health system. JBG, with its mental health system accreditation, 
would be in a strong position to take advantage of this leverage . 
A January, 1977, joint board subcommittee on staff reports in its min-
utes that, "The merged agency with its Federation's total grants of 
$4,500,000 will be in the position of drawing down, based upon the 50 
percent Department of Mental Health Services (DMHS) match formula, a 
very substantial amount of dollars to expand mental health services for 
children and families . ... " 
An April, 1977, JBG memorandum also mentions the possibility of 
" . . . Expansion of service through utilizing the expanded pool of philan-
thropic dollars to match public funds." Similarly at an April 6, 1977 
meeting of the JBG Executive Committee, it is noted that "the resources 
of the merged agency would be helpful to the City, which could use these 
as matching funds ... and help draw more state dollars .... " 
And more than simply provide additional financial leverage, the addi-
tion of JFS might provide JBG, already a major agency, with additional 
overall "clout" with the City and State . Such a consideration was raised 
by one board member in a February 1977 meeting of the JBG Board of 
Trustees, who noted the need for a stronger negotiating position in view 
of the "fiscal crunch" imposed by the City, State, and U.S. And, in a JBG 
memorandum of April, 1977, the possibility is noted of "increased influ-
ence over public policy as a result of the size and prestige of the merger 
agency." 
Finally, given JBG's constant flirtation with operating deficits, the 
possibilities of cost savings and the addition of an endowment "cushion" 
that might result from a merger with JFS had to be attractive to J.BG. 
Consolidation of field offices and gradual shi ting away from residen-
tial treatment might ease the financial problems created by the Hawthorne 
operation, which Goldsmith describes as a "sinkhole" for dollars. 
Of course, JFS would be wary of having its endowment go down 
this drain (see Risks and Constraints), but JFS's financial strength was a 
distinct "plus" for merger, as seen by JBG. 
From the viewpoint of both agencies, the attraction of merger was ulti-
mately tied to the adaptation to a new service-delivery model. For exam-
ple, Jay Goldsmith is frequently recorded as saying that " ... if one were 
to initiate an agency today . .. [given] what we know about families and 
children . .. [we] really would not set up two separate agencies. 
[Thus] there was an impelling logic to bring it together . . . . " 
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Substantial discussion centered, throughout the merger talks , on the 
nature of the new model. The June, 1976 JBG memorandum on exploring 
merger asks whether a medical model, with generalists at intake and spe-
cialists (child or family therapists, residential treatment) called in as 
needed, should be adopted . A February, 1977 memorandum mentions 
four alternative models for services integration, offered for consideration 
by Shep Sherman. 
However, the speed with which a new model of service delivery would 
be implemented was uncertain . The June, 1976 memorandum also asks: 
"Should corporate merger be followed by an interim structure, which · 
would provide for an integrated administrative structure but with a dual 
service structure (family service and child guidance) to determine 
whether, to what extent, and for which services full integration would be 
useful?" 
Jay Goldsmith says he was committed to an "integration" rather than 
"umbrella" structure from the start, but was cautious on the timing: "I 
was very committed to a merging of the processes of family and child 
treatment. I didn't want to have a family department and a children's de-
partment, which is what most Jewish family and children 's agencies have 
in this country . l wanted to merge the process, and we're doing it by 
tracking patients into service with a different kind of intake disposition 
conference and the utilization of criteria that select one to fifty modes of 
treatment at different times, depending on people's needs . . . . 
"[However], the decision at the beginning was to make no changes, 
not to rock the boat. . . . There are certain requirements that have to take 
place. There are certain departments that logically ought to be questioned 
as to where they fit into the new service . .. . We ' re aware of them, but 
we're not moving on them right away ... There are a lot of issues . That's 
one of the things the Policy and Scope Committees [of! the board and the 
professional staff will be doing ... [namely] reviewing which services 
are still pertinent to our mission and which ought to be modified or elimi-
nated. And we will do that." 
Deference to the personnel within their respective organizations seems 
to have been a hallmark of strategy which Sherman and Goldsmith 
adopted to accomplish the merger . Having resolved to pursue the merger 
proposal, they were quick to involve their boards of trustees and their 
staffs in the deliberation process . Indeed, the executives took a back seat 
at first, until momentum developed . This cautious, low-key approach was 
in recognition of all the sensitivities involved in restructuring two large 
agencies . Board member and staff positions and personalities would have 
to be rearranged. Feelings could be hurt, and fears would arise . (See 
Risks and Constraints below .) A merger would have no chance unless the 
various personalities became an integral part of the decision process . 
Thus, beginning with the executive committees of the boards of trustees, 
and blossoming outwards to include staff, numerous committees were es-
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tablished to explore various issues and implications of merger, and vari-
ous joint meetings were held between board members and staff members 
of the two agencies during the period of merger consideration. (See Chro-
nology of Events .) 
Given this cautious, participatory approach, there was, of course, the 
possibility that more problems would be raised than solved by the various 
committees . Indeed, at a May, 1977 meeting of JBG's Executive Com-
mittee (of the board) concern was expressed that it would take several 
years to work out all the problems . Hence two stages of consolidation 
were identified-legal corporate merger, followed by gradual merger of 
agency operations. In general, as merger discussions proceeded, the feel-
ing grew that (legal) merger should be accomplished as soon as possible, 
before everything started to unravel. At the foregoing May, 1977 execu-
tive committee meeting, Goldsmith stated that he did not wish to delay 
any longer because "we are now at the right psychological moment." As 
Goldsmith recalls: "There were dozens of meetings that took place with 
board and staff ... that kept coping with the issues , but one thing that 
came clear [was that] if you're going to do it, the longer [you wait], the 
more anxiety develops and the more differences begin to·emerge. It began 
to be very clear that if we have enough confidence (that] this is the way 
we want to go, we'd better do it fast. Otherwise, it'll break up .... We'll 
work out the differences later. The board and the key leadership among 
the professional staff made that decision quickly. Otherwise [it] would 
have fallen apart . . . . " 
Finally, as the merger of two nonprofit organizations, JBFCS would 
logically incorporate as a nonprofit itself. This was always assumed and 
never an issue . Nonetheless, the preferred mode of merger would have 
been to dissolve the two original nonprofits (JBS and JFS) and to incorpo-
rate a new one (JBFCS). This would have reinforced the preference (es-
pecially by those associated with JFS) that the venture be viewed as a 
marriage of equals . However, technical considerations associated with 
JBG's mental health accreditations required dissolution of JFS, its ab-
sorption by JGB, followed by a name change . (See Risks and Constraints 
below.) 
RISKS AND CONSTRAINTS 
While the arguments for merger eventually won the day, there was a 
myriad of concerns by board and staff members of both agencies, any 
number of which might have undermined the venture. There were, for ex-
ample, certain recognized risks associated with loss of effectiveness, 
identity, and independence of the original agencies, and administrative 
overburden or financial problems for the new agency . 
For those associated with JFS, which had been mostly reliant on pri-
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vate funds, there was the feared loss of autonomy of a new agency heav-
ily dependent on public dollars, i.e., "that we would not [any longer] be 
. . . free agents," as Shep Sherman puts it. Part of the concern here in-
volved the more sectarian program of JFS, and whether the greater 
proportion of public funding would mean a loss of that identity and orien-
tation. For example, the observation was made in discussion by JBG's 
executive committee in June, 1977 that the City might pressure the new 
agency to serve more non-Jewish children . Throughout the merger delib-
erations the divergent orientations of JBG and JFS were recognized . For 
example, a June, 1976 statement on exploring merger asks: "With JFS 
serving a predominately Jewish caseload and JBG serving a significant 
proportion of black and Hispanic children, what result would the "mix" 
have? How could merger be directed to assure service to a larger sum to-
tal of Jewish clientele? How could the joint service not only maintain but 
significantly enlarge its role in the general Jewish community and in the 
various Orthodox Jewish communities?" The January, 1977 minutes of 
the joint (board) subcommittee on staff go on to state: "The issue of the 
JBG serving a large number of non-Jewish clients and JFS serving a 
predominately Jewish population was discussed. Although the implica-
tions inherent in this will need further exploration, it was pointed out that 
both agencies consider themselves sectarian services giving preference to 
Jewish applicants ." 
An April, 1977 JBG memo also raises the possibility that: "There 
might .be dilution of service to the Jewish community ." The concern over 
loss of identity with, and service to, the Jewish community, was not 
solely confined to the question of public funding, nor was it solely the 
concern of JFS. Jay Goldsmith explains that staff of the Federation were 
also worried: " .. . We ... had been meeting with Federation and talking 
to them about this [merger! . . . letting them know of our intent. Shep and 
I visited [the director) ... and he gave us his blessing and said it was a 
wonderful thing . . .. Meanwhile, the rumors began to creep back to us 
that [other FJP staff said that), 'It's not such a good idea because JBG is 
more nonsectarian in style and will contaminate the Jewish orientation of 
JFS .. .. "' 
Of a more personal nature, there was fear on the JFS side, especially at 
the board level, that the identity of JFS personalities would be swamped 
by the merger. Shep Sherman notes candidly:" ... What was unspoken is 
that some of [the JFS trustees! felt that they would lose identity in such a 
larger board. They were much bigger [fish] in a small pond than they 
would be in such a larger pond .. .. And (there were] .. . similar senti-
ments among the staff. . .. [In addition) . . . . in the staff ... the single 
strongest opinion was that the JBG orientation toward [institutionalJ prac-
tice would corrupt the JFS practice (and) they ... would become . .. less 
respected and valued [and] have Jess status .. . . " 
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From the JBG side there was an even stronger concern that the merger 
would risk a loss of effectiveness and decline in professional reputation. 
In a meeting of the JBG executive committee in July, 1976, one board 
member expressed the fear that the merger "may require total restructur-
ing of the services of the two agencies with the risk that you may be giv-
ing up two good things that work, for one possible [one] that won't." In 
April, 1977, a board member assetted that perhaps JBG should stick to 
psychotherapeutic treatment of children with emotional disorders and not 
take over a whole range of social services . In May, 1977, a board mem-
ber expressed the fear that the size of the new agency and the preoccupa-
tion with merger will deleteriously affect attention to the quality of ser-
vices . Perhaps the fears of a few JBG trustees were best summed up by 
one of them at an executive committee meeting in February, 1977 . That 
trustee stated his opposition to merger and said he felt strongly about 
JBG's tradition of "quality and greatness" which he asserted was due to 
the fact that "we cut our cloth to a narrow pattern . . . [of] clinical treat-
ment of the emotionally disturbed child ." 
An important area of risk, especially as viewed by Goldsmith and oth-
ers affiliated with JBG was the prospect of an administrative morass in 
trying to fuse the two agencies together, and overburden in attempting to 
administer the new creation . Of particular concern to Goldsmith were the 
potential divisions at the board and staff levels . Speaking of the new trus-
tees from JFS, Goldsmith observes, " . . . I was engaging in a relationship 
with a whole new set of power people . .. !some of whom] came with 
high levels of suspicion and even some distrust. . . . Some were sup-
portive but generally I would say that was an area of real . .. concern, 
having to reestablish yourself with that group and prove your capability . 
"[The merger) gave me a split board .... [It) carried a great division 
within the board and within the professional staff, of those committed to 
outpatients in community-based treatment and (those committed to 1 resi-
dential treatment ... [it was a] highly unstable professional situation 
with a great deal of suspicion on both sides. The assumption ... by my 
own [JBG-derived) staff .. . that I would betray them and their commit-
ments to child treatment, and suspicion by the newer staff for me .. . that 
.. . I wasn't either acquainted or representative of their particular spe-
cialty . . .. " 
Aside from the prospect of having to mediate internal divisions, there 
were more straightforward concerns over the potential administrative effi-
ciency of the new, larger agency . An April, 1977 memorandum, for ex-
ample, wonders if: "The increase in the number and variety of services 
located under the umbrella of the merged agency might pose administra-
tive problems." While in June, 1977 a JBG trustee questions whether the 
larger "conglomerate" agency would become too impersonal in style . At 
a May, 1977 meeting of the JBG executive committee, Goldsmith notes 
Jewish Board of Family and Children 's Services /43 
administrative changes were already underway, consistent with the reor-
ganization that would be necessary for merger. In particular, Goldsmith 
says he had already planned to be less involved in the day-to-day detail of 
operation but "closer to the concepts affecting the development of pro-
grams and services ." Hence the merger reorganization would not be sub-
stantially different from the goal of the current reorganization of the JBG 
to "create a management system that will free me to deal with issues of 
policy ." 
Nonetheless, the merger represented an administrative risk if only 
from the viewpoint of additional wQrkload in carrying it through. More-
over, Goldsmith was not unmindful that administrative problems of the 
kind potentially involved in merger, have unseated other well regarded 
executives:" ... There are a few key executives in this town who have 
disappeared in the last few months, who had very secure positions and 
were very important people . That's always a possibility that ... your job 
is not secure and you may not survive . And while I guess I've never re-
ally thought about that as a serious potentiality, sure, it's slipped through 
my mind . . . . " 
One set of risks of explicit concern to both agencies was the financial 
base of the merged organization . While there was some thought that 
merging a heavily government-funded agency with one that depended pri-
marily on philanthropy represented a beneficial "hedging of the risks" as-
sociated with the two sources, much more attention was paid to the con-
cern that the Federation might reduce its combined allocation to JBG and 
JFS. After all, Federation's interest in the merger was largely in saving 
money, and the new agency would represent an obvious target as the 
largest single recipient of FJP funds . The fear of cutbacks by Federation 
is noted in the June, 1976 exploratory statement and later in an April, 
1977 memorandum, as well as in the minutes of numerous meetings . In 
the minutes of the January, 1977 meeting of the JFS-JBG Merger Finance 
Subcommittee, it is stated: "The question of continued Federation fund-
ing was of extreme importance to the Committee since, if the two agen-
cies were to merge, Federation's grant to the combined organizations 
would represent 20 percent of the total funds distributed by Federation to 
all agencies . The Committee expressed concern that, in this contracting 
climate of philanthropic giving, Federation might not be able to fund the 
newly merged organization even at current levels; particularly, in light of 
its intent to reduce the levels of grants for the next fiscal year by I percent 
and substantially thereafter." 
Goldsmith reiterates the point and goes on to say, "We .. . had a ... 
meeting with Federation in which the (board) presidents of JBG and JFS 
and .. . the professionals met with ... leadership ... in Federation and 
(we asked] . .. if we did merge, what guarantees did we have [for] Feder-
ation not to use the occasion to reduce our grant. .. . [ We talked ofl the 
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concerns that .. . [we] would have ... about being vulnerable as a large 
target for future cuts, with Federation's merger coming up with UJA ... 
in the not too distant future .... And, of course, we gained a lot of reas-
surances . . . [and) Federation encouraged us to move ahead. . . . " Loss 
of Federation support turned out to be a well-founded fear, as it ulti-
mately became difficult to hold FJP to its promises of continued funding 
at the old levels. 
In many ways, implementing the merger was analogous to threading a 
needle-numerous constraints defined a narrow opening through which 
the venture had to be guided. Some of these constraints were simply an-
noying but necessary legal and logistical requirements. Others, however, 
represented delicate balancing of competing demands from various or-
ganizational factions . 
Goldsmith acutely observes that " ... mergers cost money. In the long 
run they save, [but) in the short run they cost money ... ,"To assist with 
the costs of merger, the JFS and J BG applied to the Greater New York 
(United) Fund for a $45,000 (matching) grant in November of 1977. The 
proposal lists $90,000 worth of short-run merger expenses including legal 
fees, integration of business operations, consolidation of program report-
ing and data processing, relocation of facilities, staff reorganization and 
orientation materials, and public relations materials . The actual merger 
process would, of course, transpire over a period of time. It is interesting, 
therefore, that there was some earlier discussion over how the merger 
costs should be paid for in terms of the treasuries of the original agencies. 
In July, 1977, a JBG board member (who, not surprisingly, was an oppo-
nent of merger) proposed that a holding company be set up and each 
agency pay separately for costs of the merger. However, this idea was re-
jected in favor of immediate consolidation of fiscal resources. 
Legal requirements represented a tricky, but ultimately not very seri-
ous bound on the merger process . Various approvals needed to be ob-
tained from the New York State Departments of Social Service, Mental 
Hygiene, and Education and the Attorney General. 
A basic concern was that JBG should not lose its mental health system 
accreditation. Jay Goldsmith explains that JBG technically had to absorb 
JFS (rather than merge with it) and then change its name, in order to ac-
complish this assurance: "[A] real merger meant both agencies would 
have had to go out of existence and a new one would have come into exis-
tence . That would have meant [that] the JBG would have lost all accredi-
tation with the Joint Commission and all of its psychiatric clinic licenses, 
and [would have] had to start all over . A clumsy and difficult process, 
so the JFS merged into the old JBG, and then the JBG ... changed its 
name .... " 
As Goldsmith goes on to observe, this technical process was not 
widely understood, and carried with it some trauma: "When that notice 
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appeared in the papers, that JFS was being dissolved, all hell broke loose. 
Social workers who never read the financial page. read the financial page 
that day . . . . Nobody ever reads those notices of dissolution of corpora-
tions . . . but they saw that." 
The really serious potential trauma that constrained the evolution of the 
merger pertained to parochial and proprietary feelings on the part of 
board and staff members of both organizations . The issues included use 
of JFS's endowment funds, job security, structuring of the new board, 
and the general concerns for parity in structuring the new organization . 
Two intertwined issues that arose through the merger discussions were 
the questions of JBG's Hawthorne Cedar Knolls residential facility, and 
the use of JFS 's endowment funds. The concern of some affiliated with 
JFS was that its funds would be used to finance the JBG deficits emanat-
ing from the Hawthorne "sinkhole" and other JBG residential facilities . 
As noted by Shep Sherman, there was the. further concern by some JFS 
people " ... who had had some experiences with .. . institutions that .. . 
Hawthorne {as) an institution that has delinquent kids ... (had an unde-
sirable] image in the community ... [that] would rub off ... on the 
JFS." For their part, some trustees of JBG argued that JBG should get its 
own house in order, and proceed with the needed renovation of the old 
Hawthorne physical plant, rather than divert its energies on the merger. 
This view is expressed by JBG board members at various meetings in 
1977 . But in a June, 1977 meeting of the Executive Committee, Gold-
smith said that Hawthorne needs restructuring, but he didn't think it 
should interfere with the merger. 
That dissipation of the JFS funds was a serious problem is confirmed in 
the January, 1977 minutes of the Joint Merger Finance Subcommittee: 
"Another concern appeared to be whether, by virtue of the merger, the 
JFS funds would or could be dissipated . Both Mr. Hirsch and Mr. Cohen 
tJBG trustees) indicated that once the merger had been effected, there is 
no way to protect the funds of either organization against the creditors of 
the merged organizations but that JBG's assets are substantial (although, 
primarily of a fixed nature) and they are not in any danger of claim by 
creditors in the foreseeable future although such is always a possibility ." 
Ultimately, the merger agreement required that JBG provide moral as-
surance that JFS funds would not be used simply to cover JBG debts . Ac-
cording to Goldsmith, " .. . Whether the money would be dissipated in 
JBG's residential centers which are notoriously expensive and have huge 
deficits . . . created a tremendous problem . ... JFS ... people had a 
great deal of concern about that. . . . We had to give guarantees that 
money would not be touched . While it was to become an asset to (the) 
new agency, the moral position of the new agency would be to leave 
those dollars untouched for several years, and not (have it] go toward 
solving deficits from the old JBG problems .. .. " 
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Even more anxiety centered on the question of job security . Care was 
taken, for example, to keep the employees ' union informed, beginning 
with a meeting in July of 1977 . Although the staff anxiety was pervasive, 
both Sherman and Goldsmith agree that the greatest resistance came from 
middle management-the division chiefs and program administrators 
who were uncertain about their futures in the new agency . As Goldsmith 
summarizes it:" ... The difficulty is not in the top and not on the bottom. 
It's where it always is ... in the supervisory group .... That's the group 
that's most resistant to change .... "And as Sherman notes, the problem 
was particularly acute for JFS administrators: " ... No matter how many 
times we said that there were no plans to cut anybody's head off, the ad-
ministrator .. . in JFS looked over at [his counterpart in] JBG, and saw 
that JBG had a bigger structure ... [and] felt, 'What the hell is going to 
happen to me?'" 
The issues of job security and redefinition of responsibilities had to be 
dealt with delicately. There were, as Goldsmith emphasizes, "endless 
meetings" between top management, supervisors, line staff, and the 
union . The union was guaranteed that there would be no job loss (lay-
offs) . The administrative consolidation was dealt with in various ways. 
Sherman explains how the borough directorships were handled: " ... We 
solved it in a variety of ways. In the Bronx we ... have co-directors . In 
[another case] one of the borough directors was [fired] .... In [another 
borough] one of the borough directors was promoted to another posi-
tion .... " 
If staff problems required sensitivity and delicate maneuvering, 
structuring the board of directors of the new agency required even more 
diplomacy. Shep Sherman explains: " ... There were one or two power-
ful people in the JBG board and similarly in the JFS board [who] if they 
had been crossed the wrong way . .. could have blocked [the merger] . 
. . . "Goldsmith observes further that" ... The board's been very diffi-
cult. The sensitivities are much greater ... . "The problems at the board 
level involved reconciling reluctance to abdicate prestigious positions , 
with the need to consolidate and provide for parity between people from 
JFS and JBG. 
The July, 1977 Joint Merger Committee featured a discussion of board 
structure for the new agency in which JFS trustees insist that the merger 
be a merger of equals . There was also sentiment expressed by one JBG 
trustee that greater representation [be granted to JBG] by virtue of its 
size. What is worse, Goldsmith recalls that JFS trustees were actually in-
sulted early in the summer of 1977 by the "high hattedness" of some of 
the JBG trustees: "[In June, 1977] .. . there was a crystallized resolution 
[of] ... intent to merge .... Then the board committees ... met at the 
top and everything began to go bad. Until we reached July, 1977, it 
looked like the merger was going to be dissolved .... Several of our 
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board members at JBG offended the board members and trustees at JFS 
... [because] the JBG crowd looked at [JFS] as an addition of an outpa-
tient service . .. [while] the JFS was very sensitive to the fact [that 1 this 
was a merger, not a takeover .... " 
There was sentiment expressed at the July meeting that all present 
board members should be allowed to participate in the new board , but 
there was no agreement on how that board should be structured . By No-
vember, 1977, the issue of representation appears to have been resolved 
in favor of equality between the two agencies . 
This seems to have been only the beginning of the resolution, how-
ever. The question of who would fill key positions on the board generated 
considerably more friction . Goldsmith explains: [We faced the question 
of] who was going to be president. ... We had two presidents ... and 
neither was going to step down . ... Finally, i.t was agreed that [the JBG 
president] would step down ... (the JFS president! would go on for a 
year . . . and after a year [the JBG president[ would then become presi-
dent for four years . 
" ... The former JBG president ... now has resumed his role of presi-
dency .. . and as the time has gone on since the merger, it's apparent that 
a lot of strength is in the old JBG .... It looked like all the key ... spots, 
by virtue of age and power, . . . were emerging as ex-JBG people . .. . 
JFS people were getting more and more uncomfortable with that. .. . 
[The ex-JFS president] got very stubborn about that and [insisted that) the 
Executive Committee (Chairman) ... which is the (second] most presti-
gious position ... had to be an ex-JFS activist. [However, the manj who 
had been Chairman of that committee for 12 years didn't want to get off. 
... [The president] finally .. . had to tell him to .. . step down and leave 
room for an ex-JFS person .... But in the process, we've had to juggle 
all the committees, the budget committee, the balance of power ... . " 
Essentially, successful adoption and implementation of the merger 
meant operating with deference to the sensitivities of people, staff, and 
board members, whose conflicting loyalties required solutions within nar-
row bounds of compromise . Goldsmith himself had to work at overcom-
ing distrust of affiliates of the old JFS while attempting to revise the loy-
alties of the JBG people without offending them . 
OUTCOMES 
More than a year after the formal merger, the consolidating and delib-
erating and rearranging were still going on . There were still numerous 
staff committees and meetings to deal with the issues of program and ser-
vice delivery. But the ferment seemed healthy. Speaking of experi-
menting with a new format of disposition conferences, Goldsmith seemed 
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to aptly characterize the whole state of agency affairs: " .. . [There's] still 
a tremendous number of bugs but what we've got is a sense of openness 
and candor and battle." 
There apparently has been learning and adaptation by staff from each 
of the former agencies. For example, Goldsmith notes that "there's more 
psychiatric input into the new JFS cases .... " At the same time, " ... 
[we're] incorporating a quick response .. . in order to give service to all 
clients who come to you. That's a new concept for the old JBG people 
who really shunned short-term therapy and only thought in terms of long-
term care." 
Not all parts of the two former agencies have been equally affected by 
the merger. According to Goldsmith, "It touched the (JBG] residential 
centers least [initially]. But training has been consolidated ... (and] all 
the [old JBG] outpatient units have changed dramatically ... because 
we've introduced the notion of a quick response .... We've (also) intro-
duced priorities into Jewish families [cases], with children having first 
priority . . . :" 
In those parts of the agency where merger was the most visible, reac-
tions were mixed. As Goldsmith sees it: "It's different in different of-
fices. In (some offices] there's a compatibility and excitement that's very 
good . [Elsewhere] the JFS crowd feels it's being swallowed up by the JBG 
. . . (orj the JBG crowd ... feels it's being swallowed up by JFS . .. . It's 
a function of numbers and personalities of the staff directors .... It's 
more the personality of the people who where chosen to head up each of 
[the] boroughs ... . " 
ANALYSIS 
The merger of JFS and JBG was a venture of mutual interest to execu-
tives Shep Sherman and Jay Goldsmith. To Shennan, whose heart was in 
practice and in scholarship, the merger represented a contribution to his 
field-a chance to set into motion the development of a comprehensive 
model of service delivery to troubled families. The merger also solved a 
potential leadership problem at JFS, and allowed Sherman to retire with a 
flourish. For Jay Goldsmith, the merger presented a whole new opportu-
nity set. He would be the center in a whirlwind of new activity. And, as 
the executive of the huge and financially comfortable new agency, he 
would have the chance to indulge in grandiose new plans for the reform 
of service delivery to children and families and to develop new institu-
tional affiliations and arrangements for melding theory to practice . 
The merger proposal was born into a receptive institutional and profes-
sional context. For years, the Federation had encouraged consolidation 
among its agencies, but with little recent success in the family and chit -
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dren's service field. Nationwide the merger of family and children's 
agencies was also in vogue. Such movement had both economic and po-
litical roots . As in the New York City context in which JBFCS emerged, 
traditional client populations were shrinking while philanthropic dollars 
were also becoming more scarce. Consolidation of partially duplicative 
and complementary systems made sense . Furthermore, social work and 
mental health thinking about child care was moving away from institu-
tional care and from the "child as patient" model, towards a more preven-
tive, family-focused approach. At the same time, family services were 
being encouraged to incorporate children into their purview and clinical 
specialties into their practice. A comprehensive, multimodal family ser-
vice model represented the current state of the art. 
The merger of JFS and JBG succeeded because it was carried out sen-
sitively, with a good sense of timing. The fact that one of the executives 
was retiring solved a major potential obstacle to merger, i.e. , the choice 
of chief executive. Still, other sources of pride and uncertainty had to be 
massaged. The two executives shrewdly engaged their boards and staff 
into early and detailed participation in merger deliberations. They took a 
back seat, go-slow stance in order to acclimate their organizations to the 
concept. At the same time, once all the issues were on the table, the exec-
utives, Goldsmith in particular, wasted no time allowing the momentum 
to slow or the merger to unravel. Rather than work out all the details prior 
to legal merger, the organizations were urged to merge first, and to con-
tinue the process of consolidation over time. 
The sensitivities and proprietary feelings of members of both organiza-
tions defined a set of constraints within which merger could be worked 
out. Parity was a key guideline. It was to be a merger of relative equals in 
which power and responsibilities would have to be properly disbursed . 
Care would also have to be paid to the use of funds . It would not be ac-
ceptable for the funds of one agency to bail out the deficits of the other. 
The case of the JFS-JBG merger appears to provide some general in-
sights on the character of at least one class of nonprofit organizations . 
Certainly this merger experience shows some nonprofits to be ones in 
which power is dispersed . Chief executives arc powcrful - ce11ainly mer-
ger is all but precluded if these men cannot be accommodated - but they 
cannot alone carry out such a venture. Unlike a profit-making corporation 
where an executive-owner might easily have his way, the nonprofit direc-
tor must mollify the personal and proprietary feelings of his board mem-
bers, as well as deal with staff, union, donor (Federation) and client (gov-
ernment) concerns . In the case of JBFCS, it was a semipublic process in 
which political as well as executive (management) skills were required. 
Florida Sheriffs Youth Fund, Inc. 
PRECIS 
The Florida Sheriffs Youth Fund (FSYF) is a nonprofit umbrella orga-
nization which administers three residential child care programs- a Boys 
Ranch, Girls Villa, and Youth Ranch - in three locations in the state of 
Florida. The genesis of FSYF is the Boys Ranch, founded as a nonprofit 
agency in 1957 by the Florida Sheriffs Association as a facility to help 
troubled boys . After some initial years of struggle, the sheriffs hired 
Harry Weaver as executive director of the Ranch . Under Weaver's lead-
ership, the organization has grown from a three-cottage operation with a 
$100,000 budget, into a thriving multimillion dollar enterprise . Most out-
standing of all, the organization runs entirely on privately derived reve-
nues and has become highly sophisticated in the arts of fund-raising, es-
tate planning, and public relations. 
THE ENTREPRENEURS 
The Florida Sheriffs Boys Ranch was established in 1957, several 
years prior to Harry Weaver's involvement. By the time of its 20th anni -
versary celebration in 1977, the organization had enshrined in folklore its 
modest beginnings, including lhe sheriffs and early donors who con-
ceived and implemented the idea . There were several key characters in-
cluding former Sheriffs Ed Blackburn and Don McLeod who learned 
about Farley's Boys Ranch during a trip to Texas in 1955, and brought 
back the idea to the Florida Sheriffs Association; Sheriff Hugh Lewis 
who led the effot1 to organize the venture, including the securing of land 
and funds; Tommy Musgrove, a wealthy farmer who donated the land for 
the ranch; J .L. McMullen who led a committee of Suwannee County 
civic and business leaders to persuade the sheriffs to undct1ake the ranch 
on the site of Musgrove's land; and Sid Saunders, president of the Sher-
iffs Association during the period the Boys Ranch was begun . These men 
were instrumental in launching the Boys Ranch, but it was a very small 
and shaky enterprise when Harry Weaver took over at the helm, late in 
1961. 
Harry Weaver's early career gave little formal indication of a manage-
rial orientation . Prior to 1956, he was employed as a teacher and coun-
selor at a state training school for boys . From 1956 to 1961 he was a fed-
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eral probation officer based in Tallahassee. But Weaver's administrative 
abilities must have been recognized by the sheriffs . He did, for example, 
organize an industrial arts program at the training school. But his appar-
ent motives for coming to the Boys Ranch in 1961 were very traditional. 
After being on the corrections end of the spectrum of youth problems, 
and perhaps being discouraged by it, he wanted to do something on the 
"prevention side ." The Boys Ranch was intended to help straighten kids 
out before they became seriously involved with law breaking. 
Weaver's style is much easier to describe than his motivations . He is 
very patient and soft-spoken, and also very disciplined. He is extremely 
meticulous in his attention to detail, whether it be records of children, en-
counters with potential donors to the agency, or keeping the agency's fi-
nances. Weaver is also a crafty and calculating personality who sees pre-
cisely how his attention to details fits into an overall managerial strategy. 
And if Harry Weaver is anything, he is a very skilled salesman. 
The salesman in Weaver comes out best when he is describing his ap-
proach to getting people, especially elderly donors, to contribute to his 
agency . It's hard for the outsider, even incredible, to think of getting 
someone to make a financial contribution as an exercise in helping the do-
nor. But Weaver has carefully thought through this approach and seems 
both sincere and convincing: " . . . I learned .. . (to get] . .. satisfaction 
[from] .. . helping people to give .. .. In order for a person to give, to 
give freely, they have to be comfortable in their giving . . .. We encour-
age visits to our program . . .. People want to be a part of it and see it. 
They don't want to know the gory details of the kids' lives. They know 
they have had a rough time. They know the world today is very difficult 
for teenagers . ... But they like to be a part of something that's good, 
wholesome. . . . " 
More than just making people feel comfortable about their giving, 
Weaver sees himself providing a direct service to the donors. Referring to 
one elderly woman who visited the ranch: "lt is obvious that she is in the 
middle of her estate planning, and that she needs help. She resists help, 
however, because in fact she and her husband have done quite well 
through the years with their investments. I have encouraged her to contact 
the trust officer, but she has stayed still since she has no relatives and no 
real close friends. . . . " 
Referring to another lady who accompanied the first on her visit: "Now 
. . . I was not unmindful of the lady who stayed off to the side . . . be-
cause she had the same problem. So once she started to leave, I thanked 
her for coming, and I asked her if she was on our mailing list . ... [It 
turns out] not only is she alone, no relatives, [but] she's a real estate bro-
ker .... Never said a word during our conversations . So what have we 
got? We've got two friends; they have got at least five friends each. They 
will be our friends . 
"Now we don't do that just for the money. We do it because it is the 
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right thing to do . People are very uncomfortable in their approaching 
death if they do not have their finances in order. They may be prepared 
for death emotionally from the standpoint of religion or what have you. 
But if they don ' t have a will, and if they don't have their finances in or-
der, they are miserable ... . We work at this, and we are going to do 
more, because we think it's a service. And we think it 's important 
whether they give to us or not." 
If Weaver is the skillful salesman, he is also a patient, pragmatic prob-
lem-solver by nature: "I enjoy working with people and some people say 
I enjoy problem-solving, and seem to thrive on ,crisis. I don't know that I 
do . I rather think that I'm a person who thinks that every problem can be 
solved, or a reasonable solution can be reached .... " 
Weaver's upbringing in a poor but dedicated family , sensitized him to 
the value of enterprising and hard work. And as an FFA (Future Farmers 
of America) member and a student of industrial arts in his youth, he de-
veloped a love for building and growing things, which seems reflected in 
his enterprising behavior later on. Just as important, the care he received 
from relatives under somewhat adverse economic circumstances, helped 
develop his sense of responsibility for the welfare of others . As he puts it : 
"[It's] how we used to do it when the bam burned and everybody pitched 
in and built the barn back for the neighbor. Or, if the neighbor got sick, 
everybody pitched in and harvested the crops .... "Thus, while Harry 
Weaver is a product of his pat1icular family upbringing, he is also a prod-
uct of the general social milieu of the southern United States- a conser-
vative-minded American who advocates the traditional values . 
Yet in many ways Harry Weaver is an enigma. He professes little in-
terest in money, or power, or prestige, yet in moderate quantity he has 
achieved all these . He seems seriously concerned with helping others, yet 
he is curiously unmindful of the needs of minority children . And, it is dif-
ficult to distinguish between Weaver the salesman and Weaver the social 
worker, especially in his approach to elderly donors . 
It is clear that Weaver is an enterpriser and a builder, who enjoys 
challenges-seeing what he can do- and enjoys seeing the fruits of his 
labors, be they physical constntcts, organizational structures, ·or pro-
grams of various kinds. He is essentially pragmatic, always behaving in a 
rational, carefully thought-out manner, and in accord with basic conser-
vative principles. In a wider sense, however, he seems curiously value-
free : "I don't know what my philosophy of life is. I just live everyday ." 
THE ORGANIZATION 
The genesis of FSYF lies with the Florida Sheriffs Association, the 
professional group of chief law enforcement officers in the 67 counties of 
Florida. In Florida, the sheriffs are locally elected and are influential po-
litical figures, both locally, and, as a group, statewide. Association with 
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the sheriffs has been a major factor in building the image and the support 
for FSYF. 
The sheriffs' role in FSYF has changed gradually over the years. At 
/the beginning (I 957), it was the initiative of the sheriffs that succeeded in 
establishing the Boys Ranch . Apparently, the notion of sponsoring a 
ranch that could "straighten out" young boys before they got into serious 
trouble, by providing a substitute for poor home environments, was at-
tractive to the sheriffs as an image-builder for themselves. The sheriffs' 
image was a negative (punitive) one with respect to youth -- they were 
the officials associated with juvenile arrests, detention, and referTal to 
state training schools . The ranch would put the sheriffs in a more positive 
light, trying to help youth and prevent juvenile law breaking. 
The sheriffs had little money of their own, but they were able to use 
their status to generate resources in a manner that was to set precedents 
for the pattern of future fundraising. They solicited both cash, land, and 
in-kind labor and goods, and hit upon the ideas of issuing honorary mem-
berships to the Florida Sheriffs Association for $15 fees, and designating 
generous donors as "lifetime members." In the 20th anniversary issue of 
The Rancher, State Representative Ed Blackburn, Jr., of Tampa (one of 
the original sheriffs involved with the ranch), recalls the early activity of 
the sheriffs: "The Florida Sheriffs Association was broke . .. [but] at the 
sheriffs' January 1957 winter meeting in Key West, the sheriffs voted 
that an Honorary Membership Program be made available to a selected 
group of good citizens in each county. These good people responded. 
"Six months later, the 1957 Summer Conference of Sheriffs was held 
in Sarasota and . .. as a result of the Honorary Membership Program, the 
Association had a bank balance of $7,000. 
" .. . the Associated Press picked up the story and Sheriff Hugh Lewis, 
of Suwannee County, picked up the ball and ran with it. [Farmer] Tommy 
Musgrove had earlier given ... some 20 acres ... to the Elks Club for a 
youth project; he still owned the 120 adjacent acres to the south. So Sher-
iff Lewis persuaded the Elks and Tommy to give this 140 acres for the 
ranch. 
"Suwannee County civic and business leaders got together a presti-
gious committee, headed by J . L. McMullen, to lobby and persuade the 
sheriffs to name this as the site for the proposed ranch. 
"This committee made the formal proposal to the sheriffs' directors in 
St. Petersburg in August, 1957. The sheriffs accepted, and the idea 
mushroomed . Adjoining this land to the east were two abandoned farms 
that were in estates, about 550 acres in all, and $31,000 cash would buy 
them both . " . .. With the help and advice of the local committee, to-
gether with the help of the two friendly Live Oak banks, the sheriffs 
bought these farms for cash . 
"The banks lent the sheriffs $13,000 for a total of $26,000, the sheriffs 
added $5,000 of their $7,000 ... . " 
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Blackburn adds, prophetically : "Sheriffs, of necessity, have lots of 
friends or the badge of authority and honor that they wear wouldn't he 
theirs, but all of a sudden they found themselves surrounded by a host of 
new friends who were attracted when they learned that sheriffs had a vir-
tue they had never before seen .... Countless friends, both new and old, 
responded. Money, materials, and labor were donated . Committees were 
formed in service and civic clubs and churci.Jes all over Florida .... " 
The legacy of these early years remains strong. The sheriffs sti ll play 
an active role as directors of FSYF. The image of their association with 
FSYF continues to be a major asset for fund-raising, and much of the 
style of that fund-raising has been retained . The sheriffs also form an inte-
gral part of the intake process . Admissions to the FSYF campuses work 
through the local sheriff offices . Indeed , Harry Weaver is careful to pre-
serve the close relationship with the sheriffs : " ... I work through them. 
[If] I have a speaking engagement in an area. I don't go to that speaking 
engagement unless I let the sheriff know I'm coming . I invite him to be 
with me, and he generally is with me .... When ... our social workers 
.. . go into an area, they go to the sheriff's office, if nothing other than 
to check with the secretary. . . . 
"Each kid comes to the sheriff. That application has to be signed by the 
sheriff ... . We like for them !the sheriffs! to stay involved, to know 
what's going on .. .. " 
The sheriffs muddled through the early years of Boys Ranch, going 
through four resident directors, and floundering financially . before Wea-
ver was hired. Weaver came in 1961, on the condition !hal changes 
be made in the organization, including the nature of the sheriff's in-
volvement in administration . Weaver recalls, " .. . We were on a shoe-
string . ... If it weren't for non-cash gifts, such as beef and things, 
... we wouldn't have survived . .. . When I came we could go no way 
but up ... . We were at rock hottom .... 
"[The sheriffs! wanted to do something productive . .. and they also 
wanted to do something to help their own image. If you're for mother-
hood, you can help your image, so it was a nice combination . Now, what 
they did not see .. . were the problems they were going to have running 
the program. The idea was great; it sounded beautiful, but running an 
under-financed program . .. was very difficult. ... At the same time that 
was all they could do, because that was all the money they had .... There 
were certain changes they would have to make in order for me to come . 
. . . Finally they made certain changes . .. . The board agreed that I could 
develop a budget and spend money within that budget and I could sign all 
checks . ... " 
Essentially the sheriffs agreed to take a less direct role in administra-
tion, and a more advisory role as directors. The ranch became more its 
own organization, rather than an extension of the Sheriffs Association . 
Furthermore, the sheriffs agreed to restructure the board as well. Weaver 
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explains: " ... In the beginning, by virtue of .. . lthej limited funds, you 
had to draw on resources from local people [the Suwannee Civic leaders] 
. . . and they sort of controlled the organization. . . . , 
Weaver insisted on a more statewide, representative board structure. 
The board structure that emerged required a majority of non-sheriffs, with 
appointments to the board made by the Board of Directors of the Florida 
Sheriffs Association . The FSYF Board then elects its own officers, and of 
course, the executive director (Weaver) is responsible to the board . 
Despite the continued formal control by the sheriffs over selection of 
board members, Weaver says, "It's not a problem . . . [although) that 
probably will change one day ." 
Weaver is generally pleased with his board members whom, he says, 
are selected because they ". . . will agree to attend meetings and be in-
volved .... That's the main [thing). The sheriffs have been very good 
about this. They want to appoint those that will be involved and take it 
seriously . You don 't have to be wealthy . You don't have to be a president 
of a corporation .. .. We have a CPA .... We like to have a doctor on 
there . . . [but) the main thing is to have a professed interest in child care, 
and what we are doing . .. . " 
Nonetheless, the financial contributions of board members have been 
important to FSYF. As Weaver recounts: "Let 's put it this way . One of 
our board members ... built the medical clinic ... and he built the ad-
ministration building at the [Girls] Villa. Another one . .. built this lmaih 
administration) building and another one was instrumental in building the 
cafetorium." 
Fund-raising has become a science at FSYF. Yet here, too, the roots in 
the Florida Sheriffs' original efforts, as well as image, remain strong. 
Amazingly in this era, FSYF operates (except for tax exemption) without 
a penny of government funds. Large individual donations or estates 
willed to the organization have been responsible for much of the capital 
stock (land, buildings , etc.), but Weaver insists that solicitation of small 
donors, bequests, and in-kind contributions of goods and services are the 
backbone of the operation . Of all revenues received in fiscal year 1977, 
55 percent represented direct gifts, 27 percent were from bequests, 11 
percent from income on investments, 3 percent from sale of livestock and 
farm produce, and 4 percent other. Most of the gifts (roughly 75 percent) 
were from individual donors , as opposed to organizations, and most of 
these, Weaver says, are from "$15, $20, $25 donors." (The list of donors 
numbers some 30,000!) It is in this area pat1icularly that the imagery and 
appeal of the sheriffs is most effective. As Weaver states in a 1978 speech 
to the National Association of Homes for Bo ys: "We are fortunate to have 
been founded by and associated with the Florida Sheriffs Association. It 
links us with law enforcement which has a natural appeal to a wide seg-
ment of society . The concept of sheriffs helping youngsters with prob-
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!ems to grow into law-abiding citizens rather than following the path that 
leads to delinquency and crime is even more appealing ." 
In summary, despite the fact that the sheriffs' direct financial role in 
FSYF has been minimal (on the order of $80,000 annual contributions in 
1979, out of roughly $4 million in total annual revenues), the sheriffs 
continue to be an integral part of FSYF-through their direct and indirect 
representation as directors, through their involvement in intake, but most 
of all through the imagery of "honorary sheriffs" and other public rela-
tions aspects of sponsorship. 
The corporate structure of FSYF has become considerably more com-
plex, since 1961 . But even on this dimension there is a legacy of the early 
years. Most important is the fact that the Boys Ranch was originally estab-
lished as an itTevocable trust which meant that the organization could not 
expand past its original purpose, e .g . , it could not accommodate girls. 
Nonetheless, the organization did expand to a multiple-campus opera-
tion, adding a Girls Villa in 1970, and a Youth Ranch for coed sibling 
groups in 1976. These additions were made by the cumbersome means of 
setting up separate corporations, each governed by a similar board struc-
ture and headed by Weaver as executive director . A separately incorpora-
ted Youth Fund was similarly organized in 1973 to carry out fund-raising 
and administrative coordination. In 1977, through court action, the provi-
sions of the original trust were broken and the various pat1s of the organi-
zation consolidated into a single operation, the Florida Sheriffs Youth 
Fund , Inc . 
At the outset in 1961, Harry Weaver established his firm control of the 
organization, and this has become increasingly important as the organiza-
tion grew into a multi -campus enterpnse with abundant physical and fi -
nancial assets and a wide-ranging system of patrons and donors . Weaver 
is particularly proud of how he modernized management control . The rec-
ords of some 30,000 donors are automated and "we will have everything 
.. . vehicles, children's records, inventory, the whole bit .. . on the 
computer." 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
1957 - ... Boys Ranch is founded by the Florida Sheriffs Association, 
with 140 acres of donated land and $5 ,000 in cash . The adjoining 562 
acres is purchased with a $26,000 mm1gage . 
January , 1959·-- The first collage is built and staffed , and the first 
group of hoys is admitted . 
1960- Two more cottages are added. Total population of boys is now 
32, with an operating budget of $114 ,473 . 
1961 --Harry Weaver is hired as executive director of Boys Ranch. 
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1960-1970- Boys Ranch expands to six cottages, 100 boys . Many ad-
ditional buildings are added. The operating budget grows to $400,000. 
1970-Florida Sheriffs Girls Villa is organized in Bartow, Florida, 
200 miles south of Boys Ranch . 
July, 1972-Girls Villa opens with 8 girls . It expands to 24 girls and 
three cottages by 1978. Ultimate planned capacity is 40 girls and 5 
cottages. 
1973-Fiorida Sheriffs Youth Fund, Inc. is established to carry out 
the administrative, accounting, and fund-raising activities of the Ranch 
and Villa . 
April, 1976-The Youth Fund purchases land and buildings for a third 
campus, the Youth Ranch. The Youth Ranch opens in 1979 for 10 chil-
dren (sibling groups). Ultimate capacity is 30 children, housed in three 
cottages. 
October, 1977-The Ranch, Villa, and Youth Fund are merged into a 
single corporate body called the Florida Sheriff Youth Fund, Inc. At this 
point the total operating budget is $2 .3 million, with a net worth of $12 
million. Harry Weaver, previously executive director of each of the sepa-
rately incorporated units - Boys Ranch, Girls Villa, Youth Ranch, and 
Youth Fund - becomes president of the merged corporation. The boards 
of directors of the separate units are consolidated . 
CONTEXT 
The locale of northern and central Florida provided particularly fertile 
soil in which to grow an enterprise of the kind that FSYF has become. 
There are several reasons for this. First, the state is politically conserva-
tive. Thus the notion of contributing to an organization associated with 
the function of law enforcement is a popular one . The sheriffs are a sym-
bol of authority to be respected and admired . 
In addition, the idea that FSYF operates Without government funding 
is also particularly appealing to a conservative constituency. As Weaver 
views his donor constituency: "These people want only to share their re-
sponsibilities with other individuals and families . They strongly object to 
the intrusion of governmental entities into their responsibilities . FSYF 
cultivated support of the conservative element, by appealing to the volun-
tary, nongovernmental feature of its operation. As Weaver emphasizes: 
" . . . Our donor family is . . . pretty much a conservative group of people . 
. . . By and large it's the person who feels the government has gone too 
far, that they give too much money away, that they waste money. It's the 
Proposition 13 people. We tapped [into) them .. . a long time ago .. . . 
We're extracting from these people funds that make them comfortable in 
giving to a nongovernmental agency . ... [We emphasize) sharing, giv-
ing, giving of one's self and time, without being forced . .. to do it." 
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A second relevant feature of Florida is its large and increasing concen-
tration of elderly residents. Weaver himself discounts this factor, but it is 
clear that the multitude of elderly has provided a lucrative market in 
which to solicit bequests for FSYF. Such bequests constituted some 27 
percent of income in fiscal year 1977. Weaver and his organization have 
astutely recognized and exploited the fact that many elderly people need 
help with estate planning. Thus FSYF staff have developed special exper-
tise in this area. FSYF publishes brochures on the subject and Weaver has 
spent a major proportion of his own time visiting with prospective elderly 
donors. 
A third aspect of Florida that has assisted FSYF is rapidly rising land 
values. This phenomenon has had two effects . First, it has caused tax 
problems for older land owners, making the donation of property to 
FSYF a more attractive proposition. Second, bequests of property have 
been a source of increasing wealth to FSYF, not only in terms of the 
value of current assets, but income realized from sale of land and use of 
land for commercial enterprises such as livestock and timber farming. 
The character of Florida's criminal justice and child welfare systems is 
another contextual factor that influenced the development of FSYF. The 
early negative association of the sheriffs with the punitive aspects of juve-
nile justice has already been noted . Part of the difficulty here arose from 
the dearth of alternatives provided by the State for residential care of chil-
dren . State training schools (viewed popularly as prisons for kids) were 
the only formal alternatives for delinquents. State funds for purchases of 
service from private child care agencies, basically for foster care, were 
also meager, although many of the 50 or so other voluntary child care 
agencies in Florida, many of them church-affiliated, did receive such 
funds. 
Thus, in a sense, FSYF stepped into a partial vacuum focusing on 
older, presumably predelinquent children, more than other agencies, and 
developing a viable financial means of supporting such a program. 
CHOICES 
The basic decision to incorporate as a nonprofi1t organi7.ation was made 
before Weaver's tenure as executive director. Originally such status pro-
vided the tax benefits to donors of the land·, cash, and other contributions, 
needed to assemble the campuses and initial collages. Other alternatives 
were essentially null. According to Weaver, the public sector was not a 
viable option in 1957, despite the sheriffs' positions as government offi-
cials: ". . . Back then you really had little government funding in this 
area . It was almost unknown .... " 
Even after Boys Ranch was established, during the 1957 - 1961 period 
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when the organization floundered , the public sector option was reconsid-
ered: " . . . When they (the sheriffs] had so much trouble, they thought of 
all sorts of alternatives . . . . They talked in terms of turning it over [to the 
state] ... [but] ... there were not enough [sheriffs] for it .... "It can 
only be guessed that the sheriffs had insufficient confidence that the state 
would carry out the envisioned purpose of preventive programming; and 
indeed they may have been philosophically opposed to seeking govern-
ment involvement. ln any case, many of the sheriffs probably believed 
there was still a chance that the Boys Ranch could be made viable as a 
private venture. 
According to Weaver, the profit-making sector was also a possible op-
tion. But again, this option violated the original intent. Weaver observes : 
" ... I could have become a millionaire in profit-making .. . but it would 
be with a different kind of youngster . It would be for the youngster with 
parents of means , presidents' of corporations children and this sort of 
thing .. . . We looked at that [profit-making alternative ] very carefully 
. .. [But with] the kids that we take ... we don ' t even discuss finances 
with a family .... First we determine ... whether the youngster needs to 
come. Then if we accept it, and the parents can give a dollar a month, we 
expect them to do that [but only) because that's therapy . .. . " 
Within the framework of the nonprofit form, Weaver and the sheriffs 
made some basic strategic policy decisions which enabled the agency to 
stabilize and later to prosper. The most fundamental of those decisions 
was the setting of priorities . It was decided that building the agency's fi -
nancial base would be the first order of business. Programmatic consider-
ations would take a back seat. As Weaver puts it: " ... You have to have 
money before you can do things . You see, that's always the dilemma . 
. . . This conflict in a human services organization between fiscal people 
and program people . But you have to recognize that you can have the 
most beautiful plan in the world , and great ideas, but unless you have the 
money to put them into effect, they're not worth anything . All you 're do-
ing is dreaming ." 
Given the financial imperative, Weaver' s plans were impressive, espe-
cially in an era of relative decline in philanthropy . His intent was to build 
an endowment large enough to insulate the agency from adversity: "We 
don't want to amass a lot of reserves ... We don't want to do like Boy's 
Town ... but on the other hand, we have to make sure that we are pro-
tected in case of an adversity or disaster, or something like that. So we 
are trying to come up with a formula that will say- with this many chil-
dren, with this many fixed assets, such as buildings and equipment, and 
so on .. . the reserve should equal this . And [we would) stay with that 
formula ... [and not] over-extend ... [ourselves]." 
Perhaps more impressive than the goal of financial independence is the 
manner in which the agency chose to raise its funds. Unique advantage 
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was taken of both the affiliation with the sheriffs, the conservative mi-
lieu, and the substantial elderly population in Florida, to develop a finan-
cing capacity focused totally on private giving. Weaver recalls that latch-
ing onto the particular donor groups at the beginning was somewhat ad 
hoc, perhaps fortuitous, but having done so, the avoidance of government 
funding became a requirement:" . . . I've always been asked . .. at speak-
ing engagements ... 'Do you accept state or federal funds?' ... People 
like this business of being able to do [things independent of government) . 
. . . It's bred in them .. . the sheriffs and everybody . .. . " 
Asked if racial attitudes have anything to do with avoidance of govern-
ment funds, Weaver replies," ... No, it's deeper than that. It's the being 
told what to do and how to do it. . .. You know what government funds 
do . .. . Boy, they get you . As a matter of fact, the racial (factor] has 
nothing to do with it ... [although it may have] years ago." 
Similarly, FSYF chose to go its own way in fund-raising, independent 
of organized charities such as United Fund. According to Weaver, "We 
don't get involved in that. ... They've wanted us because we would be a 
good representative in the United Fund . .. a good agency for them to say 
that they support ... [but they don't give much money] and . . . first you 
have to go through a lot of red tape. So it just doesn't pay us ." 
Having restricted itself to its own private fund-raising, FSYF became 
expert in various techniques, ranging from the collection, utilization and 
sale of non-cash gifts, to personalized mass solicitation of small donors, 
organized visits to the ranch, estate planning and solicitation of bequests, 
setting up memorial funds, cultivation of the large donors by honorary 
memberships and prominent display of donor names on campus streets 
and buildings, elaborate coverage of donors in the agency's magazine, 
and so on . 
Significantly, the choice of private giving as the basic avenue of re-
source development, served to reinforce the basic policy decision to em-
phasize finances over program as first priority. While the FSYF child care 
program certainly was more than adequate in terms of activity content and 
physical amenities, program development played second fiddle . Com-
pared to the planning that went into resource development, program plan-
ning was ad hoc. As Weaver describes the program: " ... We really [do) 
not have a treatment modality .... I like to think of ours as PLT (Practi-
cal Living Therapy) . We have a little of all of it ... behavior modifica-
tion ... group-guided interaction [etc.] . . .. It's a very practical ap-
proach. Had I been able to come up with . . . some definite treatment 
modality of my own selection and development, l would have been more 
comfortable . . . but 1 never did have it clearly in mind . ... " 
Weaver and his staff were, in 1979, first getting around to an orga-
nized, systematic evaluation of their child care methodology and pro-
gram. 
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Not only was the child care program given a second order of attention, 
but in many subtle and not so subtle ways it was shaped and influenced by 
the focus on donors . The physical campuses are a positive manifestation 
of this . They are kept clean and manicured, and constantly open for visi-
tation and inspection. Just as conspicuously, however, every road and 
building carries the name of a donor, and a luxurious guest cabin is 
maintained. 
But there are more troublesome influences also. The admissions policy 
seems very conservative for an agency presumably designed to deflect de-
linquent behavior. There have been only a few minority group children, 
forcing one to wonder if donors, some of whom Weaver admits were bi-
ased, would be turned off by too many nonwhite faces. And despite Wea-
ver's observation that: "Our youngsters are a little more disturbed than 
those in most of the other homes .... We are geared to the teenager. 
They're more difficult to work with .... "The criteria of admissions, as 
specified on the intake form require that the youngster" ... be of average 
or above intelligence; not have been adjudicated a delinquent; be in good 
physical health, have no severe personality problems . . . be recom-
mended by the local sheriff." Furthermore, given the size of FSYF's bud-
get, the agency was conservative in the numher of children it served. 
(The agency served under 200 children in a given year.) Weaver says, 
"We are trying to maintain the right number, for quality. We could care 
for a lot more kids, but it would be just a mill .... " 
The intake form also required that a child "agree to receive religious 
instruction ." This stipulation is reflective of the general style of the 
agency, not only for children but staff as well . Again, it all revolves 
around the donors . Weaver is quite candid about this: "[Although ] we get 
very little money from churches .. . we ... have compulsory church 
times . . .. We . .. require staff who live on campus to attend church ... . 
We could not hire anyone with a beard .. .. They'd have to shave it off, 
you see, because of the people that support [us]. And this has nothing to 
do with the character of the person, but it's that identification .. .. We 
can't have extremely long hair . It doesn't have to be as short as mine, but 
we can never have that. ... Where you get your money, and how you get 
it, dictates what you do and how you do things ... . " 
Finally, the whole corporate restructuring from the original Boys 
Ranch, to the umbrella Youth Fund, was closely related to fund-raising 
considerations . Essentially, the original incorporation of the Boys Ranch 
eventually proved too cumhersome and restrictive. This first became 
clear with the undertaking in 1970 of the Girls Villa, under stimulus of 
the Sunshine State Women's Chamber of Commerce. At this juncture, it 
was apparent that broad-based support could be enhanced by service to 
girls. (Later, programmatic considerations also indicated the need to pro-
vide coed care of sibling groups, leading to the Youth Ranch project.) In 
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any case, such constituencies could not be addressed through the restric-
tive trust of the Boys Ranch, so Weaver and the sheriffs embarked on a 
deliberate strategy of separate incorporations in order to accommodate 
these constituencies in the short run, and make a case later, for consolida-
tion and lifting of the restrictions. Weaver describes the circumstances: 
" .. . People were partial to the Ranch, and there were those who were 
opposed to starting the Girls Villa [but] . . . we had some real dissension 
within the donor family as to whether to give to boys or girls .... And I 
sensed that early . Of course, what I wanted .. . at that point [was to) have 
one legal entity, [but] it [was) complicated by the fact that the Boys 
Ranch was established under a charitable trust .. . [ a) very difficult trust 
to break. 
" ... The Sunshine Women's Chamber of Commerce gave us $70,000 
to get (the Girls Villa) started . ... Then (when) we received [donated) 
funds we kept everything separate. We had duplication of everything. We 
wrote separate checks, had separate bank accounts, and the whole bit. " 
Part of the problem was solved in 1973, with the establishment of (an-
other) separately incorporated Youth Fund . As Weaver notes in his 1978 
National Association of Homes for Boys (NAHB) address: " ... In 1973, 
we established a third organization (or legal entity) to provide 'an um-
brella of support' over the Boys Ranch and Girls Villa .... The Youth 
Fund . .. took on the responsibility for all major administrative, account-
ing, and fund-raising activities of both the Ranch and Villa. 
"With three organizations (the Boys Ranch, Girls Villa, and Youth 
Fund) in operation and a fourth (the Youth Ranch) on the horizon, some 
type of move toward unification seemed wise . We already had three sepa-
rate boards of trustees, three executive committees ... and three separate 
sets of minutes .. .. We were doing three of everything . . . in spite of the 
Youth Fund organization that we had established to eliminate duplicated 
effort. . . . 
". . . I had an ulterior motive in all of it. I saw eventually that the 
Youth Fund would be the umbrella . .. . [So] we [had) three sets of every-
thing ... cumbersome and bulky, and the circuit judge went right along 
with [our arguments for consolidation) . . . . [Had] we tried to do that ... 
with just the Boys Ranch [he ] would not have gone along with it." 
RISKS AND CONSTRAINTS 
Harry Weaver describes himself as a risk-taker. Indeed, his coming to 
Boys Ranch in 1961 is evidence of this, as he gave up a secure, well-
paying job as a federal probation officer, which promised an early retire-
ment and a good pension, to lead an enterprise which was on the financial 
ropes. Having come to the Ranch, Weaver continued to take gambles. 
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For example, during his early days at Boys Ranch, Weaver directly su-
pervised FSYF's child care program, and he believes that perhaps the 
riskiest decision he has made at FSYF was to move himself out of direct 
programming involvement and into the fund-raising function: "I had trou-
ble with it for a while .. .. I was very possessive of the kids and the pro-
gram. I probably thought that nobody else could do it like I could . . .. 
[But] we had to .. . make a choice. We had to have money .... [None-
theless] I felt uncomfortable because it might have an adverse effect on 
our income [too] .. . if we had problems, or some crisis ." 
As noted earlier, another of Weaver's gambles was the gambit of sepa-
rately incorporating the Villa and the Youth Fund, in the belief that the 
courts would allow ultimate consolidation with the Ranch . He might have 
been stuck permanently with the cumbersome multi -corporate structure. 
Overall then, FSYF under Weaver undertook a number of significant 
risks in the short run, in order to build a stable base and hedge in the long 
run . It has been the basic corporate strategy of FSYF to build an efficient 
organizational structure , backed by a sufficient financial reserve, to buf-
fer the agency from whatever changes in donor behavior or governmental 
regulation (e.g., tax exemption policy) may obtain in the future. 
From the beginning of Weaver's tenure ( 1961 ), corporate decisions 
had to conform to various institutional constraints. Some of these have al-
ready been noted . or implied. For example, the restrictive trust under 
which the Boys Ranch was originally incorporated, required some organi-
zational acrobatics to accommodate and eventually circumvent it. Prior to 
consolidation , for instance, funds could not be easily moved between the 
Ranch and the Villa, restricting overall flexibility in program and re-
source development. 
Similarly, in the funding area FSYF had to Jive with certain restric-
tions, emanating from three sources- the marketplace, the sheriffs, and 
the donors . 
The marketplace has always been viewed as a source of fiscal disci-
pline by FSYF. At the beginning of Weaver's tenure at FSYF, it was a 
matter of avoiding bankruptcy ("It takes money to operate . . . you have 
to pay your staff.") Later on, despite some calculated risks, expenditures 
at FSYF continued to be rigorously justified . 
While on balance, association with the sheriffs has by far been a net as-
set, this relationship also imposed constraints. For example, care has con-
tinually been taken to preserve the wholesome, law abiding image. In the 
fund-raising area , Weaver explains: " . . . We have to be very careful in 
gifts to us . We can't let anybody of an underworld nature give to us ... . 
We have had to refuse money .. . send some money back. We can'tlet a 
known criminal element be seen with one of these [FSYF) bumper stick-
ers on his car." 
The greatest source of restriction remained the donor population, how-
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ever. The overall shaping of FSYF's program and style by the prefer-
ences of the donor population has already been discussed. More specifi-
cally, despite the consolidation of the Youth Fund, donors were able to 
designate particular usage for the funds they donate (e.g., building, 
scholarships, etc .). This, of course tended to reduce the agency's flexibil-
ity in expenditures . But FSYF was extremely creative in recognizing, in-
deed appealing to, the tendency of donors to try to earmark how their dol-
lars are spent. The theme which FSYF adopted-"Something for 
Everyone"- meant just that. The organization developed elaborate lists 
of items .and programmatic needs that donors could "buy" for the agency, 
as well as a variety of general purpose memorial and other funds to which 
they would contribute. 
Still the donor influence at FSYF has been profound . For example, 
FSYF became a fairly expansive agency in terms of multiple campuses 
and intake services, and ranged far and wide for donors, around the state; 
but it was restricted to Florida . Weaver says, "There's too much to do 
here ... . I think [expanding outside Florida is) going too far ... . The 
needs are just so great ... in the state.' Why do that? . . . There's no rea-
son . . .. " 
This seems a curiously modest position for an enterprising, risk-taker 
of Weaver's caliber. But the reasons may have something to do with the 
donor base . Going interstate would involve overview, perhaps interfer-
ence by governments in other states, or perhaps even by the federal gov-
ernment under the guise of interstate commerce . FSYF would also risk 
losing the "take care of one's own" community flavor of its operation, 
and its special association with the image of the local sheriffs. Such a sit-
uation would be anathema to the conservative element that built FSYF. 
OUTCOMES 
To the outside observer, FSYF is a hugely successful physical and fi -
nancial operation. Under Weaver's direction, the agency moved from a 
$114,000 operating budget in 1960 to a $2.3 million budget in fiscal year 
1979- all of it from private sources. Just as impressive, the agency gen-
erated a substantial surplus of revenue over current expenditures (e .g. , 
$836,000 in fiscal 1977), permitting it to amass a net worth of more 
than $12 million in assets. These assets include substantial holdings of 
real estate and marketable securities, as well as commercially viable 
timber and livestock operations . The intent was to build a self-sustaining 
endowment . 
Managerially, FSYF is a highly professional business operation . It uti-
lizes modern techniques of data processing, and is meticulous in its ac-
counting and management control, ambitious in its investment program, 
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and streamlined and constantly self-evaluating in its internal organiza-
tion . Its fund-raising operations were most innovative, meticulous, and 
diversified. FSYF was highly sophisticated in its approach to estate plan-
ning, personalized solicitation of large numbers of small donors, appeal 
to large donors, and utilization of non-cash contributions . 
Based on its affiliation with the sheriffs, and its careful study of the 
psychology of giving and special attention to its own image, FSYF 
emerged as a public relations masterpiece . In Florida, the Boys Ranch be-
came practically a household word-representing a good, wholesome, 
popular, charitable cause. Strategic, professional use of the media-tele-
vision, films, literature-broadcast this word in an eminently successful 
way . 
The reality of FSYF's child care program was somewhat less clear. No 
doubt, it had a wholesome program, with marvelous physical facilities 
and a well-paid staff. But the notion that it was making a serious impact 
on preventing delinquency is unproven. Although one may argue that pre-
vention requires taking in a youngster before he becomes seriously in-
volved with law-breaking, FSYF's intake policy seemed particularly 
timid. The emphasis was on the deserving child of unfortunate circum-
stances, rather than any demonstrated risk of delinquency. 
Furthermore, considering the scope of FSYF's financial success, the 
agency did not extend itself very far in terms of the number of children 
served. While there was expansion to additional campuses and a con-
scious widening of orientation from local (Boys Ranch) to statewide. the 
total population served less then doubled in the 1970s while the operating 
budget (not counting accumulated surpluses) increased fivefold. Rather 
the emphasis was on establishing a firm financial base for the future of 
the agency by building up assets . 
ANALYSIS 
The chemistry which resulted in the spectacular development of the 
Florida Sheriffs Youth Fund appears to have had three essential elements: 
the entrepreneurial talent of Harry Weaver, the special imagery of the 
sheriffs, and the fertile environment of conservative and elderly donors . 
Clearly Weaver was a driving force . Before his tenure the Boys Ranch 
was headed for failure . Weaver was the master builder and salesman who 
turned the operation around . He seemed to be motivated largely by the 
satisfaction of experiencing the fruits of his building efforts, seeing what 
he could do in constructing, physically and organizittionally, a viable en-
terprise almost from scratch . 
But Weaver is not simply a builder by instinct and motivation; he is 
also a social worker . Possibly as a result of his upbringing, he needed to 
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feel that he was "helping people ." Perhaps that is why he was such an ef-
fective salesman. When the organization required that he become a fund-
raiser rather than be directly involved with the children, he transformed 
this role into one of counselor for the elderly. He convinced himself that 
he was performing a service for his donors, and exuded the sincerity that 
came with this resolution. Thus he could not be easily dismissed by po-
tential donors who may have suspected that it was simply their money he 
and the Youth Fund were after. 
The imagery of the sheriffs played a very special role in the evolution 
of FSYF. The sheriffs "law and order, helping" image certainly assisted 
the agency to develop the required philanthropic base of support and 
make the ranch a public relations man's dream. 
The social environment of a conservative, elderly population of poten-
tial contributors in Florida was the third element of FSYF's success. 
Surely, the Florida of the 1960s and 1970s was one of the more fertile 
fields in which to solicit such a group. But this is probably more a matter 
of degree than kind. Other states have similar populations, perhaps in 
smaller numbers. Essentially, it was the genius of Weaver and his staff, 
in organizational design and public relations, that enabled the tapping of 
this resource in such a spectacular way . 
Given the essential chemistry, the "flashpoint" was the decision in the 
early 1960s to put financial development as the agency's first priority. 
This decision influenced not only the corporate, financial success but pro-
foundly shaped the style and program of the agency itself. The donor 
reigned supreme at FSYF, his influence seen and felt in the physical facil-
ities, administrative operations, staffing, programming, and intake poli-
cies. Weaver claims that by giving primacy to the agency's sources of 
support, FSYF put the horse before the cart-establishing a firm organi-
zational base to facilitate carrying out the agency's mission . The reverse 
may also be argued. Over time, the approach may become more bal-
anced. According to Weaver. " . .. I believe that we have a good pro-
gram .... Of course, it is not what we want it to be one day, but we each 
day work towards excellence in these areas . 
"I like to think that we put equal emphasis on our children's programs 
and our public relations and fund-raising. I am convinced that we cannot 
survive without placing equal emphasis in these areas." 
Outpatient Clinic 
(Sagamore Children's Center) 
PRECIS 
Sagamore Children's Center is one of five psychiatric children's hospi-
tals operated by the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene . In 
1974, under the leadership of its director, Dr. Mary Hagamen, Sagamore 
received a three year hospital improvement grant from U.S. H .E.W. to 
establish an outpatient program. Over the period of the grant, a compre-
hensive program of outpatient and parent-training services was devel-
oped, moving the emphasis of Sagamore's overall program from inpatient 
to outpatient care. Following expiration of the grant and the departure of 
Dr. Hagamen, this emphasis was largely dissipated, although some of the 
new services have been continued. 
THE ENTREPRENEUR 
Establishing Sagamore's outpatient department involved the efforts of 
a number of key people . Staff of the central office of the New York State 
Department of Mental Hygiene originally alerted Dr. Hagamen to the op-
portunity and assisted the negotiations with personnel at U.S. H.E.W. 
Staff of the Suffolk County Department of Health, including Dr. Lewis 
Kurke and Oliver Shepers, collaborated on development of the plans and 
proposal. Aileen Townsend, a social worker picked by Dr. Hagamen as 
director of the new department, was largely responsible with others like 
Jeff Hammerman for putting the plans into practice, while Ken Kaufman, 
a staff psychologist at Sagamore, deserves primary credit for developing 
the parent-training components of the program. 
The central character, however, was Dr. Mary B. Hagamen, the direc-
tor of the Sagamore Children's Center. Dr. Hagamen, who generated the 
idea, took major responsibility for writing the proposal and hiring and 
overseeing the staff that would implement the venture. As Dr. Hagamen 
deprecatingly saw her role: " . .. [the] guy from Albany said ... 'You 
want to write a letter to Santa Claus?' and I said 'yes' and I wrote it." 
Nonetheless, while the grant opportunity may have been fortuitous, and 
probably crucial in permitting the development of the outpatient depart-
ment, it represented a logical extension of Dr. Hagamen's own profes-
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sional thinking and development of programs already underway under her 
leadership at Sagamore (see "Organization" below). 
THE ORGANIZATION 
Sagamore Children' s Center was the first of five state psychiatric hos-
pitals for children in New York State to open in the early 1970s. The hos-
pitals culminated a movement begun in the 1930s to separate child from 
adult institutional programs in mental health. In the 1930s, Rockland 
State Hospital was built as a special hospital for children, under WPA . In 
the 1940s, Rockland became overcrowded with children having emo-
tional problems . In the early 1950s, a state-sponsored committee with 
prominent clinicians such as Lauretta Bender developed a plan for chil-
dren's psychiatric facilities . Twelve new units were envisioned . In the in-
terim, however, temporary facilities for children were opened at King's 
Park and Central Islip hospitals on Long Island . In the 1960s, Governor 
Rockefeller became interested in the plans, expressing his own predilec-
tion for interesting architecture. Ultimately, five new hospitals, each of 
approximately 200 bed capacity and 300 to 400 staff, were authorized 
and built. Sagamore's mandate was to serve the Long Island region 
- Nassau and Suffolk counties. 
As Dr. Hagamen explains, the initial conditions and environment un-
der which each of the hospitals opened influenced the nature and flexibil-
ity of their operation . The children 's hospital in the Bronx, for example, 
opened empty, and was able to give more emphasis to outpatient services 
from the start. Sagamore, on the other hand, inherited the child patient 
load from King's Park and Central Islip and opened with a nearly full in-
patient registration. Still, the children's hospitals were all basically de-
signed as inpatient facilities . As Dr. Hagamen notes: " ... I would say 
that the goals of all these places were pretty much the same- to provide 
the best possible psychiatric service, with a priority for inpatient service . 
In other words, nobody else did the inpatient service to the degree that the 
state facilities did . And, therefore, you had to take care of all the inpa-
tients before you could do anything else." 
In most respects , Sagamore is a prototypicaa state operation . Expendi-
ture and policy decisions have to be cleared through the central office in 
Albany . Employees are civil servants, with appointments drawn from 
lists determined by performance on civil service tests . 
During Dr. Hagamen's tenure as director at Sagamore there were some 
anomalies in her accountability structure, leaving her a considerable de-
gree of autonomy . Dr. Hagamen recalls: " . . . The director historically 
had total accountability to the commissioner (of mental hygiene] . Then 
Albany began to interject a series of associate commissioners . Where 
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there had been six associate commissioners . ... in 1960, there were over 
50 in 1975 .... We started out reporting to the Deputy Commissioner for 
Mental Health . Then . .. about 1971, we were changed over . .. to the 
Deputy Commissioner for Mental Retardation . . . . Around 1976 . . . 
they created an office for children, and .. . we were supposed to report to 
[the director of that] but he didn't have any authority over us because he 
was a staff ... person . . .. Then they made these :regional offices, where 
they put a whole new group of people ... hoping to decentralize .... 
They did that to a degree, but they didn't take out many of the people in 
the central office. So then you had two systems·. And you know, when 
you have that, nobody has a line on you . . . . " 
The speed with which the proposal for the outpatient department was 
approved (see "Chronology"), including its clear intent to shift state sup-
ported staff from inpatient to outpatient coverage, attests to Dr. Haga-
men's relatively free hand at the time . 
ln addition to the formal bureaucratic hierarchy within the Department 
of Mental Hygiene, the Director of Sagamore also reports to a Board of 
Visitors. This is a group of gubernatorially appointed citizens that serves 
essentially as a sounding board for the director, al.though it is required to 
make periodic investigations of conditions, and file a report with the gov-
ernor. Dr. Hagamen found her board helpful and supportive: "Our Board 
of Visitors was a watch-dog board, an advisory board, a sounding board 
for the director ... . l think any director likes to have someone to tell 
what he is doing ... to talk ... to bounce off ideas . . . . We had a 
magnificent Board of Visitors .... " 
"It is a thankless job to be on the Board of Visitors. You have to go to 
meetings every month. You have to do investigations . 
" . . . Four of the seven people were parents [of current or former pa-
tients] . And the ones that were not were very good people . .. [including] 
.. . the wife of one of the state representatives .. . (and) a man who was 
active in one of the . .. church establishments . .. . 
"I'll tell you, l thought that they were behind me 100 percent. And you 
know, there was considerable hardship for themselves, too .. .. They 
spent hours and hours . . . . They were by far, in my estimation, the best 
informed and the most active Board of Visitors in the state. And they 
were called all sorts of names by people who were jealous of their posi-
tion . . . . " 
Internally to Sagamore, Dr. Hagamen says that authority was dele-
gated to deputies, under her watchful eye and within established regula-
tions: " . . . Most authority was delegated to division heads but l knew 
most everything that was going on , and I didn't like it if I didn't. . . . I 
didn't !restrict] what people did, but l had to know it ... and in a .. . 
facility where you are dealing with a lot of people that work over a 
24-hour period with the same clients, you have to have dependence on 
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rules of procedure. Otherwise, it would be chaos .... You have to have 
some guidelines. You can't be loose and informal. ... You must draw up 
things so people know what to expect. . . . " 
Given her accountability structure, service mandates, and available re-
sources, Dr. Hagamen made the most of the discretion at her disposal to 
deemphasize institutional (inpatient) care in favor of preventative and 
commuity-based alternatives, well before the opportunity of the grant 
from U.S. H.E.W. In a paper published in the Journal ofChild Psychia-
try, Dr. Hagamen explains the situation faced by Sagamore, early in her 
tenure as director: In 1971 we were concerned when it was realized that 
although the Center had been conceived and designed as a facility for 
children of average intelligence, our energies and resources were being 
increasingly utilized by the autistic mentally retarded. It was obvious that 
unless ways could be found to decrease the need for 24-hour care ... it 
was only a matter of time until the very retarded youngsters would be 
utilizing all of our resources to the exclusion of the brighter children . 
Thus we looked to means of secondary prevention and alternatives to long 
term hospitalization. 
" .. . Gradually, over a period of five years, a variety of programs was 
developed that focused on the management and treatment of the child in 
the context of family at home .... The family support services that 
evolved . . . can be divided into two major groups-home support sys-
tems and parent training programs. " 1 
Thus thinking about outpatient-related services and some program de-
velopments were already underway at Sagamore by 1974 when the 
H. E. W. grant opportunity arose. It was a direction in which Dr. Haga-
men 's professional thinking had already been engaged. 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
January, 1970-Sagamore Children's Center is opened. Dr. Mary 
Hagamen is appointed as its first director. 
1970-1974-Sagamore evolves a series of "home support" programs 
to reduce dependence on institutional care of low-functioning (retarded 
and autistic) youngsters. 
Early 1974-Dr. Hagamen becomes aware, through an office of the 
New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, of the possibility of ap-
plying for a Hospital Improvement Grant from U.S. H.E.W. 
March I, 1974-Sagamore submits the grant application for an outpa-
tient program. 
July I, 1974- U.S. H.E.W. approves the three-year grant. 
1Hagamen, M. (1977). Family support systems. Journal of Child Psychiatry, 53-66. 
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September l, 1974- Expenditures on the grant officially begin . Ai-
lene Townsend is appointed as Director of Outpatient Services (a new 
department) . 
October I, 1974- The Sagamore Outpatient Clinic is opened. Devel-
opment of an array of outpatient and parent training services is begun . 
1976- AIIegations of abuse and neglect in Sagamore 's inpatient pro-
gram appear in the press. Ultimately, Sagamore is engulfed in contro-
versy and involved in official child abuse proceedings. 
May, 1977-Dr. Ken Kaufman is appointed as Director of Outpatient 
Services, replacing Ailene Townsend who leaves Sagamore for another 
job. 
June, 1977- Dr. Mary Hagamen leaves Sagamore to become Director 
of Child Psychiatry Clinic of Nassau County Medical Center. Robert 
Evans is appointed as the new director . 
August 31, 1977-The Hospital Improvement Grant officially termi-
nates. 
January, 1978- The Sagamore outpatient unit is eliminated as a dis-
tinct organizational unit. Dr. Kaufman is made Director of Treatment 
Services, which encompasses both in and out patient care . Some outpa-
tient services continue . Some are spun-off to external agencies . 
CONTEXT 
The fact that the Sagamore Outpatient Department was funded by the 
last grant under H.E.W.'s Hospital Improvement Program was symbolic 
of the juncture in social programming generally evident in the country 
and in New York State in the early 1970s. As Dr. Hagamen observes: 
"This was the last hospital improvement grant. ... Hospital improvement 
plans were very big items in the '60s and this was the absolute bottom of 
the barrel. We drained the pot. ... The '60s ... were a splurging time 
for social and economic programs .. ; [a] release of energies into the War 
on Poverty . . . that carried with it programs of building hospitals like 
Sagamore Children's Center (and] ... Head start, Title I Education (etc . ]. 
. . . All kinds of social and economic programs focused on kids and par-
ticularly underprivileged kids . [Then came] the first [New York State] 
budget crises of 1972 .... So in 1974 we were beginning to feel 
poor .... " 
In certain ways, the Sagamore outpatient project represented the think-
ing of the 1960s. For example, the clinic idea was consistent with the ob-
jective of expanding government services to fill existing lacuna. As Dr. 
Hagamen notes: "[It was] the first psychiatric clinic for children in Suf-
folk County . ... It seemed most important to have some kind of an out-
patient unit because children would come to us and maybe not need inpa-
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tient care, yet that was the only thing we had to offer . .. . In Suffolk 
County in 1974 .. . there were no specific units for children. There were 
units for the developmentally disabled run by pediatricians at Suffolk 
State School. There were adult psychiatric county services, but there was 
no specific link with specialists trained in child psychiatry, geared to 
serving children exclusively . . . . " 
There was even an anti-poverty flavor to the clinic idea. As Dr. Haga-
men explains: "[Just as] education had its problems with segregated 
schools, health services had problems in that rich people went to private 
outpatient care and poor people went to inpatient care . And inpatient 
[care] was always kind of the end of the road . .. . So when you were des-
ignated as an inpatient facility, you just caught what was thrown to you . 
. . . We were conceived of as kind of the last place, and when I went to 
Sagamore it was my goal to make hospitalization treatment of choice 
rather than last resort . . . . " 
The outpatient project was also consistent with emerging trends of the 
1970s. New York State as well as other jurisdictions in. the country had 
already begun to embark on "deinstitutionalization" of mental hospitals in 
favor of community-based care, and while there was no specific intent to 
apply this policy to the recently opened children's hospitals, the outpa-
tient program was certainly consistent with that general policy. 
Furthermore , professional thinking about autism and retardation was 
progressing to the point where institutional programs were being severely 
questioned. The Willowbrook state institution for the retarded in New 
York City was soon to come under heavy fire and forced to reduce its 
population in favor of community-based care. And as Dr. Hagamen ex-
plains , autism was beginning to be understood: " . .. [There was] a lot of 
pressure . . . put on us to take all kinds of youngsters . . . particularly 
those very low-functioning youngsters whose families did not want to put 
them into the facilities for the retarded. . . . [You see] in the 1960s there 
was a great confusion that gradually resulted [over] the difference be-
tween an autistic youngster and a retarded youngster. At that time, partic-
ularly the people in retardation were saying that autism is a psychiatric 
disorder and therefore ... if you just do the right psychiatric treatment , 
up would pop a normal child . Well , that was a lot of magic thinking . . . . 
Gradually [we found] that 75 percent of autist;c children are retarded and 
. . . were appropriately placed with other children with developmental 
disabilities and ones who need life long care. But [still] there was great 
argument as to where they belonged . Many of the other children's hospi-
tals declined to admit them, but it seemed to me that there was a need for 
this service. We were there and if they were going to come in, the only 
thing for us to do was to develop services for them. Not to say 'we don ' t 
have a program.'" 
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CHOICES 
Development of the Sagamore outpatient program exhibited a combi-
nation of fortuitous, evolutionary, and purposeful modes of decision 
making . The grant opportunity itself, rather than being deliberately 
sought out, was a bolt from the blue . A concerted effort to develop and 
fund a coherent outpatient program might never have emerged without 
this unexpected opportunity . 
Yet in a real sense, Dr. Hagamen and her staff were "ready" for this 
choice . There was not much debate over what kind of proposal to pre-
pare. The notion of an outpatient service was a logical extension to the 
home-support programs already developed at Sagamore for low-function-
ing children , and a reasonable response to local service demands . As Dr. 
Hagamen explains: "If you saw Sagamore as a bright and shiny 
.. . new place with lots of dedication, lots of young staff, you would get 
very excited ... if you ... had a [low-functioning] youngster and were 
having troubles with him . ... It would be much easier to apply for a 
place here than it would be to apply to a place like Central Islip where 
[special children] had been . So , we rapidly became a place with these 
low-functioning youngsters . .. (who) are poorly understood and . . . are 
excluded from many services . Gradually . .. we ... developed ... pro-
grams that began to ... work with these youngsters long before the fam-
ily became burned out. ... We could (then] make sure that they got into 
appropriate day programs . ... [Sometimes] we felt it was better for the 
child and better for the family if we only took the child for the weekend, 
rather than have them living in an institution full-time, or at home full -
time and exhausting their family [or] distorting their family interaction . 
So . . . we developed a variety of ways to help families . .. [i .e. ,] family-
support services .... And a natural extension of that ... [because] we 
came to look at all children earlier, was to do outpatient work .. . . And 
we found that many of the things that we developed for our low-
functioning youngsters, were also helpful to parents who had hyperactive 
kids .... " 
As envisioned in the proposal, the outpatient department would pro-
vide a potpourri of services , roughly divisible into three categories of psy-
chological and psychiatric treatment and evaluation; behavior manage-
ment and social casework including family therapy and parent training; 
and physical treatment and evaluation including pediatric and neurolog-
ical diagnosis, and speech and learning therapy . To a large extent the pro-
posed array of services represented special interests of core Sagamore 
staff. For example, parent training for the care of handicapped children 
was a particular specialty of Dr. Ken Kaufman, while the concept of 
diagnostic and evaluation services was modeled somewhat on Columbia 
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Presbyterian where Dr. Hagamen had been a resident. Nonetheless, the 
services of the outpatient department were not rigidly defined at the out-
set; rather they were adapted to operational needs as the clinic began to 
function . Dr. Hagamen describes some of the evolution (and broadening 
of function) that took place: ". . . We began to develop classes for all 
kinds of parents. Having started out working with the parents of the re-
tarded, we then began to work with the parents of the hyperactive young-
ster . . .. The parents began to come to us to understand their children bet-
ter and to know .. . how to raise kids .... So we had some very 
wonderful people with some very normal, healthy children come to us 
like they might go to adult education. And we felt that that would be a 
very good thing ... (because] it was ... helpful to people who had dis-
turbed children to see parents of healthy children there .... I have always 
felt that as far as 'mainstreaming' is concerned it is just as important to 
bring normal kids and normal people into the activities of the more dis-
turbed [as] it is to get the more disturbed into (normal settings] .... " 
A similar evolution took place in the diagnostic component of the out-
patient program. Dr. Hagamen continues:" ... There are many twists of 
the rope that you don't foresee .... (For example] we found that it took 
more time to do evaluations. . . . Initially we planned to be able to do 
treatment without doing evaluations and we found very quickly that we 
could not do treatment on other people's assessments .... We had to do 
our own assessments . ... Putting people into treatment using outside re-
ferral information . . . we found was .. . not a good idea because we had 
such a great demand for treatment from the people that we had already di-
agnosed .... So ... our treatment programs were largely done with the 
people that we diagnosed ourselves .... For instance, (if] a school pro-
gram worked up a kid and said 'go there for treatment,' we still had to do 
an evaluation and assessment." 
As befit the concept of the clinic, admission policy gradually broad-
ened not only to include a wide variety of mental disabilities, but also to 
permit earlier intervention in children's and families ' problems rather 
than have Sagamore serve solely as a last resort. In contrast, however, the 
geographic catchment area for the clinic was to be substantially narrower 
than that of Sagamore as a whole. Still a gradual broadening was antici-
pated here too. As Dr. Hagamen explains: "It was a new activity for us, 
so it seemed to me that we needed to develop expertise .... It was easier 
to start with a tiny core and then work with that, and develop our exper-
tise as we went along .... Hopefully we would be able to transfer it out 
of the catchment area . . . once . . . we understood what needed to be 
done and how to do it .... We focused on a particular area surrounding 
the Sagamore Children's Center .. . in Babylon Township .... It 
seemed appropriate that we should be focusing on that as our target popu-
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lation but that we would not exclude anyone that came from another 
area .. .. " 
If program and client policy decisions were developed gradually and 
adaptively over the period of the grant, certain strategic organizational 
decisions were clearly specified at the outset. A twin rationale underlied 
these organizational decisions: (I) Dr. Hagamen 's desire to maximize the 
mileage she could get out of whatever (limited) grant funds were avail-
able from H.E.W. , and (2) her intention to turn Sagamore "inside out," 
i.e., to shift its emphasis from inpatient to outpatient service. 
A key decision was to staff the clinic largely with "per diem" people 
rather than full-time career employees. This would minimize fringe bene-
fit costs associated with permanent employees and it would avoid long 
term commitments to people before their performance in the program 
could be properly assessed. Dr. Hagamen elaborates: "It was a very small 
grant-a hundred thousand dollars a year for three years ... . What I did 
was to take the basic Sagamore staff and use them as senior people . . . 
but I hired per diem psychiatrists, per diem psychologists [etc.] ... . The 
idea was to use the core personnel from the Center, and then let them pick 
whom they [wishedj .. .. The people would come in from the outside . . . 
an afternoon a week and work in the outpatient clinic . And that meant 
that I really didn't have to pay that 331/3% fringe . ... [Another] reason 
for hiring people on a per diem basis .. . was . . . that we could decide 
whether we ever wanted them in a civil service position . .. . You really 
can't tell from a curriculum vitae or an interview what a person is going to 
be like . . . . Even with extensive recommendations you need to know 
how that person fits into your system, and this was an ideal way to find 
out whether anyone fit into our system." 
As Dr. Hagamen observed, $100,000 a year wasn't very much money, 
but what she managed to do was to leverage this money with state funds, 
at an increasing rate over time so that more and more resources were de-
voted to the clinic operation. It was all part of her "inside-out" strategy to 
deemphasize inpatient care: " ... This is another reason that it might have 
been attractive to H. E. W . ... [In the j first year I put in l 00 thousand dol-
lars of state funds with a 100 thousand dollars offederal funds. The [sec-
ond] year, I added enough staff from the State, so it was $200,000 of state 
funds and $100,000 of federal funds .... The next year we made it 
$300,000 of state funds .. .. You see, so as you close down the hospital 
[inpatient wards ... you build up the clinic] .. . . I thought it was a very 
neat thing." 
All this was consistent, of course, with Dr. Hagamen's general ideas 
on how to improve patient care: "We wanted ... not .. . just to ... 
lower inpatient care . . . we wanted to provide the services needed . . . 
and we felt that we could do that by offering alternatives to inpatient care 
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. . . with a better assessment of the youngsters who would be referred to 
us, particularly from Suffolk County [where outpatient services for chil-
dren were meager] . . . . " 
Over the period of Dr. Hagamen 's tenure, the inpatient census of Saga-
more was reduced from approximately 190 to 70, while the number of 
outpatients rose from approximately 50 in 1971 to 250 in 1977. The bulk 
of these changes were effected during the 1974-1977 grant period. One 
aspect of the "inside-out" decision was that Sagamore became bifurcated 
into two separate departments, a shrinking inpatient department and a 
growing outpatient department, with staff assigned to one or the other, 
and with the momentum of excitement (and possibly morale) favoring the 
latter. It was a situation that seems to have had serious long term implica-
tions . (see "Risks and Constraints" below.) 
RISKS AND CONSTRAINTS 
Turning a hospital "inside-out" would appear to be a rather radical 
venture, entailing concomitant, risks and resistance. But Dr. Hagamen 
seems to have had a fairly free hand until late into the grant period, when 
some of the risk factors began to materialize . 
One of the risks was that Sagamore would be penalized financially by 
the State for having reduced its bed capacity, the traditional "hard" indi-
cator of hospital workload . Initially Dr. Hagamen was assured that this 
would not be the case, but with the onset of the State's fiscal crisis the as-
surance became less meaningful. Dr. Hagamen recalls: " . .. There were 
problems because we were given cutbacks continuously from Albany be-
cause the census was going down and they began to allot staff based on 
increase in census, which was just the opposite of what they had told 
[us]." 
A more serious source of risk was not specifically associated with the 
outpatient project so much as with the general tenuousness of the direc-
tor's position. Running an institution for troubled children provides am-
ple oportunities for incidents to occur that can be exploited by opponents 
of the director's policies or by the media, seriously hampering the direc-
tor's effectiveness. Of more specific relevance to the outpatient venture, 
it was possible, although apparently unanticipated at the time, that phas-
ing down the inpatient program would decrease the effectiveness of su-
pervision in that area, hence increasing the chance of an incident. In any 
case, such an incident did occur in 1976, causing Dr. Hagamen to renect 
on the risks: " .. . We went through some pretty hairy times based on 
some distortion of .. . minor incidents that were blown way out of pro-
portion .... And because of the rapidity by which our communication 
system works now, there is always something on television, or a [news-
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paperj headline going into every home . So the life span of an administra-
tor is cut down enormously compared to years ago . ... You can't tolerate 
too many of these [incidents j. . . . " 
In terms of actually implementing the outpatient program, Dr. Haga-
men faced a number of conventional constraints associated with state 
government operations. For example, as noted earlier, funding for the 
program would not have been possible without the external grunt: "[If the 
grant] hadn't come through . . . I don't think I could have done it. ... I 
probably would have fought [for it) ... but I think the time was not right 
for me to get any money [from the State]to do anything. It was also likely 
that 'bottom line' resistance would develop to a complete phase out of the 
inpatient program ." 
Dr. Hugamen feels this is endemic to any effort to eliminate a govern-
ment program: " . .. I'm sure that on the part of some people . .. there 
was a worry that as we decreased the inpatient beds that we would be 
working ourselves out of existence . . .. And that is kind of hard for peo-
ple [in) civil service to accept. . .. When the thing worked and we got the 
inpatient population . .. down to about 75 ... people began to think 
'Gosh, we need more patients.' . . . It's something to think about. .. . In 
the large state governments where in the past 15 years [there] have been a 
tremendous number of innovations, what you find is .. . !when] a pro-
gram . .. comes that replaces [another) . . . nobody will have the guts to 
cut [ the latter program] out." 
Despite a generally effective, cooperative relationship that Dr. Haga-
men enjoyed with officials of the State Department of Mental Hygiene in 
developing and processing the grant proposal, she still complained about 
the cumbersomeness of working administrative matters through the cen-
tral office in the state capital. For example, the grant called for a subcon-
tract for computer services: "[One problem was) . . . being able to de-
velop contracts ... . you know as a state agency, having to follow their 
contract protocol and getting approvals in Albany. !Things ] would come 
through two or three weeks later. . . . " 
Of all constraining factors, the civil service appointment system gave 
Dr. Hagamen the most grief in implementing the grant, although she got 
what she wanted after long hours of interviewing and processing candi-
dates on civil service lists: ". . . You are very hampered in government 
operations by having to deal with civil service lists . . . . Some of the 
problems [with] civil service . .. were overcome by our stamina and 
knowledge .... I think we went down several dozen people on the list to 
get [the outpatient director] . . .. Civil service is a cumbersome method of 
hiring, and we followed the rules to the nth degree. But it is an exhausting 
procedure . Many people on the list have no idea of what the job is about 
and are really not interested, but to protect their standing on the list they 
respond to the canvass letter. This means hours of interviews .... I had 
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interviews on my free days ... ·. I worked on Sunday and ... I had people 
come from out of state for 8 o'clock appointments on Sunday morning, 
because I had to start early to finish the interviewing .... (This] is why 
people dori't do it. It just takes so much out of you ." 
OUTCOMES 
During the period of the grant (1974) - 1977) Sagamore Children's 
Center was rather dramatically turned "inside-out," exhibiting a major re-
duction of its inpatient beds and a build up to about 250 outpatients and 
180 parent-training participants . Yet following 1977 the enterprise began 
to unravel. In January of 1978 the outpatient department was eliminated 
as a separate organizational unit, by Sagamore's new director, and staff 
members were no longer exclusively assigned to outpatient care. By 1979 
the outpatient case load had dropped to 140 and the parent training en-
rollment to about 50. In contrast, the inpatient census rose from about 60 
in 1977 to 130 in 1979. 
There was also a change in the nature of outpatient care. Rather than 
serve children with a broad spectrum and varying levels of disability in a 
preventive orientation, Sagamore now confined its outpatient service to 
cases which would otherwise require immediate inpatient care. Similarly, 
parent training services were tied more closely to the needs of the inpa .. 
tient population. 
To a degree these changes were hedged by the spin-off of services 
from the outpatient department to other agencies in Suffolk County. For 
example, developmental pediatric services was still funded by Sagamore 
but administered by the Psychiatry Department at the State University at 
Stony Brook . And training for parents of autistic children was turned over 
to the Suffolk Child Development Center, with Sagamore staff (Ken 
Kaufman) in consultation . 
It is difficult to pinpoint what caused the demise of the Sagamore out-
patient program, but two factors are obviously involved---·the departure 
of Mary Hagamen from Sagamore, and the expiration of the H.E. W. 
grant, both in the summer of 1977. 
Although Dr. Hagamen took a relatively back-seat role in actually run-
ning the clinic, it was her sponsorship and support that enabled it to grow . 
It was "her baby ." Anything that hampered her effectiveness would be 
likely to reduce the viability of the embryonic new department . The 
events of 1976-allegations of child abuse, child protective hearings, 
and adverse media coverage in connection with incidents in Sagamore's 
inpatient section- apparently took their toll. Although she rode out the 
storm, Dr. Hagamen had lost considerable strength. It became inevitable 
that she would leave, and that her pioneering programs would be jeopar-
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dized: "It was futile ... to do anything. I waited until the whole thing 
was over ... but I didn't want to [leave] ... in the middle of that mish-
mash .... " 
"[In any case] I had to finish the job I started . I did everything that I 
felt I could do within the state system .... By the time I had the outpa-
tient department done, by the time I had turned this hospital inside-out, I 
had done everything . . . that could be done in a state hospital . . .. I was 
ready to go on .... " 
Even if Dr. Hagamen had not left, or if the adverse publicity had not 
marred her tenure, it is very possible that the outpatient program might 
have been phased down anyway . Without its external touchstone of sup-
port from the expiring grant, a renewed state endorsement and additional 
funds for the program would have to be sought. And it was becoming 
clear that the times were not right for this. Indeed, as Dr. Hagamen ob-
serves, it seemed more logical to disperse Sagamore's outpatient work 
throughout the county:" ... We had arrived at the next chapter in the de-
livery of health services in the Department of Mental Hygiene .... Many 
things were changing rapidly .... Funds were changing from the state to 
the county [level] . ... Population was moving eastward [on Long Is-
land], away from the Center . ... The [State] University [Health Sci-
ences Center at Stony Brook] was beginning to develop. A lot of things 
were happening .... There was [also] an increased need for inpatient 
care for adolescents . Therefore, as the outpatient department evolved, so 
did the recognition that here was a building that was empty in terms of 
what it was designed for .... For Nassau and Suffolk Counties ... 
therefore, would it not be appropriate to put those youngsters in that 
empty space that was now occupied by more preventive [services] and 
... to have the prevention programs move out to the community? 
"[So] ... it depends on where you take your photograph .... [Up to) 
1976 there was a very optimistic outlook. Things were moving [toward 
outpatient emphasis] . If you take a photograph at the end of 1978, look-
ing at the outpatient department, you see that the regional office had said 
'Look, we built this as a hospital. The outpatient department should be in 
the community. Therefore, we want you to ... do what needs to be done 
first. . . . Do what this hospital was built to do ... "' 
ANALYSIS 
The Sagamore outpatient program was an opportunistic response to an 
RFP (request for proposal) by an energetic, idealist psychiatric profes-
sional committed to principles of good clinical practice, and to leadership 
in the world of professional ideas. 
The venture took place in the public sector simply by circumstance. 
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The grant opportunity was noticed by someone in the State Department of 
Mental Hygiene and found fertile soil in Dr. Hagamen's administration of 
Sagamore . It is perhaps more germane to ask why Dr. Hagamen became a 
public sector administrator to begin with. Certainly she chafed constantly 
against the bureaucratic environment of the state system. But it was basi-
cally a physician's career ladder- specifically that ·of a child psychiatric 
professional-that Dr. Hagamen had followed. As such she had worked 
in both the nonprofit and public sectors. But it was the State, in recogni-
tion of her service as supervising psychiatrist at Central Islip State Hospi-
tal, that gave Dr. Hagamen the first major opportunity to shape her own 
program, as director of a new children's hospital. It was in this context 
that the outpatient program took root . 
The clinic represented a natural extension of Dr. Hagamen's beliefs in 
early intervention and prevention-focused care , and parent-oriented train-
ing and support systems. It also provided a context for her involvement at 
the crossroads of psychiatric, pediatric, and obstetric disciplines. More 
than this, the outpatient department was an experiment-a model of the 
"inside-out" concept which Dr. Hagamen sought to demonstrate to her 
professional colleagues in other psychiatric hospitals. 
The Sagamore outpatient program demonstrated both the skills and 
limits of Dr. Hagamen as a manager and administrator. Primarily a physi-
cian, and unused to the grantsmanship· game or other aspects of entrepre-
neurship, she might never have organized such a project if others had not 
made her aware of the opportunity. As an idealist, she is impatient with 
the administrative mentality, viewing bureaucracy as an obstacle to be 
overcome rather than to be indulged. Nonetheless, as an energetic, tena-
cious, competitive, and achievement-oriented person, she acquired con-
siderable strategic skill in overcoming civil service constraints to staff the 
clinic by her own standards. And as a respected physician with adequate 
support at the top, and good standing among professional colleagues, she 
was able to indulge a relatively free hand to reorganize Sagamore Chil·· 
dren's Center as she wished . 
In 1974- 1975, Dr. Hagamen was riding high. Hard work and good 
fortune had produced federal money to organize a pet .prograrn . She en-
joyed not only a good personal reputation, but savored the image of Saga-
more as a bright new children's psychiatric facility, with enthusiastic 
young staff. And her outpatient program, whi e somewhat inconsistent 
with Sagamore's original design parameters, was consistent with the 
State's new emphasis on deinstitutionalization of mental health. She suc-
ceeded in turning Sagamore inside-out although she may have erred stra-
tegically in departmentalizing inpatient and outpatient programs in a 
manner that might have demoralized the former . 
In 1976 things began to change. Dad publicity emanating from inci-
dents in the inpatient department undercut Dr. Hagamen 's base of sup-
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port. In 1977 the H.E. W. grant ran out, removing a strong reason for con-
tinued state commitment to the outpatient program. More conventional 
bureaucratic and political forces began to reclaim lost ground. Sagamore 
workload and budgeting requirements were still seen from above in terms 
of inpatient beds and Sagamore's institutional space began to be coveted 
to satisfy new demands for adolescent inpatient care. State budget crises 
reinforced these pressures to consolidate around old lines of defense and 
to allow local communities to pick up outpatient programs. Dr. Hagamen 
was no longer in the driver's seat. In better times , she might not only 
have completed the "inside-out" strategy, but found a way to maintain it 
on a more permanent basis . 
